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CRITICAL AND RADICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF THE SOCIAL, THE SPATIAL AND THE POLITICAL

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CONTENTS

Preface	MIZUUCHI, Toshio	2
Bridging the Critical Perspectives for Alternative Practices in 21st Century Geographies	HSIA, Chu-Joe	3
The People's Geography Project; Popularizing Radical Geography	MITCHELL, Don	10
The Demise of a Critical Institution of Economic Geography in Japan	MIZUOKA, Fujio	22
The Geopolitical Context of "Redefined" Security: Japan and the U.S. Military Presence in the Post-Cold War Era	YAMAZAKI, Takashi	35
An Essay on Geopolitical Writings in the Magazine <i>Kaizō</i> during the Asia-Pacific War in Japan	TAKAGI, Akihiko	51
Self and Others in the Social Construction of Nature: Critical Inquiry into the Afforestation Campaign in Modern Japan	NAKASHIMA, Koji	59
Representations and Practices around "Kyodo" (home place, homeland, Heimat)	OSHIRO, Naoki	74
The Development of the <i>Posyandu</i> : Historical and Institutional Aspects	SAITO, Ayami	80
Context and Contingency: Los Angeles, New York City, and Other Global Nodes	ETHINGTON, Philip	98
Postwar Transformation of Space and Urban Politics in the Inner-ring of Osaka	MIZUUCHI, Toshio	107
Migrant Workers' Housing in Illegal Construction in Guangzhou: A Prelude to Social Justice and the Chinese City	TANG, Wing-Shing	132
How to Understand Housing of the Urban Poor in Hong Kong from the Perspective of Colonial Governmentality?	TANG, Wing-Shing	136
Festival, Identity and Urban Community in Modern Japan: 'Yamakasa' Festival in Hakata, Fukuoka City, 1880-1940.	ONJO, Akio	139
Local Tradition and the Construction of Community and Identity in Postwar Japan: The Case of the Kishiwada <i>Danjiri Matsuri</i>	ELLEFSON, Dylan	153

■ Preface

The English-language report collections in the list below, underwritten by scientific research funds, have subtitles that include the words 'Japanese contribution and geographical thought.' Thus the publication of these reports has a long history, and their existence has become known overseas mainly among people in the field of geographical thought. However, among critical geographers in Europe and America they are, regrettably, not well known and have not been read widely. The Japanese-language journal *Kūkan shaki chiri shisō* (*Space, Society, and Geographical Thought*), of which I am also the editor, has been widely read and well-received, mainly among critical geographers, as a journal that ambitiously sets out critical problems. Compared to it, the English-language reports have not yet been widely read or welcomed by foreign researchers.

Title	Editor/University	Year
<i>Geographical Languages in Different Times and Places</i>	I. Suizu/Kyoto U.	1980
<i>Languages, Paradigms and Schools in Geography</i>	K. Takeuchi/Hitotsubashi U.	1984
<i>Cosmology, Epistemology and the History of Geographical Thought</i>	H. Nozawa/Kyushu U.	1986
<i>Indigenous and Foreign Influences in the Development of Japanese Geographical Thought</i>	H. Nozawa/Kyushu U.	1989
<i>Social Theory and Geographical Thought</i>	H. Nozawa/Kyushu U.	1996
<i>Nation, Region and the Politics of Geography in East Asia</i>	T. Mizuuchi/Osaka City U.	1999
<i>Representing Local Places and Raising Voices from Below</i>	T. Mizuuchi/Osaka City U.	2003

Having served until now as editor of this series, I have been appointed to Osaka City University's Urban Research Plaza (http://www.ur-plaza.osaka-cu.ac.jp/index_e.html) and will move there starting in April, 2006, and will be in a position to plan and disseminate a broader range of urban research. This also makes it possible, with the Plaza's funding assistance, to publish critical studies by geographers. This collection marks the publication of the first volume in a series of URP Research Papers.

The present collection of report contributions was first compiled based on papers presented at the 2000 Taegu, South Korea meeting of the International Critical Geography Group (ICGG). I want to express my warm appreciation to Fujio Mizuoka of Hitotsubashi University for the compilation of these papers. Other contributions arose from papers presented at various meetings of the ICGG's East Asian Regional Conference in Alternative Geography (EARCAG). Additionally, we received papers from members of the Los Angeles - Osaka Project (http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/history/historylab/LA_Osaka/) which the present editor has organized. I hope that in using these papers assembled from some of the world's critical geographers as a detonator, this book will be a major step forward in gaining international recognition of critical geography emanating from Asia.

The publication of this book was made possible by the financial support of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science and the Urban Research Plaza of Osaka City University. The book is also available for online viewing as an e-book at the following URL: <http://www.ur-plaza.osaka-cu.ac.jp/publication/e-book1>.

Finally, I am most grateful to Ms. Yuko Itatsu in the University of Southern California, and to my old friend Mr. Sidney Atkins for their correction of each English paper.

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Bridging the Critical Perspectives for Alternative Practices in 21st Century Geographies¹

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Keywords: geography, planning and design education, theory and practice, Taiwan

One of the proposed topics of the 2nd ICGC is: “Why is geography so conservative?” In order to stimulate a theoretical dialogue, I propose that we rethink this issue historically through Asian experiences. This paper focuses on bridging the gap between theory and practice within the critical paradigms of social theories of space. First of all, I want to show that, historically, conservative paradigms have been dominant in Taiwan’s academies and research institutions, and they prevail in most disciplines, not just in geography. The developmental state has been constituted as a historical vehicle for the hegemonic elites’ project of rebuilding the nation state. Such academic poverty is part of the social costs of political repression in the processes of growth and modernization. Up to the 1980s, along with social changes, critical paradigms of social theories were introduced onto campuses as new modes of thinking reflecting western ideas after the social movements of the 1960s. Both the political economy of space and cultural studies of spatial representation have greatly influenced the younger generations in recent decades. Furthermore, critical perspectives cannot simply be transplants of the western thoughts as they were before; they have to be interactive processes with local social changes. Articulation of questions regarding the local and how to engage in theoretical and global dialogue are crucial. Critical perspectives have to face the unchanged structural problems of the nation state as well as the developmental state of the Taiwan model. This paper proposes an articulation of all of the critical issues of class, gender, ethnicity, and environment with spatial theory and practice. Beyond the trap of formal institutional divisions among geography, sociology, political science, urban studies, planning and architecture, the real challenge in fact lies in interactive autonomy. That is, we have to be aware of the autonomy of theory, as well as the importance of the articulation between theory and practice, between spatial theory and planning-design practice, between state, social movements, and radical intellectuals, and between global and local.

“The problem of the proper conceptualization of space is resolved through human practice with respect to it. In other words, there are no philosophical answers to philosophical questions that arise over the nature of space – the answers lie in human practice.” (David Harvey, 1973:13)

Inspired by one of the proposed topics of 2nd ICGC, “Why is geography so conservative?” I think this is not only a proposition for geography as classical ‘earth-writing,’ but also a real question for geography in Asia. Certainly there are some specificities in the field of geography. The same question also applies to sociology, as well as architecture and city planning, in Taiwan. It is worth some attention to tease out the

conservative paradigm theoretically and historically.

This history extends back to the beginning of the 20th century in Europe. The modernity project was launched amidst bourgeois confidence and conflicts on the eve of the First World War. East Asia was the most recently discovered land for imperialist penetration. For most of the newborn Asian countries, the 20th century was a process of economic development for survival, as well as a part of the larger modernizing project. When history turns a new page to the 21st century, the question of “who am I?” should be replaced by the questions of “what did we do?” in the process of modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and westernization, and the question of “what are we doing?” with regards to globalization. Thus, bringing into the reflection of the discursive struggles between conservative and critical paradigms, and the case of Taiwan and the historical experience of the Asian Pacific, this paper aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice for the critical paradigm of social theories of space.

First of all, in terms of regional differentiation, there is no such a thing as an economically integrated Asian region within globalization. However, with regards to the experience of modernity, the Asian Pacific does share the common experience of a state-led economic development process.² For the purpose of dialogue, the Asian experience has to go beyond taking for granted a neutral geographical boundary but must include a theoretical examination. After a close look at the empirical data of the late 1990s, after a rapid growth through export based economic development, the hypothesis of the Asian Pacific as an integrated region in the global economy has been questioned. The historical periodization and calculation of Asian trade adopted by J.A. Frankel, Stephen Cohen and Paolo Guerrieri, and Manuel Castells points out that there is no such thing as an integrated Asian Pacific region. That is to say, the fundamental dependency of the region with non-Asian OECD countries hasn't been changed through the performance of export trade resulting from the asymmetry of trade between Japan and the rest of Asian countries (Castells, 2000a: 111-112). Even considering the cultural diversity and the recent divergent trends of Asian countries in the economic crisis, they still shared some common experiences. That is, the state-led economic development processes as a means of nation-state building. The individual states have historically succeeded in promoting economic development. However, after the economy developed, the role of the ‘developmental state’ became challenged by integration into globalization. This was marked by the economic crisis experienced after 1997 (Castells, 2000b). Furthermore, representing the affirmation of standards of living in emerging civil societies, social movements are challenging the legitimacy of development values imposed by the state (Cheng and Hsia, 2000).

In Taiwan, it is important to emphasize the historical context of the overarching conservative paradigm of almost all academies and institutions, which were dominated by the KMT government, a defeated right wing political regime from China. For instance, the ‘geography’ textbook in Taiwan has been criticized as a textbook of ‘history’ for a long time due to its anti-Communist ideology and its restricted information. Acclaimed as a condition of national security and social stability, this is exactly the same process of the ‘Taiwan miracle’ and the highly touted ‘Four Asian Tigers’ in the Cold War. The developmental state has been a historical vehicle for the rebuilding of the nation-state, and the social processes of growth and modernization legitimized the high degree of social costs and political repression. Critical perspectives only survived on the margin of political resistance.

As a new mode of thinking about the western reflections after the social movements of the 60s and 70s, critical paradigms of social theories have been introduced into Taiwan since the 1980s. This is not only a transplantation of advanced western thoughts as before, but as an interactive process of social learning and social mobilization amidst the social changes and political democratization of the 1980s. For instance, class movements remained and formulated an alliance with socially peripheral groups such as public prostitutes in the late 90s. The housing movement in 1989 triggered active urban movements. Integrating with historic

preservation movements, the extension of the community movements in the 1990s has empowered grassroots networking. In pursuit of sustainable development, environmental movements have formulated trans-border pressures against the pro-development policies of the state. Feminist movements set up a base for the gay and lesbian movements that have followed in recent years. Most of the social movements have been nourished by critical discourse which has arisen in the emerging civil society.

While Taiwan began to taste democracy in the 1990s, economic growth, political democratization, and social modernization were not equal to reduced instances of economic exploitation, political repression, and cultural domination. The emerging critical perspectives had to face the unchanged structural problems of the Taiwanese model of the nation-state and developmental state, even though the nation-state has been restructuring since the 1980s. For the purpose of inciting social changes instead of simply reproducing existing social relations, critical perspectives have to be articulated encompassing all the critical issues of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, environment, and urban and regional issues in the real life of the emerging civil society of Taiwan. Critical perspectives have to reformulate the theoretical questions as well as the practical strategies at the dawn of a new historical transformation in the information age.

Examining the conjunction of social and political transformation in the globalization of Taiwan, a major and serious contradiction exists between economic structure and dynamics in the global economy, and the political structure and dynamics of the nation state. On the one hand, Taiwan's economy has been integrated into the global informational economy. Taiwanese corporations increase their competitiveness through trans-border investment, especially in China. More and more, Taiwan is one of the nodes in global flows, and this seems a trend from which there can be no return. In fact, any policy to inhibit this trend will hurt Taiwan's economy. In terms of further economic development within globalization, the integration between Taiwan and China is inevitable. In a process of 'making capitalism in China' the structural role of Taiwan is a node in the network of introducing the production and management systems of global informational capitalism into China and turning the page of a new century (Hsing, 1998; Hsia, 2000a). That is to say, Taiwan is the virtual bridge in the global network. We can almost foresee that trans-border Taiwanese corporations will increasingly penetrate the Chinese market. The so-called 'China Circle' along the edge of East Asia between Tokyo and Singapore will push the economic development of China further (Naughton, 1997). Whatever the categories we use, or can be identified by themselves, the power of the capitalist class from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China itself will be integrated as historical forces to further capitalist development in China within the global economy.

On the other hand, Taiwan's politics run counter to the trans-border corporations. Having gone through the restructuring of the nation-state in the 1990s, Taiwan is a new state. After the presidential election of March 2000, the central government is a new government. The former president, Teng-hui Lee, claimed in his new book published in Japanese that now the state is 'the New Republic,' or 'the Second Republic,' and 'Taiwan ROC' has replaced 'ROC (Republic of China) on Taiwan.' Certainly, and ironically, all of them are 'the new state without a nation' under the cover of the political symbol of the 'ROC.'

Regarding Taiwan's society, after thirty years of economic development, an ambiguously categorized middle class has risen, and a civil society is emerging. There are two intertwined but opposite lines which must be mentioned. They consist of social segments of fragmented identities which have expressed the historical shift of identity through social movements.

The first is the different values and identities expressed by various social segments since the late 1980s. For historical reasons, most of the repressed Taiwanese cultural identity is the counterpoint to the nationalist projects of the conventional KMT, and it is against the political repression of the KMT regime. In a broad sense of class interest, most of the middle class accepts an American way of life that affirms freedom, democracy, and professional values. However, their national identities are fragmented and mobilized by

each agitated election. The society becomes a divided society in this sense. Should cultural identity become integrated with political forces in the pursuit of national identity, the relations with China could become extremely tense and endanger the peace of the Asian Pacific. These identity politics in globalization are historically rooted in the colonial experience of the 'orphanage syndrome' and in the bitter experience of massacres by the corrupt KMT regime in the early post-colonial period (Hsia, 2000b).

The second is the identity politics of globalization shifting from abstract national identities to the daily personal identities of cities, communities, families, and individuals. The social actors in the emerging civil society express themselves and expand into multiple dimensions of urban movements, environments, community movements, aboriginal movements, women's movements, and gay and lesbian movements. Community organizations and NGOs/NPOs of class, gender, sexuality, and minority will increase the convergence of their public voices, and will transform the nature of the state, delegitimize the emphasis on development, and reshape the character of local government by opening the decision making process to citizen participation. This is an alternative path towards grassroots democracy (Hsia, 1998).

Where then is the space for leftist intervention? Besides the vacuum for leftists in the extremely tense relationship with China mentioned above, facing the specific conflicts of globalization in Taiwan, the practice of leftist intervention could be articulated with a critical analysis of issues relating to the quality of life. This is the theme of the reproduction of the capitalist system, and there is great potential here for urban social movements.

This paper therefore proposes to articulate critical issues of class, gender, ethnicity, and environment with spatial theories and practices. In going beyond the trap of the formal institutional divisions of geography, sociology, political science, urban studies, planning and architecture, the real challenge is building linkages between theory and practice, research and politics, spatial theories and planning-design practice, between state, social movements and radical intellectuals, between global and local. An interactive autonomy is posited as an idea to bridge the gap between theory and practice. These are also the lessons that come from my experience researching the articulation between critical/radical intellectuals and the social movements in Taiwan. It is also a dialogue that can cross over and show the misunderstanding between the researchers and planners, such as between my former teachers and friends, Manuel Castells (2000:389-390) and John Friedmann (2000:460-472).

First, **an interactive autonomy between theory and practice** is proposed, due to the historical lessons in the turmoil of real radical politics. After the paradigm shift in the 1970's, political-economic analysis of the socio-political processes of urban questioning, combined with cultural studies on spatial representations, has become the center. On the one hand, considering the relative autonomy of theory and research, the researcher has a responsibility to do good research. Certainly a good theory has to be used in practice; however, a discipline has its own criteria beyond political positions. The quality of a theory has to be judged by research rather than by a political community.

On the other hand, considering the relative autonomy of practice and politics, activists have to independently determine what they want. This is their right. They do not simply follow the political guidance of theory. Politics, not theory, tells activists what is to be done. The activities need to be practical. They also need the capability of being flexible to adjust to time and space considerations. The most critical principle for landscape architects in the practice of making ancient Chinese gardens is "regarding each locality according to its own characteristics" (*yindizhiyi*).

As for the articulation between theory and practice, both need autonomy. The dialectic interaction between theory and practice is historically complicated. Since autonomy is relative, the relationship is not just a metaphysical exercise of philosophical questions and philosophical answers. At least, the problematic results from practice. Instead of the pure internal logic of conceptual systems, in critical discourse the

research question has to be a response to the real questions raised from real practice. The key to bridging theory and practice is understanding this “problematic” or, the mode of posing research questions. Practice helps theory, and reflects what happens in reality. For instance, the notion that “command economies don’t work” is a part of history and reality in practice. While research is evaluated by its scientific criteria, political positions need political judgment. In other words, **practice raises questions but not answers**. Usually, we see a right-wing researcher as raising poor questions, while the left-wing researcher does poor research through poor research methodologies after raising a good question. We have to do good empirical research and we have to know exactly what and how things happened rather than exercise pure theoretical deduction.

Therefore, in the positivist paradigm, research was considered as neutral, but in fact was social and institutional reproduction. In the Leninist paradigm, politics took command, and theory became dogmatic. Now, the interactive autonomy between theory and practice creates a boundary between the different social actors and interactive communication. There is no neutral researcher, but only self-aware subjectivity. Interactive autonomy defines the boundary of inter-subjectivity with both sides nourishing the boundary in between. The interactions between the subjectivities and the objective relative autonomy perform together as an interaction of posing research questions of the problematic. This interactive space is the key element between the theory of the division of labor and practice, which is a political space. For instance, the division and interaction resemble the roles of different players on a volleyball team. Only mutual understanding and interaction between different players can express their capabilities as a team.

Second, for the purpose of social change rather than reproduction in a global capitalist system, the relations between state, social movements, and radical intellectuals have to be dealt with historically and practically. Researchers, professional planners, and designers are defined as intellectuals here. As for the internal contradictions between researcher, planner and designer, let us constrict the study to planning theory. In a historical sense, these conflicts are indeed “the small waves in the tea cups of the intellectuals.” In the relationship between state and radical intellectuals such as researchers, planners and designers, for instance, the policy-maker is a part of the state. Even the role of consultant is an instrument of the state. But the state can be used and penetrated. This is especially true for the local state. Also, the state may be studied together with the larger society. There is a powerful relationship between the state and society. If we are to alter society, it can be changed through the state. In principle, the state represents society, but it is distorted by the dominant class. So radical intellectuals have to emphasize the logic of change rather than simply reproduction. It is possible for radical planners and designers to emphasize the society rather than the state, and to find maneuvering space against the pressure from the state, advancing the interests of the powerless over the power elites.

Considering the relationship between state and society, the social movements of civil society are outside the state’s apparatus and remain challenges to the system. Citizen participation is exercised in the ambiguous space both inside and outside of institutions, and provides possibilities for increasingly transforming the nature of the state through releasing the power of the society.

Again, considering the relationship between radical intellectuals and social movements, there could be an objective alliance between radical intellectuals and social movements. However, the radical intellectuals cannot use social movements, nor guide social movements, due to the interactive relationship between theory and politics mentioned above. Moreover, social movements are not all correct. The so-called middle class community movements are always the most conservative, with the roles of radical intellectuals limited to providing analytical and theoretical understanding rather than advice to the social movements.

There are no general rules for the relations between social class, state, and radical intellectuals. Radical intellectuals provide clear ideas about what makes for progressive social change. However, it takes people

at the grassroots level to build up the interactive process. Radical intellectuals evaluate the possibilities of state apparatus, support the powerless, and bargain and negotiate with the state. If the state supports this, there is “reform”. Consequently, we need good planners and designers. Cultural innovation is an automatic practice as research is autonomous from politics. Good research questions can be provided from politics, good answers depend on ‘professionalism,’ which translates into planning strategies for what people are to do, and appropriate symbolic meaning for individual expression, just as a good engineer creates a good machine. Radical planners and designers have to sustain good relationships with people and provide good answers for them. That is why planning and design education are important, and why these qualities are important. The qualities of space and place are not the privilege of the bourgeoisie. Radical planners and designers are not only experts to paint the surface red in color with no substantial change because they have only political positions. If it were so, then the students are revolutionaries when they are students and after graduation they become pragmatic bureaucrats.

Finally, let me say a word about the roles of radical intellectuals from the theoretical intervention in the discursive space of social theories to the planning intervention in the public space of urban politics, and design intervention in the representation of urban symbolism. Their relations with social movements will be the determining distance of the historical stage of social transformation as well as spatial transformation. All of them search for social transformation and spatial transformation; however, the relation to transformative political action is through the historical lessons of practice. The social commitment is still there, but this is a historical challenge to the roles of radical intellectuals. Liberating leftists from Leninist limits, we have to search for new interactive roles of interactive spaces for the autonomy of intellectuals in the research, planning, and design processes.

Visions of the societies and cities of tomorrow are always a major emphasis for radical intellectuals and social actors. These are the historical forces of social change. However, Marxism is not utopian, but practice based on analysis for social change. Radical intellectuals certainly know their theory has to be dialectically integrated with practice. Thus, theoretical analysis is the specific inevitable responsibility of the radical intellectuals. We really need good research for the analysis, which benefits social and spatial transformation. As for social movements, they are not dinner parties and not classrooms. They are specific classrooms and always open for anybody to join. They transform us as a subject through collective self-identity in the political process. The chance of participating in social movements is a historical chance, for which we cannot wait. So, what is to be done? Determining this is the specific right of those involved in the activities. There is no space for a privileged outsider to enjoy.

Notes

- 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2nd International Critical Geography Conference, Taegu, South Korea, Aug.9-13, 2000.
- 2 For instance a Korean scholar, Yung-rei Bai's, paper on rethinking East Asia at the turn of the century provided a significant reflection on the dream of a strong nation state (Bai, 1999).

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The People's Geography Project: Popularizing Radical Geography

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“The geography we make must be a *peoples' geography*, not based on pious universalisms, ideals, and good intents, but a more mundane enterprise that reflects earthly interests, and claims, that confronts ideologies and prejudice as they really are, that faithfully mirrors the complex weave of competition, struggle, and cooperation within the shifting social and physical landscapes of the twentieth [and twenty first] century. The world must be depicted, analyzed, and understood not as we would like it to be but as it really is, the material manifestation of human hopes and fears mediated by powerful and conflicting processes of social reproduction.

“Such a peoples' geography must have a popular base, be threaded into the fabric of daily life with deep taproots into the well-springs of popular consciousness. But it must also open channels of communication, undermine parochialist world views, and confront or subvert the power of dominant classes or the state. It must penetrate the barriers to common understandings by identifying the material base to common interests. Where such a material base does not exist, it must frankly recognize and articulate conflict of equal and competing rights that flows therefrom. To the degree that conflicting rights are resolved through tests of strength between contending parties, so the intellectual force within our discipline is a powerful weapon and must be consciously deployed as such, even at the expense of internalizing conflicting notions of right within the discipline itself.”

- David Harvey (2001 [1984]), 116-117.

A Time for Optimism?

For the first time in a long time, there's cause for optimism: important movements against the rapacious practices of global capitalism have arisen and taken hold across the globe; student activism is on the rise; struggles are developing against the seeming inexorable march of what Naomi Klein (1999) calls “branded space”—public spaces “sponsored” by jeans or liquor conglomerates, the mallification of everything, and the intrusion of corporate advertising and commodity hegemony (even into the elementary schools); and labor unions are again on the march, not just (or not only) as business concerns or as bargaining agents for select groups of employees, but more importantly as organizers of workers, social movements, and participants in myriad social justice coalitions. And there's cause for optimism because radical geography possesses the tools—the ideas and theories, the methodologies, the areas of sustained research—that can, in fact, aid and abet these movements. A new “labor geography” has taken root that both (critically) celebrates workers and has developed the tools to link analyses of exploitation, alienation, and the oppressive work-place practices, to workers' movements for social justice, a geography of labor struggle, and both

intellectual and practical resources for contesting the shape and structure of local, regional and global space-economies. A decade's worth work on the privatization of public space has constructed not only the theoretical, but also the political, tools to show how and why this privatization, this branding of space, must be stopped—for the sake of homeless people, for the sake of the poor, for the sake of social movements, and for the sake of all those who simply seek a small corner unalienated life. And the same decade has seen a burgeoning interest in the production and contestation of geographical scale, an interest that has made possible a highly sophisticated and potentially revolutionary means for understanding the complex practices of global uneven development and its resistance around the globe.

Only a couple of years ago, things looked quite different. As Noel Castree (2000) tells the story in his call for a revived radicalism in Anglophonic geography, the rise of radical—now critical—geography traces a line at right angles to the decline of the non-academic Left. Just at the moment of the Left's historical eclipse, its subsumation into “new” labor and “new” democratic parties not only in the US, Britain, Germany, and France but in Latin America and Asia too, its seeming quiescence in the face of the “end of welfare as we know it,” and the global triumph of neo-liberal capitalism—just at that moment academic geography's Left rose, in the Anglo-American context anyway, to a position of hegemony, if not in numbers, dollars won in grant competitions, and positions of authority in the disciplinary institutions, then certainly in terms of scholarly innovation: the geographical left has for at least the past two decades simply been at the forefront of theoretical development and critique, disciplinary debate, and innovative research in human geography. In geography more than many other disciplines, the Left controls not just the intellectual high ground, but almost all of the intellectual ground-period. Castree argues that the geographical Left's rise was symptomatic of a larger “bifurcation” of the Left as a whole: the concurrent decline of the non-academic Left with the rise and even hegemony (at least in the humanities and some social sciences) of the academic Left has led to a large gulf between the two. The vibrancy of the academic Left over the past two to three decades while the non-academic Left has suffered defeat after defeat has led to the largest theoretical, practical, and political “distance” between the two in generations. This “distance” has only been increased by the significant “professionalization” of Left academics, who have made their mark in large, and important, part by “boring from within” the institutions of academia and becoming powerful, if not always dominant, players in departments and in university administrations. With this professionalization, no easy “popular front” between the professionalized academic Left and the often fragmented and ill-coordinated grass-roots Left, at least in Castree's telling, seems possible.¹

Even so, like I say, there is a great deal of room for optimism at the moment—optimism, that is, if Leftist geographers are smart enough to follow—and to find ways to help to lead—the new political activism that burst onto the public stage in the “Battle for Seattle” at the end of 1999, but which has really been incubating for quite some time. The gap between the academic and the grass-roots Left stands ready to be bridged, and rapprochement might be easier than we think—a rapprochement that runs from the “outside world” to the academy as much as from the academy to the “outside world.”

A brief story from my own experience illustrates this point. A year after I moved to Syracuse University, the service workers—janitors, librarians, cafeteria workers, parking lot attendants, groundskeepers, and maintenance workers—went on strike. In many (but not all) important respects, the workers won their strike. The strike was beautifully organized and orchestrated by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), with workers leaving their jobs and throwing up picket lines on the first day of classes in the Fall term, 1998. Faculty had engaged in some minor—and frankly half-hearted—support organizing over the summer, but when the strike hit, both they and student activist quickly rose to the challenge, organizing a series of teach-ins, media events, and picket-line support groups, and beginning a media and educational blitz that exposed the way that Syracuse University's treatment of its employees was of a piece with the way other

workers were treated around town, around the state, across the nation, and most importantly, globally. Drawing on the expertise of some remarkable striking employees, as well as our own knowledge—from what we teach and learn—students and faculty were remarkably successful in showing how the strike at Syracuse was over exactly the same issues—the right to a living wage, the need for worker control of workplace practices, the presumption by management that it could do with people’s lives what it wanted, wherever it wanted, and when it wanted—that anti-sweatshop activists had made the subjected of heated discussion in their exposure of Kathee Lee Gifford’s sweated designer clothing line, that workers had shown to be crucial in the recently successful United Parcel Service Strike, and that ordinary people knew to be so vital either from their own workplaces or every time they wondered who picked their strawberries or cleaned the toilets at their local mall.

What worked so well in our support work was our expertise, our hard-won theoretical knowledge—our ability to make connections across space and place and to show how the geography of work and life here was intimately tied to the geography of work and life there; our ability to show how the way the university attempted to control the putatively public spaces of the campus was of a piece with the way that capital and its allies in the state sought to control public space across the cities and towns of the country; and our ability to show how there was a keen *geography* to the political economy that made the bad wages at Syracuse University some of the best wages in town.

Service workers won their own strike, through their own militancy, to be sure, but also by effectively deploying our expertise. Along the way, they inspired, at what is really a quite elitist and complacent private university, a core of activist students who found that the key to living the lives they want to live is to contest the politics—and *geography*—of those who would sell them a quite different way of life. Quite surprisingly, a vibrant, labor-oriented movement has arisen at Syracuse University, one that has maintained and expanded links with the regional labor movement as a whole, with the local labor-religion coalition’s Living Wage campaign, and with national and international anti-sweatshop and anti-corporate globalization campaigns. These students are hungry, starving really, for the intellectual and practical tools that will allow them to both understand and transform the worlds they live in. They’ve turned in two directions. One, gratifyingly, is to Marx. Reading groups have developed, like the one this summer (inspired by Seattle) exploring the relationship between Marxian socialism and various anarchistic models of society, that comprises students, faculty, and workers from around the city. In addition, I am continually asked to suggest ways into Marx, to teach special directed reading classes on his theories, and to link together students seeking a grounding in Marx on a campus where there only person teaching Marxism directly was recently, and probably not accidentally, denied tenure.

The other direction students have turned, even more gratifyingly, is geography. More than at any other time in my decade of teaching, students know – in their bones, but also in their pocketbooks—that geography matters, and they are eager to see how and why. They know, even if inchoately, that geography *determines*—or to put that less crudely, social processes are given force, even made possible, only in and by producing space. They would never put it that way, but they know it.

And that is why more than a dozen found their way across the country to Seattle in November 1999. That is why two busloads of Syracuse students and residents went to Washington to protest the IMF/World Bank meetings the following April. That is why they were a vibrant presence in Quebec City. That is why they have organized a growing anti-sweatshop movement that makes it abundantly clear that the treatment of workers in Indonesia or Guatemala is a *local*—as well as a global—issue. And that is why they are picking up the fight for a living wage, knowing that the struggle for economic and social justice, in Syracuse and across the globe, must be fought on innumerable, but always linked, fronts.

Now is definitely a time for a bit of optimism. Things are exciting. And radical geographers, both

have as much or more to offer to this new and exciting activism than anyone else—certainly more than the political scientists down the hall, still pouring over the latest polling data, still arguing about why humans don't behave like the rational actors of their computer models (and how to make them do so), and certainly more than the economists who, like Paul Krugman, labor under the most simplistic and crude notions of what space and spatiality are all about and why they are so crucial *now*. And certainly more than our staid mainstream geography colleagues, old and young, either so infatuated with GIS that they cannot see beyond their computer screens or still arguing about whether PhD students should be examined on the average rainfall and grain export statistics of the Argentine Pampas. Radical geography has an opportunity to prove itself—perhaps the greatest opportunity since the movement started in the 1960s in the crucible of anti-war activism, urban uprisings, the revivification of the women's movement, gay rights, the ecology movement, and the attack on imperialism—political and economic—in which all of these fermented.

Activist Geography

And yet, will we—and how can we—meet the challenge that this moment presents to us? By what means can we satisfy the cravings for real, important, geographical knowledge—real, important knowledge that is useful in the battles on and for the streets? By what means can we answer the demands of not only our students as they become involved with and create new forms of economic and class activism, but also the demands of ordinary people as they seek to make sense of the world around them as it “globalizes”? And do we really have the tools we need to make the kinds of knowledge people want?

To answer these questions requires turning to the history of radical geography, even if only briefly. Forged in the crucible of anti-war, feminist, urban, gay, and student activism, radical geography began primarily and self-consciously as *activist* geography. From Bill Bunge's (1971, Bunge and Bordessa 1975) geographical expeditions,² to Clark Akatiff's (1974) analysis of the anti-war March on the Pentagon (surprisingly published in the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*), to early attacks on the patriarchal composition of urban and suburban space (e.g. Hayford 1974), the goal of radical geography was, in Marx's famous formulation, not only to understand the world, but to change it. And the possibility that the world *could* be changed shines through this early work. Bunge's (1971) remarkable collective, yet highly personal, study of Fitzgerald in Detroit, uneven and awkward as it is at times, is both painful and exhilarating to read nearly thirty years later: painful because the sense of promise implicit in the book, the sense that through progressive activism the world could be changed, seems so remote from the geography I grew up in during the 1980s and 1990s; exhilarating in that in what we would now call (I often think wrongly) its very political and theoretical naiveté, *Fitzgerald* is such an impassioned, activist *intervention* into the world in which Bunge lived that shows all those more recent works that proclaim themselves to be “interventions” as being too removed from just what they mean to intervene in to be of much immediate political use. Bunge's *Fitzgerald* reminds us of what we *could* do.

That same sense of painful exhilaration greets the contemporary reader of Harvey's (1973) *Social Justice and the City*, a book of intellectual journey and discovery, but also a book responding to the immediate context of its writing—the Baltimore riots and the struggles for social justice they gave rise too. As is often claimed, Harvey's *Social Justice* is a memoir of radicalization, but it is also a call for an activist geography, one that puts the production of a socially just geography right at the center of the geographical project. So too were the early feminist interventions explicitly activist, geared towards advancing the aims of radical, socialist feminism on the streets, in workplaces, and in the homes of women.

But with the defeat of the activist Left in Paris (and indeed Prague) in 1968 and of a weaker Left in the United States and Britain some few years after that, the bifurcation that Castree (2000) describes began to

grow. Leftist geographers maintained their struggles, but—and quite importantly—focusing as much on the transformation of the discipline, and indeed, eventually in many ways winning it over. If the works of the late 1960s and early 1970s activist radical geography prove exhilarating in their goals and immediate striving for relevancy among radical social and social justice movements, then the radical and radical-inspired work of the late 1970s and into the 1980s and 1990s proves just as exhilarating in its sense of intellectual discovery and ferment. New ideas, new ways of understanding and exploring the world, exploded into geography with astonishing rapidity. Marxist theory may have been hegemonic on the geographic Left for a time, but that hegemony was the result of an exceptional intellectual ferment, a heady time of theoretical debate and development, a time (contrary to the misguided complaints of James Duncan and David Ley [1982] about the totalitarian rule of “structural Marxism”), in which heterodox arguments about the production of space, place, and economy contended for space in both “established” radical journals like *Antipode* and in newer Left-leaning journals like *Society and Space*. Concurrently, the continued theoretical development by, and the militant demand for attention of, feminist geographers transformed the way that space was theorized even as it demanded a reconfiguration of “the project” of Leftist geography (Christopherson 1989; Walker 1989; Chouinard and Grant 1995). Finally, the turn to identity, most particularly race and sexuality, in the 1980s and 1990s required again a reconfiguration of theories of space, and the focus of the Left in the discipline shifted once again.

All this intellectual ferment, in other words, is exactly what makes it possible to say that Bunge’s geographical expeditions were not only remarkable and exhilarating for the activism, but also seemingly naïve in their theoretical positioning.³ There has been an impressive—and rapid—intellectual growth in geography over the past two to three decades. Neil Smith (1989) has argued that geographers have recapitulated—and advanced—a century of social-theoretical development in the course of a generation. Along the way there has been a theoretical pluralization in geography marked by an efflorescence of theoretical orientations, political goals and objects of research. Leftist geography is remarkably varied and remarkably vibrant—and some of it, as with queer geographies, still fairly closely connected to activist movements, though the majority of Leftist research cannot fairly be said to be directly activist in any but the most limited sense.

From Radical/Activist to Critical/Academic (and Back Again)

This intellectual growth, in other words, has come at a certain cost. As Castree (2000) argues, that cost can best be summarized by the fact that cutting-edge geography no longer calls itself “radical” but instead goes by the name “critical”—as is the case with this the International Critical Geography Group. Leftist geography, concurrent with its professionalization, has undergone a severe, academization. This is not all for the bad—far from it. The academization of Leftist geography, its transmogrification, that is, from radical to critical, has led not only to important insights within and for the discipline, but also to the growing importance of geographical theory to other parts of the academy. Critical geography is now more important to the project of critical social theory as a whole than it has ever been. And as I indicated above, we *have* developed many of the intellectual tools that activists now so much want in order to make sense of, and to transform, the world we now live in. We developed those tools, quite clearly, in part *because* we professionalized and became more academic. But as Castree (2000) so cogently argues, professionalization and academization has come at the cost of a large gulf between the geographical Left and the grass-roots Left.

It has also come at the cost of a clear theoretical focus on historical *materialist* geographies. If one barometer of the “sea change” in Leftist geography is the evolution from radical to critical, then another can

be found in what could be called “the strange case of the missing prepositions.” No longer do we find it important to think *about* space, *about* economy, *about* identity, or *about* class (if we think about class at all [Smith 2000]), now we “think space anew” (in Massey’s [1999] words), or content ourselves simply with “thinking space” (as Crang and Thrift [2000] title a recent collection of essays); we “think the economy differently” (as Gibson-Graham [1996] urges), “think identity as constitutive” (as per Rose 1999), and “think class radically” (Gibson-Graham again). This is an important barometer because it shows that as the gap between activists and academics has grown, academics have succeeded, in their own minds anyway, in collapsing that gap back in on itself, and erasing all difference between theory and the world it represents. Theory is no longer *about* the world, but *is* the world. By making this conflation, academics can fool themselves into thinking that they remain highly activist, even if they are part of no social movement, simply because they *think*. To think is to do in the formula of contemporary critical geography (and cultural studies more widely). This is a severe cost indeed, because it has led, along with the efflorescence of theoretical pluralism and sophistication to a rather remarkable insularity—and solipsism (cf. Olsson 2000)—in the precincts of high theory.

A third indication of the nature of the evolution of Leftist geography into critical geography is the cultural turn that has gripped the field in the past decade. As I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell 2000), this turn has brought with it a revival of a form of culturalism or cultural determinism that actually is quite unhelpful to unraveling the politics and practices behind not only the political-economic restructurings we call “globalization,” but even more importantly, the production of “culture” itself, which as Naomi Klein (1999), Thomas Frank (1997) and others have so cogently argued, is precisely the primary field of accumulation for contemporary capitalism, and precisely the field for some of the most important political activism around the world today (see Hardwick 2000). The cultural turn’s fascination with identity and identity politics, as important as it has been, has smuggled in what can only be called a form of “essentialism lite” (or at the very least a fruitless search for an always deferred, ever-receding authentic “essence” [Joseph, Forthcoming]) that blinds it to the specific social and economic processes—particularly the drive for the commodification of all aspects of life—that produce identities in the contemporary world.

In response to this transformation of radical into critical geography, Castree (2000) calls for a revival of radicalism, but now a radicalism that is focused on the academy itself—as a site of work, as an institution of cultural production and identity formation, as a political-economic force in the world, as an instantiation of hegemonic norms, modes of reasoning, and social practices (see Readings 1996; Nelson 1997). This is an important project, and indeed, some of the most exciting social movements in the United States at the moment are based on campuses—struggles to organize graduate teaching assistants and faculty into unions, battles for living wages for service workers, campaigns against corporate sponsorship and domination of research, fights over how to represent difference in the curriculum and on the faculty, struggles over intellectual property and the inroads of capitalist property relations into the products of intellectual labor—and all these are keenly geographical struggles, struggles to which critical-cum-radical geographers can and should contribute. They are fights that are very much worth our while waging.

And yet there is also a need to re-radicalize geography’s interactions in and with the world beyond the academy, to deny and contest the collapse of action into academic thought, and to realize that we can and should have a role to play in participating in, advising and actively shaping radical social movements. There are innumerable fronts upon which this reengagement with the activist world needs to be waged—from taking to the streets to doing direct research for radical and progressive causes—but the one I want to focus on in this essay is perhaps surprising: the traditional academic pursuit of popularizing theoretical knowledge, a traditional pursuit that critical geographers have for too long ignored. For it is precisely in such a popularization, it seems to me, that critical geography will be re-radicalized. It also seems to me that such a

re-radicalized popular geography will resonate particularly well now—people and progressive movements *want* what we can offer, and in delivering what they want, we will rediscover our activist roots, our ability to engage in and with the world in direct, compelling way. Moreover, by engaging with the world – the world of progressive activism—by presuming to speak with it, for it, of it, and to it, while at the same time remembering to listen to it, and to learn from it, we will in fact *advance* not hinder the incredible theoretical journey that radical-cum-critical geography has been on in the past generation. We will make critical geography radical again. We will make it once again activist.

For a People’s Geography

If the theoretical sophistication of contemporary Leftist geography has been bought at a certain cost, then it is certainly a cost that can be recouped. The time is now propitious for Leftist—critical—geography to reconnect both with its activist roots and with progressive activists and ordinary people around the globe. I have confined my own analysis and ideas so far to the Anglo-American world, and even more particularly to the US, because that is the political and intellectual arena I know, but there is no reason that what I am about to argue for cannot be implemented—and of course improved upon—in other places. Indeed, what I am about to argue for, is first and foremost, a solidarity-based geography, and as such *should* desire to expand beyond borders, into new pockets of social life and radical analysis.

So what I am about to argue for? Simply this: an important way that Leftist geographers can re-radicalize their critical geography, and an important way they can make it activist again, is by developing self-consciously “people’s geographies.” A people’s geography is one that is committed to the notion that in the struggle for economic and social justice, it is essential to understand how relationships of power are deeply geographical. That, of course, is just what radical and critical geography *has* been showing over the course of its evolution. The difference is that the production of such geographical knowledge (and its dissemination) is now clearly put in the service of people’s political movements, in the service of their struggles, and in the service of ordinary people who seek to understand how the world they live in came to be—and what they can do about it. While a People’s Geography will not give up the right to critique and criticize the movements it is part of, such critique, essential and integral as it is, will not be its primary purpose, its *raison d’être*. Rather its *raison d’être* will be to package and present knowledge, to circulate it, to make it usable in the most crudely instrumental sense.

In other words, a people’s geography, must first and foremost be a *popular* and *popularizing* geography. It must find ways to make geography’s theoretical sophistication about power, economy, culture, and identity available to people in a language they can understand. This does not mean abandoning the project of critical theory—just the opposite. It means strengthening it. It means that *some* geographers need to refocus their energy towards the popularization of geographical theory and knowledge, but that others, of course, need to go on developing theory—indeed, that language of some and others is wrong, since any decent people’s geography would require of its practitioners that they do both. It means making geography even more critical, especially in raising the critical question of *why* it produces the kinds of knowledge it does. And it answers that question by assuring that it serves the needs of progressive activism and ordinary people in their struggles. *That* is what makes it a *people’s* geography.

The People’s Geography Project

What does a people’s geography look like? That’s an open question. In the US, I helped organize the People’s Geography Project. The Project brings together the talents of a dozen extraordinary and

diverse geographers and is beginning to encompass many more. If there was a clear genesis to the project, it was in listening to a series of talks at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers in Boston, some of them related to a celebration of 30 years of radical geography, but many not. A number of talks—especially ones by George Henderson and Brian Page (both now members of the Project)—explicitly outlined radical analyses of the historical geographic “making” of landscape and region, and it occurred to me that a type of knowledge was being presented that people *needed*—indeed, *wanted*—to know. Couple that with my growing dissatisfaction with the seeming solipsism and insularity of so much of the “cultural turn” in geography—solipsism and insularity that was also everywhere apparent at the Boston AAGs—and it occurred to me that geographers could do far better in connecting with others outside the academy and that it shouldn’t be too hard to do so. Indeed, it seemed to me that the most pressing need *for* critical geography was to find ways to break out of the solipsistic box it had built for itself and by doing so it might find itself in demand—socially and politically—around the world. With Seattle, Bangkok, Okinawa, Quebec City, Genoa, and so many other fronts opening in the popular struggle to take control of the politics and economics that shape the world, and with the new radicalism I see among my own students, I am even more convinced that this is the case.

Out of a set of conversations over the two years following the Boston AAGs—and money made available through a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship and the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse—the People’s Geography Project was born at a meeting in New York City in September 1999. The goal of the Project is just the one I have stated, to popularize radical geography (and radicalize popular geography) through a dialectical re-engagement with the world around us, especially the world of progressive activists.

The project has taken as its primary goal for the next few years the following. First, a *Geography for Beginners*-type volume. *For Beginners*-type books present introductions to important progressive issues, movements, and realms of thought—Marxism, Cuba, Foucault, Feminism, the World Bank, are examples—and do so in cartoon form. Written in accessible language, these books do not simplify complex realms of social theory and social practice, so much as make that complexity understandable.

Second, a one or more volume book called the *People’s Geography of the United States* will be written. This book will tell the social geography of the United States “from the bottom up.” Modeled on Howard Zinn’s amazingly successful *People’s History of the United States*, but even more so on the important two volume *Who Built America?* series from the American Social History Project, the goal of these books is to make a radical analysis of America’s geography—from its local manifestations to its global pretensions—available to the reading public, activists, and school and college students. The goal is to provide an innovative interpretation of the “building” of America that shows how people—not just theoretically, but in their practices—*make* the worlds they live in, even if not under conditions of their own choosing. Moreover, if successful, the *People’s Geography of the United States* will provide readers not just a radical lens into the history and geography of America, but a lens into radical geographical *theory*. It will show how the tools we have developed in the past thirty years for explaining the geographical production and reproduction of the world are tools to which they too can have access, and which they will find useful. This is a crucial aspect of popularization. It is a way that the value of radical geography will be circulated, made available to activists and others, and therefore, not incidentally, will become a tool for radicalization itself, in the same way that Zinn’s book is. Ultimately we plan to turn the *People’s Geography of the United States* into one or more documentaries, so it reaches more than just the reading public.

Third, the People’s Geography Project has begun to develop a series of pamphlets and tear-sheets that ask people to understand the geography of power that structures their lives—and what to do about it. We call these “guerilla geographies” because the goal will be to scatter them unsuspectedly about, to draw

ordinary people into the struggle, to use them as a tool for radicalization. The first pamphlet, *Just in Time!*, explains the geography of the 1998 Flint, Michigan United Auto Workers strike and shows how workers can grab power, even in a “just-in-time,” flexible production world and use it to fight against both corporate and state dominance.

Fourth, we will develop People’s Geography curricula for secondary schools, for colleges and university, and for labor unions, community groups, progressive movements, and others.

Fifth, we will lend ourselves out to progressive and radical groups that want to use us—to draw on our knowledge, to help them analyze the geographies of their struggles, and so forth.

And conversely, sixth, we will draw progressive and radical organizations into the university, working to break down the barriers that separate academics from activists—barriers that on American campuses like my own are often as physical as they are class and ideological.

Seventh, we will become evangelists for people’s geography, giving our ideas to whoever wants them, hopefully spawning imitators everywhere, for without doing so, the Project, which must eventually be internationalist, will stagnate. And in spawning imitators, we will of course be spawning projects that will better us and that we will learn from and make common cause with.

Finally, eighth, we will engage in a project of disciplinary and institutional transformation, developing pre- and post-doctoral fellowships and scholarships for young scholars seeking to make their work popular (or to help popularize the work of others), creating an institutional space out of which radical, and accessible can emanate, and by which it will be rewarded. And by doing so, we will show that “relevancy” in geography is not monopolized by those who serve corporate and state masters or who can fiddle with the latest technological gadgets. Indeed, we will show that radical popular geography is often more relevant, and certainly politically less suspect, than the sort of work our disciplinary hierarchy regularly touts as significant in the press and among themselves.

All of this has one overriding goal: to make and to continue to make radical geography relevant and useful in the struggle for social and economic justice—as useful and relevant as we know much of geographical theory to *already* be. That is, and at the risk of repetition, our overriding goal is to make geography *for* people, not just for ourselves. And as the structure of the Project indicates that means we are not—and cannot be—squeamish about presuming to *know* and therefore to *teach* (which much postmodern ideology says we ought to be squeamish about). We often *do* know what others ought to know and we shouldn’t be shy about making what we know available. Without this, critical-radical geography will be for naught; it will find that the retreat into “thought” that is so symptomatic now of much critical geography in the Anglo-American world is quite comfortable indeed, and the needs and desires for geographical knowledge of the people we live among and struggle with will have to be met some other way, perhaps by the banal *Don’t Know Much About Geography* brand of geographical trivia.

Why is this an important project now? The answer to that question has two parts, one related to activism in the world, the other to activism in the academy. I have already indicated the answer to the first part—the legions of activists and ordinary people anxious for what we are so well-positioned to give them: a way to make sense of their struggles, why they are important, and what they mean, and a way to understand the unjust geographical constitution of the world they live in – how and why it was made, and for whom—so they can better focus those struggles. The answer to the second part of the question takes a little more development.

People’s Geographies and Institutional Transformation

Anyone working in the contemporary Anglo-American university knows the pressures against the type

of popularized radical geography the People's Geography Project is proposing. Research Assessment Exercises in Britain and the disciplinary aspects of the tenure regime in the United States both mitigate against such work, encouraging highly specialized discourses, and often quite narrow publishing agendas. Prestige follows money and finding the money to reward such work is both difficult and exceptionally time-consuming. Nor is the winning of such money necessarily as well-rewarded as, say, a National Science Foundation research grant when tenure and salary raises are determined. Teaching is often straight-jacketed by out-dated disciplinary norms (this is very much the case in my department) and fighting to change those institutionalized norms is not only expensive and time-consuming, but also can alienate exactly those people who decide your tenure and your raises. The very struggle for legitimacy, as now 30 years of feminists, queers, Marxists, and other Leftists can tell you, is itself a huge project, and one that demands enormous political commitment and energy, often at great risk. All these are important issues for radicals in the academy, and it is precisely why Castree (2000) argues that some—if not much—of our energy should be devoted to radical activism within the academy itself.

But Castree is also right that many of these battles have been won, if not completely, and if not necessarily permanently, then at least to some large degree and for now. It is far easier to be a radical in the academy for me and my generation than it was for those of the generation that preceded me, precisely *because* that generation fought so hard, and because it cleared the institutional way for us.⁴ Against this institutional space, of course, stands the arrayed power of corporate capitalism that sees the university as a significant and relatively under exploited source of surplus value production and realization. So the way that has been cleared in the academy for radicals is one that we squander at great—indeed life and death—cost.

The People's Geography Project is therefore designed explicitly to *further* institutionalize radical geography, to create a permanent set of institutional structures that *reward* radical and popularizing work, with the same sorts of money and recognition that so-called primary research can already garner, while also rewarding innovative theoretical pursuits, the often under-valued job of curriculum development, and so forth. And in so doing, by creating an institutional home for radical geography, and by creating a series of important and useful products—like decent curricula and textbooks—we can radically transform what geography *is*, both in its practitioners' minds and in the mind of the "public" and the pundits who speak (legitimately or illegitimately) for it. The People's Geography Project will show how valuable it can be to popularize radical geography—and to radicalize popular geography.

Towards Internationalist People's Geographies

While I have been critical of "critical geography," it is because I think there is a great deal of room—and a pressing need—to re-radicalize it, and I think people's geographies are one important means towards that end. But the People's Geography Project is US-based and, at least for now, US-centered. The project's parochialism is for practical reasons. But it is also strategic: it starts from what we know. As noted above, however, the Project has grown on philosophy of solidarity: we hope that others, in other places, will develop similar projects which can then be confederated. The International Critical Geography Group is one site through which this confederation can occur. But for such a confederation to be possible, a set of questions need to be raised:

What points of contact exist—and what differences?—between the Anglo-American geography out of which the People's Geography Project grew and geography practiced elsewhere around the world? What responsibility does the *critical* geography embodied in the International Critical Geography Group have to radicalize, and how should it do it? What would a properly international, and internationalist, people's

geography look like? What forms of popularization should we undertake? What constitutes geography from the bottom up, from the perspective of ordinary people in radically different settings around the world? How—and why—do we expose relations of power to be inherently and crucially geographic when some of benefit so much from exactly those relations? What does international social justice constructed out of people’s geographies look like? What are its contours? What are the relationships between radical popularization and our own pedagogy—and how can and does such pedagogy travel across borders?

These are questions that are just beginning to be asked. The potential answers are both exciting and daunting. Consider the argument David Harvey (2001 [1984], 116) made more than 15 years ago in his “historical materialist manifesto” for geography. He argued that geographers needed to construct:

a peoples' geography, not based on pious universalisms, ideals, and good intents, but a more mundane enterprise that reflects earthly interests, and claims, that confronts ideologies and prejudice as they really are, that faithfully mirrors the complex weave of competition, struggle, and cooperation within the shifting social and physical landscapes of the [contemporary world].

To do so may very well mean internalizing conflict within the discipline and within the International Critical Geography Movement as the needs of differently situated peoples around the world are addressed. But that is as it should be, for if, as the architects of the International Critical Geography Group contend, there is a “world to win,” then it can only be won by facing up squarely to the *differences* that structure the possibilities for economic and social justice in the world and to begin the work of constructing a geography of solidarity out of them.

As I have said, there is cause for optimism at this historical-geographical moment since the new global movements are built on exactly this vision of radical solidarity built on a geography of differences. It remains for us as radical and critical geographers to *realize* that optimism, to make good on it, to put our work in the service of the struggle for social and economic justice. The time for a People’s Geography is here.

Notes

- 1 A more optimistic appraisal of leftists’ “march through the institutions” can be found in Michael Watts’ (2001) recent exploration of the legacy of the 1968 global uprisings.
- 2 See the excellent analysis by Merrieffield (1995)
- 3 Though I should say that re-reading the major documents of the Geographical Expeditions leads to some surprising discoveries, like a quite sophisticated methodology based on analyses of interlinking scales of process and activity—a concern that is currently driving much of the best critical research in geography.
- 4 There is a more cynical reading of events that is also correct, namely, in what Readings (1996) call the contemporary “University of Excellence,” radical scholarship has been successfully commodified and is thus not only no threat to the capitalist university, but of positive value to it. In this paragraph I am purposely overstating the case and eliding the fact that radicalism and commodification are deeply intertwined in the contemporary academy.

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The Demise of a Critical Institution of Economic Geography in Japan

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I. Critical Geography Defined

‘Critical geography’ is a term with dual connotations. First, it is relative, for the act of criticism can take place only where the target to be criticised or the established paradigm exists. Here, the nature of being critical is an inverse image of the establishment and therefore in constant flux reflecting shifting paradigms. When Hartshornian chorography was the paradigm, any attempt to criticise it with the term ‘exceptionalism’ was critical and revolutionary. Once the competing paradigm ascends to the throne of orthodoxy, however, the role turns and new challengers to this new orthodoxy arise.

A corollary to this connotation emerges when two different kinds of ‘orthodoxy’ are taken into account. In our academic circles, orthodoxy can have political or intellectual context, or sometimes both. Being critical can therefore not only mean challenging the intellectual paradigm, but also challenging some forms of political domination of the national geography school or an individual professor engaging in nepotism or discouraging academic freedom, particularly among graduate students and young scholars who seek favourable recommendation letters and tenure evaluations. In Japanese academia, where Confucian values still predominate to a certain degree, the role of critical geographers therefore is to challenge the political orthodoxy of their professional associations or senior professors who tend to bring the existing paradigm into ossification and obstruct the sound development of scholarship in geography.

Second, ‘critical’ has an absolute connotation, for the act of criticism is a component of a much larger political endeavour to change the current unjust, unequal, and war-prone capitalist mode of production into an alternative mode of production that is more just, egalitarian, and peaceful. Critical geographers act jointly to achieve this overall political goal. Since this political and social revolution of society and economy requires scientific and logical analysis of the existing mode of production, a nomothetic theoretical body which is normally called Marxism is to be placed at the base of critical geography.

When these two connotations coincide in reality, the momentum for the rise of critical geography becomes all the more strong. The crises in capitalism have thus had the habit of triggering critical approaches in geography: the Vietnam War in North America, and the Great Depression of 1929-30 in Japan. Both in North America and Japan this movement ended up with attempts to introduce a more critical and nomothetic theoretical framework into geography.

Taking into consideration the loaded complexity of the term ‘critical geography,’ I adopt the term in a more flexible manner. Depending on the context, different connotations of the term may receive stronger emphasis than others.

II. Japanese Critical Geography: The Heritage of More than Two Generations

Surprising as it sounds, critical geography, with its history of only one generation of scholars in the English-speaking countries, has a heritage that has lasted seven decades in Japan.

Amidst the raging militarism and suppression of academic freedom, Marxism attained its zenith in Japan in the 1930s, marked by the completion of the first full Japanese translation of *Das Kapital*, and the publication of a comprehensive Marxian analysis of the structure of the pre-war Japanese economy that later became seminal. This gave impetus to the translation of several geography books published in the Soviet Union and Germany. The Stalinist influence was obvious, in its sweeping disavowal of geographical determinism, which was regarded by the communist regime there as one of the major ideological impediments to the ‘remodelling of nature’ and space. This nevertheless gave a decisive kick-off to critical geography in Japan.

Kawanishi was one of the principal figures. He translated Wittfogel’s main work on *dialektische Wechselwirkungstheorie* (dialectic theory of human-environment interaction, 1929), which was later adopted by geographers in the critical camp in Japan as a basic frame of reference until it was criticised by Kawashima (1952). Yet, Kawanishi’s weakness in putting lopsided emphasis on the labour process was carried on into his new research agenda, the critical appraisal of location theories. Kawanishi’s alternative treatment of location theory covered two aspects: the interpretation of industrial production as a labour process, and the examination of variegated locational dynamism at different stages of capitalist development (Kawanishi, 1936) where he again left out the valorisation process in favour of technological aspects.

In the 1940s, his conceptual weakness degenerated amidst attempts to ‘academically’ legitimise the Japanese militarist expansion in WWII and the Japanese military predominance over the Asian Pacific, through the propagation of the ‘Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,’ drawing upon the notions of geopolitics (Kawanishi, 1942). He thus became not only the first critical geographer who converted into supporting the national political orthodoxy, but also the first to give in to the orthodoxy. Indeed, “the history of geography clearly reflects the evolution of empire” (Godlewska and Smith eds., 1994: p. 2), and critical geography offered no way to escape from becoming a victim unless one became consciously aware of the danger of co-optation.

III. The Foundation of a Critical Institution for Economic Geography: the Japan Association of Economic Geographers (JAEG)

The position of geographers within academic orthodoxy immediately after the war was best manifested in the presidential address of the Association of Japanese Geographers (AJG) at its 1948 annual meeting: “Warfare has always enriched geographical knowledge.” Yet Japan’s defeat in WWII shattered the dream, bringing Japanese geographers back into the state’s land development projects (Tsujimura, 1948). The *Geographical Review of Japan* (*Chirigaku Hyōron*, *GRJ* hereafter), the official journal of the AJG, boasted, “Geography has gradually become recognised as a practical science among many walks of life, as manifested in its adoption by the government sector” (*GRJ*, 21:6, 1948).

It was in this academic and social ambience that the critically-minded Japanese geographers made their first attempt to organise themselves. This was perhaps the first attempt on the globe to establish a ‘counter geography institution’ as an antithesis to the national school. It was initially formed as the ‘Geography Study Group’ for human geography and the ‘Association for Geological Collaboration’ for physical geography, both divisions of the Association of Democratic Scientists, a movement that had associations with the Japan Communist Party. On this institutional base, the critical geographers “turned their back on the existing authority and order, and...struggled to reform the AJG by campaigning for candidates [in favour

of the critical positions] as councillors; while they simultaneously poised themselves for the foundation of the Japan Association of Economic Geographers” (Kazamaki, 1998: p. 72).

At the 1951 autumnal AJG meeting, these critical geographers hosted a roundtable titled ‘Human Geography as a Social Science.’ Ishida (1952), who had postulated that geography should be of “nomothetic nature as one of the social sciences,” chaired the session. He claimed that, in conducting research in geography, “theories of general social science have to be assumed,” and rejected exceptionalism by stating, “Enumerating the facts from field surveys or descriptive regional geography does not in itself amount to the category of ‘research’ in social sciences.” This torrent further strengthened into establishing the Economic Geography Forum, then the Economic Geography Study Group, and ultimately into the Japan Association of Economic Geographers (JAEG, *Keizai Chiri Gakkai*) in 1954. They used the word ‘economic geography’ as a surrogate for critical or Marxist geography to make it more palatable to the general public.

Sato, professor of economic geography at Hitotsubashi University and who later assumed the first presidency of the JAEG, declared its aims and objectives as follows:

We hereby establish the Japan Association of Economic Geographers, aiming at creating, developing and propagating economic geography as a social science, by elaborating the theory of economic geography as well as conducting research on real issues of economic geography, incorporating research outcomes without limiting ourselves to the pigeon-holes of the disciplines, and through the collaboration of our members engaging in free and lively criticism. (JAEG, ‘General Index’).

The themes of the first four meetings were, in chronological order, ‘On Economic Geography,’ ‘On Regions,’ ‘The Fundamental Problems of Economic Geography,’ and ‘Agriculture and Industry or Urban-Rural Interregional Relationships.’ The inaugural issue of the journal of JAEG, *The Annals of the Japan Association of Economic Geographers (Keizai Chirigaku Nempō, AAEG hereafter)* published in 1954, contained the following articles: ‘Materialism and Geography,’ ‘The Methodological Development of the Analysis of Industrial Areas: as a Process to Recognise the Problematic from Critical Economic Geography,’ ‘The Allocation of Agricultural Productive Forces in the Soviet Union,’ ‘Measuring Transport Orientation of Industrial Location based on the Virtual Weight Calculation Method,’ and ‘Location of Electro-chemical Industry.’ A review dealt with a book published in the People’s Republic of China on stock farming. The strong critical and theoretical inclination among the members at the early stage of the JAEG was clear.

The second issue contained a paper by Kawashima that later became seminal. He set up a new agenda for economic geography to formulate a nomothetic law along Marxist lines on ‘spatial distribution of economic phenomena and localities’ and their ‘development and demise’ (Kawashima, 1955: p. 9), rejecting the neo-classical approach in explaining this in favour of historical materialism, by claiming (pp. 11-12):

...an attempt to explain the production of regional economic structure drawing upon the law of marginal productivity equilibration is as empty and nonsensical as claiming that ‘it is nothing but competition based on liberalist principles that produces regional economic structure.’ In explaining the production of regional economic structures, it is self-evident whether economic geography should be pursued along the lines of an abstract principle as it were of management technique, or a more realistic law of social and economic theories.

He concluded the paper by proclaiming (p. 17), “both the overcoming of localities and the

transcendence of class are the major targets that humans must and can achieve. The most fundamental task of economic geography is to identify the relation between these two intertwined targets (i.e. localities and class).”

The same issue contained another more philosophically oriented article (Okuda, 1955). It attempted an “ontological discourse of the dialectical world as the object of science in general,” and postulated several propositions, which the author later synthesized into a book presenting his own conceptions of critical geography (1969).

IV. The Progress of Critical Geography in Japan in the 1950s and 60s

In the initial years of the JAEAG, attempts were made among Japanese critical geographers to counter the conventional exceptionalism prevalent in the dominating national school and to establish a theoretical body serving the conceptual core of the critical movement. Their mentor was Stalin, the absolute authority before which all left-wing people trembled. Kamozaawa (1954) proclaimed in *GRJ*, “Upon the gradual transition from socialism to communism, the Soviet academic circle, in drawing upon the epoch-making paper of Stalin, achieved publication of papers that further promoted economic geography,” and asked Japanese geographers to “study the works of Stalin thoroughly.” A review by Watanabe (1955) appearing also in *GRJ* naïvely praised the inroads of Russian-managed plants, which were the consequence of the USSR’s forcible annexation of the Baltic countries by Stalin. Topics common among Western critical geographers a generation later, such as the concepts of ethnicity, minorities, or the question of democracy in socialism, were largely absent in the arguments of the Japanese critical geographers during this period. Stalinism being so rigid, attacks upon conventional geographers became more dogmatic, and thus over time deprived Japanese critical geographers of fresh and flexible conceptual creativity.

In *GRJ*, Kamozaawa (1955) condemned a paper on ‘the population centre of gravity,’ as having abstracted social relations and ignored unemployment in ‘the population,’ thereby “leaving out the historical and social natures.” It is easy to make this sort of sweeping denial of the conventional school, but the harder part lies beyond-in the creation of their own theory, into which Japanese critical geographers had rarely ventured (Mizuoka, 1996). The 1956 issue of *AAEG* published two articles (Akamine, 1956; and Sato, 1956) reviewing the historiography of critical geography in Japan. Ohara (1957) studied the development and demise of an old cotton town, Lowell, Massachusetts, incorporating historical materialist perspectives on environmental concepts. Yet their potential to create concepts unique to critical geography was hardly present in these works.

Lacking their own critical theories, economic geographers’ practise gradually shifted into exceptionalism. They described problem regions with exposés, drawing upon ready-made conceptions available outside geography. Some advocates of critical economic geography had explicitly endorsed this research orientation. Ohara (1950) stressed the descriptive nature of geography, while denouncing location theory as a core of the discipline. Iizuka, another contemporary, claimed, “the function of geography lies by definition in the descriptive or regional aspect” (Iizuka, 1952: p.117).

The study of disasters was a good case in point. Disasters, by nature, having strong associations with the physical environment, and the capitalist development of power sources and deforestation often having an adverse affect on the livelihood of the poor more than the rich, made such studies an apt agenda for critical geographers in pursuit of social relevance. Here they drew upon the concepts common among contemporary critical civil engineers under Maoist influence, who valued the traditional wisdom of the local peasants more in disaster prevention than Western technologies (Akamine, 1960;and Ishii, 1960).

The studies of developing countries were another case. Many existing paradigms and preceding

research done by non-geographers were readily available, and the application of an existing framework, the dependency theory *inter alia*, was capable of producing research that normally put blame on dominating imperialist powers and gave support to oppressed ethnic groups and the poor. The *AAEG* published articles by Kamozaawa (1957) on Turkey and Central America, Koga (1957) on India, and Ōiwakawa (1964) on Palestine.

Other approaches by Japanese critical geographers included the study of industrial geography with emphasis on capital-labour relations. A group consisting of a small number of critically-minded industrial geographers was evolving in connection with this research agenda.

This trend was eventually consolidated in the seminal *A Lecture Notebook of Economic Geography* (Kamozaawa 1960), of which original plans had appeared in the *AAEG* (1955) five years before. In this book, Kamozaawa explicitly asked (pp. 15-16) critical geographers to 'borrow' theories from other social sciences, then to apply them to idiosyncratic field studies. He thus took the position of endorsing the 'passive consumption' of aspatial concepts from the social sciences, and legitimized exceptionalist field practises among critical geographers.

Nevertheless, several significant attempts to break away from this exceptionalism emerged from the second half of the 1960s to the early 1970s. Some critical geographers, if not many in number, strove hard to revive creativity in theoretical concepts unique to critical geography. Indeed, during this brief interlude, which lasted for less than a decade, critical geography in Japan enjoyed its heyday, when Japanese geographers came to the fore, perhaps along with their French counterparts, among all the geographers on the globe striving along critical lines.

A series of articles containing more creative conceptualisations of critical geography appeared in the 1966 volume of *GRJ*. They attempted to establish contextual concepts of society-space or space-place interfaces, an agenda that became common among critical geographers in the English-speaking countries decades later (Ōta, 1966; Okuyama, 1966; Ishida, 1966; Moritaki, 1966; Fujita, 1971). (For details, see Mizuoka, Mizuuchi, Hisatake, Tsutsumi, and Fujita (2005): pp. 458-459).

Nevertheless, some articles that appeared in *GRJ* in this period still remained exceptionalist. Aono (1967), for example, published detailed field studies of the textile industry in Osaka, throwing in radical terms such as 'monopoly capital' and 'union-management co-operation under the social-democratic line,' with little conceptual significance unique to geography.

In spite of these efforts, the wane of the critical stance in the JAEG camp at large had already been noted among economic geographers taking a clearer Marxist line. Moritaki (1966: p. 15) expressed his concern as follows:

...some 'Marxist' economic geographers assume that economic geography must be a branch of 'theoretical' social science, omitting all phases immediately concerned with the natural environment from the study content. They try to reduce the field of economic geography even by arbitrary 'co-operation' with various schools based on capitalistic economies. Such tendencies deserve criticism as involving an unscientific distortion of the nature of economic geography.

This criticism targeted first some geographers in the JAEG who had been trying to compromise between Marxism and neo-classical regional economics; and second, scholars who attempted to throw away human-nature relationships from the agenda of critical geography in favour of the 'concept of region.'

Ueno, the author of *The Milestone of Economic Geography* (1968), wrote *The Ultimate Origin of Chorography* in 1972, which responded positively to Moritaki. This book, attempting to integrate Marxist and humanistic approaches into one theoretical frame of critical geography, marked a significant achievement in the post-war

critical heritage of Japanese geography. Drawing upon the interpretations of Heideggerian phenomenology by two Japanese philosophers, Watsuji (1933) and Hiromatsu (1969), Ueno attempted to explain something objective as intersubjective, in interpreting the produced nature. (For a more detailed account of Ueno's contribution, see Mizuoka, Mizuuchi, Hisatake, Tsutsumi and Fujita (2005): pp. 459-461).

V. The Divide: The Year 1973 and After

The year 1973 marked the turning point for the post-WWII economy as well as for critical geographies both in English-speaking countries and Japan. In the case of geography, however, the directions they took were totally opposite to one another.

The Japanese counterpart of Harvey's *Social Justice and the City* was Toshifumi Yada's article titled "On Economic Geography" (1973). Yada had originally been a critical economic geographer specialising in coal-mining studies. He denounced the government's policy which had attempted to scrap the coal-mining regions after the influx of petroleum into Japan, claiming that it aimed to "support the large enterprises and eliminate small companies" (1967: p.19), and damned the "monopoly capital exploiting and abusing domestic resources on the pretext of 'regional development' and 'urbanisation'."

In his 1973 paper, later incorporated into *The Regional Structure of Post-war Japanese Capitalism* (Moritaki and Nohara eds., 1975) as the theoretical introduction, Yada jumbled up past Japanese geographers who made considerable contributions to critical scholarship, including Iizuka, Kamozaawa, Kawashima and Ueno, into the 'economic chorography school,' which had in fact never existed but was imagined by Yada himself.

Yada criticized this 'school' as meddling with futile ideographic approaches. The facts did not necessarily support his claim, however. Although exceptionalism was a significant stream among Japanese critical geographers by then, and Iizuka and Kamozaawa had indeed advocated explicitly for it, Ueno's notable theoretical achievement discussed above proved to be quite to the contrary.

Yada's point was to introduce the national spatial scale more explicitly into the research of exceptionalist critical geographers. The alternative that Yada thus put forward was what he called the 'regional structure conception (*chiiki kōzō ron*).' According to his own definition (1990: pp. 15-16), "*chiiki kōzō* (regional structure) is the system of the regional division of labour of a national economy," which is "in principle determined by the industrial structure, or the system of social division of labour." He gave two elements that form *chiiki kōzō*: "location of various sectors and functions that constitute the industrial structure" and "regional [economic] circuits that unfold based on these locations" (2000: p. 300). Using this concept, he set out to identify relatively autonomous economic regions within Japan. Recently he has asserted that *chiiki kōzō* could "...put forward logic to understand macroeconomic spatial systems based on spatial behaviours of corporations at the micro level" (2000: p. 301).

One could easily come to wonder, however, how the identification of autonomous economic regions can be the agenda of critical geography. It is something more homologous to market area analysis, central-place theory, or shift-share analysis. They would work better with neo-classical economic geography than with the critical perspective. In pursuit of identifying the spatial system in Japan, Marxist concepts were thus tacitly substituted with neo-classical ones. Space was thus brought into geography at the cost of leaving the title 'critical' behind.

Armed with his *chiiki kōzō ron* with this theoretical defect, Yada organised the *Chiiki Kōzō Kenkyūkai* (Group for Regional Structure Research) with Kitamura, a conventional industrial geographer, being the figurehead, and a score of other economic geographers as a core. Many younger economic and social geographers once enthusiastic for the critical orientation were lured into the Group, partly due to Yada's close association with the political line of the Japan Communist Party at that time, wherein its critical nature

was taken for granted without scrutiny.

The *Kenkyūkai* thus eventually grew into an influential faction in the Japanese geographers' circle. Having many conventionalists enticed into the Group made the *Chiiki Kōzō Kenkyūkai* conceptually more compromising towards them. On the other hand, it canalised the younger geographers who had been in the genuinely critical camp into more conventional or neo-classical tenets.

The process of forming a faction in academic politics took place behind the scenes. When I was a graduate student, I was invited to a 'workshop' reviewing *The Regional Structure of Post-war Japanese Capitalism*. The 'workshop' was held in Urawa, now a district of Saitama to the north of Tokyo, in early 1977. After the formal session, the 'confidential' portion of the gathering began, where 'strategic politics' to organise the research activities of economic geography were arranged and agreed upon. At the end of the workshop, I was told not to disclose the existence of this workshop to anyone else.

This method of organising a faction has much similarity to the organisational principle of a Leninist-Stalinist-type communist party. According to this party principle, only one 'vanguard' party, structured along the monolithic principle of 'democratic centralism,' can claim political orthodoxy, which is to be exercised by the omnipotent 'great leader' who commands all the social actions. Here, various organisations engaging in social movements are virtually placed under its control through a party faction, acting as the 'conveyor belt' of the party principle. While critical geography in North America emerged from the stage of empiricism, and moved towards attempts "to construct a new, philosophical base for human geography" (Peet 1977: p. 20), the Japanese counterpart degenerated into mere politics in academic circles.

After all, Yada's accusations against the past practises of critical geographers of 'economic chorography' were meant more to be a political manoeuvre to set up his own faction than a serious academic attempt. The political power thus exercised managed to undermine the intellectual power which had been prevalent among the circle of critically-minded economic geographers until 1972.

VI. The Crisis of Critical Geography in Japan

Japanese critical geography suffered a severe setback, as the *chiiki kōzō* faction failed to come up with a research agenda to formulate a critical theory of space as in the West. This manifested itself in several instances that have taken place lately among the geographers closely associated with the JAEG.

A Japanese translation of the third edition of *Location in Space: Theoretical Perspectives in Economic Geography* appeared in 1997 (transl. by Ito *et al.*). The original book by Lloyd and Dicken has been a standard textbook of economic geography and location theories for undergraduate students. Its third edition, published in 1990, was unique in drawing heavily upon the critical concepts of space developed in the English-speaking countries, especially in Part II. Unfortunately, many of the Japanese translators could not render fundamental terms and phrases of social and spatial concepts into Japanese correctly: 'mode of production,' a basic theoretical building block of historical materialism, dropped out, and 'heterogeneous space,' an essential assumption of Weberian location theory, was wrongly translated as 'homogeneous space,' just to give a couple of examples. These mistranslations suggested that the translators, many of whom had been associated with the *chiiki kōzō* faction in some way or other, were incapable of understanding both the spatial logic and social theories contained in the original text. Some mistakes were corrected in their revised translation, but not all of them.

Naito's criticism of Yamamoto (1997), the successor of Yada at Hosei University and the director of the executive board of the JAEG at that time, was another case in point. Naito, who had once been a JAEG executive board member but had quit the JAEG altogether a couple of years before, contributed his

paper on multicultural and multiethnic society to *GRJ*, the journal published by the orthodox national school and once the target of criticism among the geographers affiliated with the JAEG. Naito called into question Yamamoto's amenability to German authority and lack of robustness in his observations on Turkish immigrants in Germany:

Yamamoto emphasised that institutional discrimination against foreign residents has a lower profile in the present migrant issues [in Germany]. However, this is wrong. Even though many of the local governments exhibit tolerant attitudes, the Turks are still reluctant to seek improvement of their legal rights, which are restrictively regulated by the federal government. Most of the Turks in Germany have become aware that their difficulties in achieving equal rights as German citizens are the result of an institutionalised alienation whose ideological basis is a concept of the German nation (Naito, 1997: p. 766).

This manifested a clear change of the scene, indicating more freedom in the acceptance of academic pluralism in the *GRJ*, while keeping a position closer to the political orthodoxy in the JAEG camps.

In the meantime, Yada himself had tacitly converted his political orientation away from the critical and snuggled up to the political authority of the state apparatus. He began to associate with the conservative and sometimes corrupt LDP-led government, by actively serving on a number of government committees promoting national land development and urbanisation policies. The younger, once critical geographers nonetheless stayed loyal to him, largely tempted by nepotistic and collusive motives in being offered, for example, university positions.

Gradually, this faction came to dominate the executive board of the once critical JAEG. Reflecting this, the national and divisional meetings of the JAEG became increasingly geared to the neo-liberalist corporate culture of the local states working hard to market their regions to global capitalism by flattering national and local policy makers, capitalising upon vested interest associated closely with the conservative members of the Diet. The JAEG has hosted a series of meetings dealing with regional development policies, with Yada playing a significant role in many of them. The 1998 national conference, organised by Yada's close ally Yamakawa, was on the theme "Deregulation and Regional Economy." In a symposium at this conference, Yada (1998) uncritically gave a briefing on the main features of the most recent national land development projects focused on the 'National Land Axes' "from the viewpoint of those who participated in formulating and deciding on the project." Yada (1998: pp. 102-103) commented:

We should no longer use the concept of balanced growth to legitimise mere redistribution of public investment and income....The notion that infrastructure provision is a fundamental lever to promote equal opportunity in geographical terms is, I believe, based on the idea that furnishing an environment should facilitate easy access to state-of-the-art services and the enjoyment of short nature trips, regardless of residents' socioeconomic status. There is no need to provide every single local state with uniform sets of services. With transportation and other networks well-equipped, those who value proximity to a city and enjoyment of urban services should opt to live in the city; whilst those who prefer to indulge themselves in nature with only occasional trips to the city might opt for living in the 'multi-natural living zone.' Once these places are well-developed, the residents are then left to their own choices. This new land development project indicates a shift to the concept where the burden of promoting the region falls on the shoulder of the residents.

One can discern a neo-liberal tone with a concept akin to Tiebout's 'voting with one's feet,' as well as a contempt for egalitarianism in spatial planning.

VII. The Demise of the JAEG under Neo-liberalism

It has been touted that neo-liberalism entails democracy, yet it actually brings about a kind of democracy that 'votes with dollar bills' or that 'votes with one's feet.' Democracy through political representation or participation is rather suppressed, or there is constantly some 'crisis situation' identified so that everyone will be driven into some institutional form which will force people into neo-liberal economic and social structures.

This paradox of neo-liberalism manifested itself in the 'constitutional reform' of the JAEG, which abolished the system of the free and direct election of JAEG officers. The idea behind it was expressed in a draft amendment proposed by Hiroshi Matsubara, one of the loyal disciples of Yada who served in the position of chief executive of the *AAEG* for the 2004-2005 term. The retiring executive board members would produce a candidate list for the executive board with the exact same number as the number of seats open; then this list would be presented to the general members who could do virtually nothing but rubber-stamp it. In this system, reminiscent of fascist or Stalinist regimes, it would be easy for the *chiiki kōzō* faction to perpetuate its domination of the JAEG.

The general assembly of the JAEG held in May 1999 adopted a milder version than that proposed by Matsubara: it deprived the general assembly of the right to approve or deny the list of members of the executive board, who should instead be picked out of the elected councillors 'by consultation' behind closed doors. During the debate that lasted for three hours, Yamakawa, then chairperson of the general assembly, attempted to dismiss the right of the opposition to propose a more democratic counter-proposal to the original reform bill. When the time came to vote, and the administration began to distribute the ballot sheets to those members on the floor, Kitamura, former head of the *Chiiki Kōzō Kenkyūkai*, demanded that the vote be made by a show of hands instead, forcing everyone in the assembly to reveal their position openly. In the voting procedure, a miscount occurred and the members of the assembly were forced to vote a second time.

Keiichi Takeuchi, then president of the JAEG, regarded this constitutional reform as merely for the sake of feasibility and efficiency in administering the JAEG. Yet the result of the election held in autumn of 1999 under the new constitution proved the contrary. The outcome was "certainly very disappointing, although by now expected" (Smith, 2000). Most of the older economic geographers active since the 1960s and 70s, outside the *Chiiki Kōzō* faction, and who had served as JAEG councillors for many years, lost their seats almost across the board. Also defeated were critical geographers of the younger generation, who were working in close collaboration with international scholars for critical economic geography and had been trying hard to establish a solid foundation of global critical economic geography in Japan. A group of handpicked *Chiiki Kōzō* faction allies now forms the executive board with Yada, who was an incumbent member of the principal council of the National Land Agency, a government body, as the president.

With the undemocratic and neo-liberal turns made in parallel, the JAEG shook off its past heritage of critical economic geography and positioned itself in the role of a 'regional service class' (Lovering, 1999: 390) for neo-liberal local states and the conservative national government with vested interests. There has, on the other hand, been a constant trickle of geographers who once practised along the critical line quitting the JAEG, including Nohara, who was the co-editor of *The Regional Structure of Post-war Japanese Capitalism* together with Moritaki.

Action was also taken to remove the JAEG secretariat from the Hitotsubashi campus, where the JAEG

had kept its office for more than two decades, to a more conservative teachers' college. President Takeuchi and Matsubara openly claimed that this move was meant to distance the JAEG secretariat from the place where criticism against the neo-liberal and undemocratic turns of the JAEG took place (a motive quite geographical indeed!). To facilitate this move, the JAEG library at Hitotsubashi, which held books and periodicals donated to the JAEG in the past, was forced to shut down, and the members now no longer have access to this literature.

Ever since then, the JAEG has been snuggling up to academic circles pursuing Krugman-type neo-classical economic geography and Michael Porter's concept of industrial clusters, simply leaving the critical heritage behind. Oda (1999: p. 91), for example, cited in his review a number of economists, including neo-classical ones, who had been rejected by Kawashima forty-four years before, for their contribution in identifying the state-of-the-art research agenda of industrial clustering. He also quoted a recent government measure for clustered industries enacted in 1997, without placing them within the context of the crisis that broke out in Bangkok that same year. Nevertheless, few scholars in economics or business fields showed interest in the JAEG, let alone joined the JAEG as members. The membership of the JAEG has stagnated at around 800 for six years since the 'constitutional reform' took place. Oda deplored the fact that the works of economic geography had been neglected by scholars in business administration. No doubt not many scholars in the field would find academic merit in economic geography conducting idiographic rehashes.

The attempts to associate the JAEG with the local policy makers further continued, by inviting them to present papers at JAEG divisional meetings. In the New Regionalism, "the policy tail is wagging the analytical dog and wagging it so hard indeed that much of the theory is shaken out." (Lovering, 1999: p. 390).

Lately, the journal *AAEG* no longer attracts articles of critical import. Most of the papers published there are methodologically of a conventional and descriptive nature, rarely addressing problems of contemporary capitalism and paying little attention to the global stream of critical geography.

While the global academic circle of economic geography "has been the scene of a constantly changing parade of theoretical and empirical pursuits combined with virtually ever-present debate and controversy" (Scott, 2000: 33), the JAEG, once the first camp of critical geographers on the globe, 'free and lively criticism' was choked off with the *chiiki kōzō ron* that sat on the throne as its 'unofficial orthodoxy'.

VIII. Toward Resurrection of the Critical Heritage in Japan as an Integral Part of the Global Community of Critical Geographers

Sucking itself into an isolated pigeonhole of national geography, Japanese economic geography in close association with the JAEG has been relegated to 'self-imposed isolation' from the global community of critical geographers.

There was not one single member of the JAEG executive officers presenting a paper at the Global Conference on Economic Geography, held at Singapore National University in December 2000, where more than 200 leading economic geographers convened from over 30 different countries to review the achievements of economic geography in the last century and to identify a research agenda for the 21st century.

This reality contrasts clearly with Yada's wishful self-image of his own *chiiki kōzō ron*. In a recent discussion on "contemporary economic geography and *chiiki kōzō ron*," he put together a chart titled "the principal theories of economic geography in the world" (2000: pp. 287-288). Along its 'spatial axis' he began with 'aspatial' Marx, Daniel Bell and Freeman, then 'the spatial system of world economy' by

Wallerstein and Lipietz, continuing on to 'spatial system of informational economy' by Pred and Castells, 'spatial system of corporate economy' by Massey, Schamp, and Porter, as well as 'spatial system of regional economy' by Scott and Marks; and culminated the whole list with the geographer who put forward "the spatial system of national economy and its restructuring": T. Yada himself. The chart leaves an impression with Japanese readers that *chiiki kōzō ron* is one of the world's most prominent theories of economic geography. Idolatry and ossification have come to their extreme.

Amidst this ossification and isolation from the global geographers' circle prevailing among Japanese geographers, there emerged attempts, if sporadic, to gear Japanese critical geography to the global community.

The initial attempt of this kind began with a group studying Peet's *Radical Geography* in the late 1970s led by Aono, who later became one of the candidates in the JAEG presidential election in 1999 and lost out to Yada by a wide margin. By the end of the 1990s, major works of Harvey and Scott had been translated into Japanese, including *Social Justice and the City*, *The Urbanization of Capital*, *Metropolis*, and "Monument and Myth." A book presenting a comprehensive dialectic between society and space was published (Mizuoka, 1992).

New cores of critical geographers are emerging from the ashes of demise lately. One of these is a study commission of the AJG, 'Critical Geography: Society, Economy and Space.' These commissions began in 1994 when 'The Theories and Tasks of Social Geography,' headed by Takatsu, served an instrumental role in inviting David Lay, Harvey and Scott to either the JAEG or AJG annual conferences. The members of the commission now work in close alliance with the ICGG, EARCAG (the East Asian Regional Conferences in Alternative Geography, a regional affiliate of the ICGG) and the People's Geography Project of the US to propagate critical geography now practised globally among Japanese geographers and other social scientists. A national research grant, headed by Mizuuchi, has recently been another core for the development of critical geography in Japan. With this grant he edits two journals entitled *Space, Society, and Geographical Thought* and *Japanese Contributions to the History of Geographical Thought*. The former, published in Japanese, contains original articles by Japanese geographers and translations of critical works published in foreign languages, whereas the latter publishes original articles in English to introduce works by Japanese geographers to their overseas colleagues. As the titles suggest, activities under the grant originally had an informal association with the IGU Commission on 'History of Geographical Thought,' yet the research carried out with this research grant, including sub-groups initiated by younger critical geographers, has transformed the nature of the grant into an instrument providing a more solid financial and institutional foundation for Japanese critical geographers working in the global context.

Amidst the countercurrents of contentious vectors towards the neo-liberal and the critical in geography, consciously critical geographers in Japan are now striving hard in promoting a critical orientation in geography, this time in close association with the global development of critical geography, and at various academic frontiers in honest and robust ways.

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The Geopolitical Context of “Redefined” Security: Japan and the U.S. Military Presence in the Post-Cold War Era¹

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Abstract

The end of the Cold War has affected the geopolitical context of East Asia in a complex way. This renewed balance of power made it necessary to redefine the role of the U.S. military presence in Japan as well as in East Asia in general. However, the deployment and amount of U.S. military forces in the area have not changed significantly. Rather, political discourses over new ‘threats’ such as China and North Korea seem to be accepted by the Japanese public so that the current U.S. military presence tends to be considered inevitable. Regardless of possibilities for new multilateral diplomacy in East Asia, the ‘redefined’ Japan-U.S. security arrangements attempt to open a path for Japan to become more active in military ‘contribution,’ especially after September 11th. This paper examines the current meaning of the U.S. military presence in East Asia and the orientation of Japan's security policy in relation to the increased global hegemony of the U.S.

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War has affected the geopolitical context of East Asia² in a complex way. Although the demise of the Soviet Union significantly decreased the possibility of a fatal nuclear conflict between two superpowers in East Asia, the instability and unpredictability of its regional security still remain. The economic and military development of China, the nuclear threats from North Korea, unresolved territorial disputes in Southeast Asia³ and the recent ethno-religious conflicts in Asia at large keep the geopolitical order of East Asia uncertain. This international order constitutes a context of Japan’s military security policy, which in this paper is referred to as the ‘geopolitical context.’

In this new context, which renewed the regional balance of power, the role of the U.S. military presence in Japan, as well as in East Asia, needed to be redefined, since the U.S. military presence in East Asia had been a product of the Cold War. The U.S. and Japanese governments began to reexamine the strategic environment covering not only East Asia but also the Asia-Pacific region. This led to the redefinition, in the second half of the 1990s, of the conventional Japan-U.S. security arrangements.⁴ According to the redefinition, the deployment and amount of the U.S. military presence in East Asia would remain intact for its new role in “forward deployment,” which would meet new global security requirements.

Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union as a nuclear superpower, potential military threats to Japan appeared more realistic to the Japanese public when Chinese and North Korean (the latter in particular) military actions took place close to Japanese territory. Political discourses over such new ‘threats’ in the Japanese media tended to emphasize the importance of territorial defense (Yamazaki 2002, 2003). In conjunction with the redefinition of the U.S. military presence in Japan, the existence of perceived actual threats helped to create a public atmosphere in which the U.S. military presence as well as

Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were thought of as being essential to Japan's security.

The September 11, 2001 attacks (hereafter 911) gave a new meaning to the redefined Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In addition to the increased domestic, rather than international, pressure on the dispatch of the SDF for U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, the Japanese government has become more active in pursuing a 'military' contribution in the international arena. After 911, the Japanese government (the Koizumi Cabinet) decided to dispatch Maritime SDF vessels to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan. The Japanese government used to be extremely cautious about deploying the SDF overseas due to the stipulations of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the critiques of such a policy by neighboring countries.⁵ The Koizumi Cabinet, however, was able to overcome this long-term constraint because 911 facilitated international military cooperation (i.e. the 'war on terror'), initiated by the U.S. In this sense, 911 constructed a new geopolitical context in East Asia that allowed Japan to become more active in the international security arena.⁶ At the same time, the redefined Japan-U.S. security arrangements and new international relations after 911 promote the maintenance, reorganization, and reinforcement of the U.S. military hegemony in East Asia. On the other hand, however, even in such a new security environment, no multilateral talks among countries within the region have yet developed, with the exception of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Based on an understanding of the above-mentioned conditions, the following sections will examine the current meaning of the U.S. military presence in East Asia and the orientation of Japan's security policy in relation to the increased global hegemony of the U.S. At the end of this paper, there will be an examination, based on the results of public opinion surveys, of how the Japanese public has formed views regarding military security according to the recent changes mentioned above. A few comments will also be made about the prospects of the pacifism symbolized by the Japanese Constitution.

2. The End of the Second World War and the Defense of Japan's Territory


As a result of defeat in the Second World War (1945), Japan lost its colonies and had its territory reduced to its pre-colonial area: Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and other outlying islands. With regard to defense, Japan was completely disarmed in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945. The General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ), led by the U.S. military, 'indirectly' governed Japan. Based on the directions of the GHQ, a new Japanese Constitution was enacted in 1946. Article 9 was included in the Constitution to prohibit Japan from ever again having any military forces.⁷ However, following the GHQ recommendations, the Police Reserve Force (*Keisatsu yobitai*) was formed as a small ground force in 1950 when the Korean War began. In 1952 when Japan was restored to full sovereignty, the Police Reserve Force was reformed into the Security Force (*Hoantai*) with a new maritime unit. In 1954, the Security Force was reorganized into the Self-Defense Forces (*Jieitai*, SDF) consisting of the Ground, Maritime and Air SDFs.

Although the construction of the SDF constituted the defensive rearmament of Japan, it was actually a result of the development of the Cold War in East Asia. The development of the Cold War required the U.S. to rearm Japan and station military forces within or near Japan. This division of labor over security was the purpose of the Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty concluded in 1951. Due to the fact that the rearmament of Japan was constitutionally regulated and that the Cold-War containment policy of the U.S. was deployed in East Asia, the power container⁸ of Japan came to have a rather ambiguous nature. The territorial security of Japan depended primarily on the US military forces stationed within mainland Japan and Okinawa, not on the SDF.

The ambiguity about who should militarily defend Japan can be explained partially by the fact that

many Japanese were not actually aware of the U.S. military presence within Japan. In June 1945, the U.S. military captured and occupied Okinawa, one of the prefectures of Japan. As a result of the Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1951, the US military continued to govern Okinawa until 1972. More US military bases have been constructed in Okinawa than in mainland Japan since the end of the Second World War, while the U.S. occupation force began to withdraw from Japan as it restored full sovereignty (Figure 1). The constitutional pacifism denying the possession of an aggressive military force and the spatial separation of Okinawa from the territory of Japan led to the lack of a sense of territorial defense and a weak territorial consciousness among the mainland Japanese. The loss of the colonies, Japan’s geographical configuration as an island country, and the absence of military conflicts with neighboring countries after the war have also contributed to a weak sense of international boundaries and territorial sovereignty.⁹

Figure 1. Shifts in the Area of U.S. Military Installations within Japan (1945-1998)



However, the situation described above has been shifting in recent years (Yamazaki 2002, 2003). There are several reasons for this shift. First, the geopolitical context of Japan has changed. The end of the Cold War removed the threat posed by the former Soviet Union, and it has become more important to construct different diplomatic and military approaches to each of the remaining communist countries. Second, incidents that made the Japanese cognizant of the remaining potential threats occurred in the late 1990s. The launch of a so-called *Taepodong* missile from North Korea in 1998, the invasion of North Korean ships into the territorial waters of Japan and Japan’s armed response to them after 1999, and the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea that became a controversial social issue after 2002, are incidents that have increased public awareness of the actual threat from North Korea. Finally, since the second half of the 1990s, the repetition of military exercises by China to pressure Taiwan has been a security concern for the Japanese government. In other words, Japan can no longer deal with these issues within the framework of the conflicts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, or as a response to the communist bloc; instead, it needs to redefine them as multilateral diplomatic and military issues in East Asia. Individual incidents such as these seem to have given the Japanese public opportunities to rethink the level of Japan’s territorial defense.

The core of such territorial defense, or Japan's realistic security policies, has been the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as a counterpart to the Japanese Constitution that advocates pacifism.¹⁰ In the following sections, the meaning of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements will be examined from the viewpoint of shifts in the geopolitical context of Japan.

3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements in the Post-Cold War Era

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

After the Second World War, Japan was completely disarmed and incorporated into the Western capitalist bloc through the U.S. occupation. The Japan-U.S. security arrangements were formally established in 1951 when the Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were concluded. The current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty¹¹ determines two important obligations for both countries. Article 5 of the treaty requires that the U.S. defend Japan, which implies that an armed attack on Japan would result in a military confrontation with the U.S., and, therefore, means that for Japan the treaty possesses power as a deterrent. Article 6, conversely, requires Japan to provide the U.S. with areas and facilities so that the U.S. can station its military forces within Japan, particularly in Okinawa (Figure 2). This 'mutual' relationship has sustained Japan's constitutional pacifism and a relatively non-aggressive SDF on one hand, and the U.S.' forward deployment in East Asia on the other. The deployment of U.S. military forces has also been considered as playing an important role in maintaining a military balance among East Asian countries. Figure 3 represents such an idea in the form of the conventional geopolitical vision of East Asia by the Japan Defense Agency.

As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War necessitated a reexamination of the conventional Japan-U.S. security arrangements which were based on a bipolar world. After close consultation between the governments of Japan and the U.S., the two countries announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996. Recognizing that instabilities and uncertainties would continue to exist in the Asia-Pacific region, the two countries reconfirmed in the declaration that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would remain the cornerstone of the maintenance of a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region into the 21st century (Japan Defense Agency 2002: 97).

On the significance of the newly-defined Japan-U.S. security arrangements, the Declaration presents the following points (ibid.):

- (i) The most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close cooperation on defense between Japan and the U.S., based on a combination of an appropriate defense capability of the SDF and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The U.S. deterrent under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty remains the foundation of Japan's security.
- (ii) In order to meet its commitments in the prevailing security environment, the U.S. will maintain its current force structure of about 100,000 forward-deployed military personnel in the region, including the current level of forces deployed in Japan.
- (iii) Japan will continue to make appropriate contributions to the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan by providing them with facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as well as host nation support.¹²

Figure 2. The Distribution of the SDF and U.S. Military Installations in Japan







Figure 3. Major Military Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region



Notes: 1. Source: "Military Balance" (2001-2002), etc. (Figures for Japan show actual strength as of the end of FY2001).
 2. U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are combined figures of Army and Marine Corps personnel.
 3. Combat aircraft include naval and Marine Corps aircraft.
 4. Figures inside the parentheses (-) show the number of divisions.



Source: Japan Defense Agency (2002: 38).

As the declaration indicates, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements were redefined as maintaining the existing security arrangements not only for Japan's security, but also for the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The sphere which the Japan-U.S. security arrangements would influence was also correspondingly enlarged from the territory of Japan to the Asia-Pacific region. This indicates that the Japan-U.S. politico-economic alliance reconstructed the division of labor and cooperation in the region after the Cold War (Grant and Nijman 1997). Thus, the end of the Cold War did not significantly change the nature of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Rather, the alliance between the two countries was

reinforced against newly-emerging instabilities and uncertainties in the globalizing world.


The QDR and Asia

After 911, the reinforced Japan-U.S. security arrangements entered a new stage. For the U.S., East Asia became one of the important strategic areas. Following 911, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) paid particular attention to East Asia (U.S. Department of Defense 2001). In addition to China being depicted as the U.S.’ new ‘military rival,’ North Korea was listed as a member of ‘an axis of evil’ (Bush 2002). In this new context of the “war on terror,” the Bush Administration has given new security implications to East Asia.

In discussing the U.S.’ basic strategic guideline for this new context, the QDR listed four critical areas closely related to the U.S.’ strategic interests: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia (Figure 4). Recognizing ‘asymmetric approaches to warfare’¹³ as an important aspect of current security trends, the QDR mentioned the following key geopolitical trends (U.S. Department of Defense 2001: 3-4):

- (i) Diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance.
- (ii) Regional security developments.
- (iii) Increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states.
- (iv) Diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors.
- (v) Developing and sustaining regional security arrangements.
- (vi) Increasing diversity in the sources and unpredictability of the location of conflict.

Figure 4. Strategically Important Areas in QDR.



Note: This map was drawn by the author according to the description of QDR

As item (i) implies, with the spreading prospect of ballistic missiles as well as other weapons of mass destruction targeting the U.S. and its allies globally, the forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the four critical areas is justified. In item (ii), Asia is defined as “a region susceptible to large-scale military competition.” In particular, the area that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia is named “a broad arc of instability” and regarded as a region that contains a volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers. Thus, this ‘arc of instability’ constitutes a source of military threats to the U.S. The QDR states that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region, suggesting threats from China.

Moreover, item (ii) refers to “the East Asian littoral” ranging from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan as representing a particularly challenging area. This is because:

“The distances are vast in the Asian theater.¹⁴ The density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. The United States also has less assurance of access to facilities in the region. This places a premium on securing additional access and infrastructure agreements and on developing systems capable of sustained operations at great distances with minimum theater-based support” (U.S. Department of Defense 2001: 4).

Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that such an interpretation of the nature of the Asian ‘theater’ could lead to closer military cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the region after 911.

Elsewhere, the QDR emphasizes the maintenance of the U.S.’ ‘regionally tailored forces’ and the strengthening of its ‘forward deterrent posture’ in the four critical areas (U.S. Department of Defense 2001: 20). Since the U.S. military presence in Europe and Northeast Asia to contain the aggression of the Soviet Union is no longer relevant, the forward deployment of U.S. military forces needs to be reconstructed in order to adjust to the new strategic environment (U.S. Department of Defense 2001: 25), and this adjustment needs to be financially feasible.

It can be said from this that the U.S.’ new global strategy as represented by the QDR is both to maintain the U.S. military presence in the four critical areas for its security, and to seek multilateral military cooperation with friendly countries in each area. Although the unilateral aspect of the U.S.’ foreign policy after 911 is repeatedly emphasized in the media, the U.S. has attempted to reconstruct an international regime dealing with newly-emerging security threats such as global terrorism.

Japan’s New Security Mission?

It appears that the QDR had a significant impact on Japan’s security policy after 911. The Japan Defense Agency’s *Defense of Japan 2002* (DOJ) follows the QDR’s interpretation of the international military situation in many respects, indicating that Japan’s security policy is firmly connected to its U.S. counterpart and the U.S. global strategy through the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The DOJ (Japan Defense Agency 2002: 2-6) basically regards the general international military situation as ‘a time of uneasiness’ and interprets the elicitation of ‘asymmetrical threats’ and ‘threats of non-state-actors’ as leading to the globalization of security issues. As a result, the DOJ states that, while the aspects of stability accorded by deterrence by power and the balance of power remain, various efforts are being made to promote international cooperation, aiming at a further stabilization of international relations. With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, the DOJ recognizes that geographical and historical diversity exists in the region and that countries in the region have varied outlooks on national security. More importantly, despite the end of the Cold War, the DOJ states, the region has not witnessed dramatic changes in the security structure as seen in Europe, and contains military forces, including nuclear weapons, on an enormous scale. In addition to

existing security issues such as China's military and economic development, military tensions in the Korean Peninsula, and unresolved territorial disputes in other areas, the QDR's perception of the region as being part of an "arc of instability" leads the DOJ to conclude that:

"Given such circumstances, bilateral alliances and friendly relations centering on the U.S., and the presence of U.S. forces based upon these relationships, continue to play an important role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region" (Japan Defense Agency 2002: 3).

The DOJ clearly follows the U.S.' new strategic framework, represented by the QDR, and regards Japan's security role in relation to the U.S.' global strategies as crucial for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Concerning Japan's security principles, the DOJ states that, while maintaining bilateral diplomatic relations such as the Japan-U.S. alliance, and strengthening regional and global cooperation with neighboring countries as well as the U.N., Japan needs to improve its security power and firmly maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. This means that Japan will keep securing U.S. military intervention and deployment in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the DOJ, Japan's cooperation with U.S. military strategies will contribute to peace and security not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the world. In sum, for Japan, the end of the Cold War and 911 have contributed not to changing the structure of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, but rather, to reinforcing it through redefining its role and significance in the new regional and global security contexts.

4. Japanese Popular Consciousness over Security Issues

As mentioned above, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements have not undergone dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War. However, Japanese popular consciousness over security issues in the 1990s seems to have experienced significant changes towards a more defensive position. Unlike the period during the Cold War, increasing regional conflicts seem to have affected the Japanese public perception of Japan's security. Using the results of public opinion surveys conducted by the Cabinet Office, let us examine the changes in Japanese public opinion on security issues.

The results of the surveys reveal several interesting tendencies among the respondents concerning the SDF and defense issues (*Naikakufu daijin-kanbo seifu kobositsu* 2003, Figures 5 to 10). Respondents' interest in these issues has been increasing (Figure 5). The recent three surveys (1997, 2000, and 2003) indicate that more and more respondents are becoming interested in these issues since the issues concern Japan's peace and independence (Figure 6). Incidents such as the invasion of North Korean ships into Japanese waters, North Korea's launching of missiles in the late 1990s, and 911 may have contributed to the increase in such responses.

For the Japanese public, the primary role of the SDF has been disaster relief. However, national security (i.e. prevention of foreign invasion) is becoming another major role, while it is expected to play other roles such as making an international contribution (Figure 7). On the other hand, in the 1990s more and more Japanese came to believe that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was useful for maintaining Japan's peace and security (Figure 8). The number of Japanese who support the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the SDF as a means to maintain Japan's security has been increasing over time (Figure 9). Opinions rejecting the security arrangements and/or the SDF have been in the minority. From this it can be concluded that the Japanese public has increasingly supported the current security arrangements. Figure 10 shows that the number of respondents believing that Japan may be involved in war has increased drastically in recent years. Many respondents are worried that current international tensions and conflicts may put Japan in danger.¹⁵

The number of respondents concerned about the situation in the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East is also increasing.¹⁶ In sum, as international tensions and conflicts, especially those in East Asia, increased in the post-Cold War era, more and more Japanese became concerned about Japan's security and began to support the security status quo.

As the Japan-U.S. security arrangements were redefined and rearranged to cope with the new geopolitical context in the post-Cold War era, Japanese popular consciousness over security issues has transformed accordingly. What is noteworthy in these trends is that, while the institutional arrangements for Japan's security were not dramatically changed, the Japanese popular consciousness transformed to cope with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War world. It seems that Japanese postwar pacifism or anti-war sentiment is disappearing among the Japanese public.

Figure 5. Interest in the SDF and Defense Issues




Figure 6. Reasons For Interest in the SDF and Defense Issues




Figure 7. Future Roles of the SDF
(Multiple answers)




Figure 8. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty




Figure 9. Measures to Maintain Japan's Security





Figure 10. Danger That Japan Will Be Involved in War



5. Conclusions

Since 911, the Koizumi Cabinet has become very active in increasing Japan's contribution to the global military operations initiated by the U.S. Unlike during the Gulf War, Japan swiftly dispatched Maritime SDF vessels to the Indian Ocean to support the U.S. military campaign against Afghanistan in 2001, and sent the SDF to Iraq for its postwar rehabilitation in 2004. In addition, the Japanese Diet passed bills for emergency defense laws in 2003. Japan's security policy has thus transformed dramatically in the past few years.

In light of the U.S.'s new strategic framework focusing on four critical areas and the redefined Japan-U.S. security arrangements, Japan is/will be actively involved in the U.S.'s international military operations in order to support its forward deployment. In this sense, Japanese popular concern that Japan may be involved in war is an 'accurate' perception of the current situation. However, the Japanese public shows its preference for depending on the existing Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the SDF, which means dependence on the same security arrangements that may simultaneously create security threats to Japan. In other words, Japan needs to be 'prepared' for war because it has decided to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements through which the U.S. can exercise its hegemonic power over East Asia as well as the Asia-Pacific region. One can ask whether this is the best way to relieve tensions and solve conflicts in the region, and why Japan needs to maintain a security relationship only with the U.S.

With regard to the Japanese popular consciousness over security issues, unlike the public response during the Gulf War,¹⁷ the Japanese public seems to become more 'realistic' or tolerant of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in the face of concrete threats from outside Japan. Since 75% of the area of the U.S. bases in Japan is concentrated in Okinawa (Figure 2), mainland Japanese do/will not have to carry the burden for this option.¹⁸ Feeling uneasy about such a situation, the author will now offer his view on the prospects for the existing anti-war peace movements.

For popular movements against militarism, the above-mentioned situation is not at all favorable, and in this new context it is not an easy task to reconstruct the movements and make them effective. At the same time, anti-U.S. base movements in Japan, especially in Okinawa, tend to be localized and weakened. Although a series of protest movements, which were caused by the rape of an Okinawan girl by U.S. servicemen in 1995, spread across the prefecture in 1996, these came to an end in 1998 when Okinawa voters refused to elect leftist Governor Ota for a third time. Responding to the protests, the Japanese government decided to reduce the U.S. bases. However, the removal of the Futenma Air Station to Nago City was refused by local Okinawans through the city referendum in 1997, but accepted by Mayor Higa in exchange for his resignation, which resulted in the election of a candidate (Kishimoto) who stated that he might accept the new station. The protest against the removal also became localized as a local affair at Henoko, which was designated as the destination of the new station.¹⁹ On the other hand, Japanese popular consciousness is being transformed so that the gap between the popular consciousness and Japan's security policy is narrowing. Although the Japanese Constitution, particularly its Preface and Article 9, assumes the construction of peace through strict regulation against the use of military forces and has been an ideological basis for Japanese anti-war peace movements, it seems that this ideal finally lead to a public consciousness that cannot help but accept the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Given this picture, a completely new strategy for the movements will need to be created in order to overcome such localization and weakness, and mobilize the public against increasing militarism as a solution to international disputes.

The prospect for such a new movement is not necessarily commanding, but the development of new information technology, for instance, will enable people to construct a transnational network useful for the exchange of opinions and creative ideas and to accumulate knowledge and resources for an effective new movement. In the early 20th century, modern geography established geopolitics to serve state military policies. Serious reflection on the outcomes of this would suggest it is necessary to develop non-state

sources of information and knowledge and establish a ‘new geopolitics’²⁰ that is an empirical and critical discipline able to question militarism. This new geopolitics could serve in practice to actively problematize the subject of state security in research and education, and vitalize the public consciousness that would otherwise tend to maintain the status quo. I hope that more geographers can be involved in this process along with activists and other researchers.

Notes

- 1 This paper is a modified translation of Yamazaki (2005a).
- 2 By “East Asia,” this chapter refers to the area from the Russian Far East through Japan to Southeast Asia.
- 3 The disputes typically concern the Spratly Islands. China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Brunei claim territorial rights over the whole or part of the islands, and this has been thought to be one of the most likely causes of military conflicts in Southeast Asia.
- 4 The contents of the redefinition were included in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security published on April 17, 1996 after the meeting between Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton.
- 5 In particular, China and South Korea have been critical of Japan’s militarily aggressive policy because of the historical relationships between Japan and these countries.
- 6 East Asian countries (that is, their governments) have not made a clear objection to the SDF’s participation in the ‘war on terror’ and seem, if not willingly, to have accepted a series of their overseas activities. For example, see the reactions of participant countries to Japan at the ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) summit on November 5, 2001 (*Asahi Shimbun* 2001).
- 7 Article 9 states, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized;” cited from K. Inoue (1991: 275).
- 8 Giddens (1987: 11) coined the term ‘power container’ to express one of the fundamental functions of the modern state as a nation-state, which is to be a territorially bounded administrative unity and generate power first and foremost through the concentration of allocative and administrative resources within it.
- 9 The results of the public opinion surveys mentioned in Section 4 indicate that the Japanese public does not necessarily regard the role of the SDF as maintaining state (territorial) security, and that they tend to believe that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has been useful. However, Japanese conservative intellectuals and media have repeatedly criticized the public lack of interest in, and the Japanese government’s attitude toward, territorial issues over the Northern Territories, Takeshima Island, or the Senkaku Islands (see Takubo 1999; *Sankei Shimbun* 5/18-7/12/97). As a recent example, despite the repeated claims by the victims’ families, the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea neither became an important political agenda nor a matter of national interest (Nishioka 2002: 5-23).
- 10 The complementary relationship between the Japanese Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was constructed by the third Yoshida Cabinet (1949-1952). In order to conclude the Peace Treaty as soon as possible, Prime Minister Yoshida took advantage of the U.S. military force for Japan’s security, neither rearming Japan substantially nor questioning the constitutional grounds for such a policy (Tanaka 1997: 68-69).
- 11 The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised in 1960.
- 12 The measures taken by the partner countries to support the U.S. military forces deployed overseas.
- 13 These approaches employ non-conventional means of attacking the weaknesses of enemies, such as through the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and bio-chemical weapons), ballistic missiles, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and other means (Japan Defense Agency 2002: 72 note 2)
- 14 ‘Theater’ means the areas where the U.S. military forces are strategically deployed and stationed. The U.S. military forces posit three (Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific) theaters.

- 15 Of the respondents believing that Japan may be involved in war, 73.9% in 2000 and 79.5% in 2003 believe so due to the existence of international tensions and conflicts.
- 16 The recent changes in the proportion of such respondents are as follows: the situation on the Korean Peninsula changed from 56.7% in 2000 to 74.4% in 2003; the situation in the Middle East from 14.8% in 2000 to 33.9% in 2003.
- 17 As Figure 9 shows, the number of respondents supporting the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the SDF slightly decreased during the Gulf War in 1991. Figure 5 also shows a drastic increase in popular interest in the SDF and defense issues in the same year. Umabayashi (2002: 19-24) argues that these facts prove the obvious existence of an anti-war sentiment among the Japanese public. However, the results of the 2003 survey following 911 do not clearly show the effect of such a sentiment.
- 18 The proportions of the respondents supporting the removal of part of the U.S. bases in Okinawa to Japan proper were 42.2% in 1997, 36.8% in 2000, and 34.6% in 2003.
- 19 For a detailed discussion about these political processes, see Yamazaki 2004a, 2004b, and 2005b.
- 20 “New geopolitics” refers to political geographic studies that critically reconstruct classical geopolitics which attempted to contribute to state military and foreign policy, and that critically and empirically examine the dynamics of international relations. This field of research appeared after the revitalization of Anglophone political geography in the 1980s. New geopolitics currently constitutes one of the major research subjects in Anglophone political geography. Yamazaki (2001) explains its significance for the history of the sub-discipline. See also the author’s academic and educational attempts to construct new geopolitics in the Japanese context at: www.lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp/~yamataka/home.htm

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An Essay on Geopolitical Writings in the Magazine *Kaizo* during the Asia-Pacific War in Japan.

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1 Introduction

It is said that geopolitics (*Geopolitik*) was established as a sub-discipline of *Staatslehre* which deals with state-land relations and was coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén in the early twentieth century. It developed in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s.

Geopolitics was first introduced into Japan in 1925. Although some geographers noticed its value as a policy science, most geographers regarded it as a part of political science rather than geography. Therefore, geopolitical studies did not develop further in the 1920s. However, geopolitical studies came into the limelight as a field sympathetic to the Establishment when militaristic sentiment increased in the second half of the 1930s. Geopolitical studies reached their peak during the Asia-Pacific War of 1941-1945. However, the Supreme Commander Allied Power in Japan purged some geographers engaged in geopolitics, and geopolitical studies and the movement disappeared after the war.

Many studies have been done on Japanese geopolitics up till now. These studies clarified the actual conditions of geopolitical works written by Japanese geographers during wartime. Takeuchi (1980) clarified the introduction of geopolitics in Japan and its development before World War II. According to him, there were three geographer groups engaging in geopolitics: the Kyoto school, which was oriented towards indigenous Japanese geopolitics; academics who were strongly influenced by German geopolitics; and finally the academics, politicians and military men who founded the Japanese Society for Geopolitics. Takeuchi (1994) argued that Japanese geopolitics was related to Japanese imperialism. He mentioned, “the criticism of Japanese geopolitics has not acknowledged the social relevance...of geographical studies.” He also mentioned “all the critiques have so far failed to point out what prompted researchers and practitioners of geography to support imperialistic geopolitics.”

Fukushima (1997) tried to clarify the reasons why Japanese intellectuals critical of geopolitics at first changed their attitudes later. The reasons for their change of attitudes “stemmed from several problems which both contemporary Japanese and international society were facing” (Fukushima 1997: 407). That is, geopolitics was deemed useful in order to stress the linkage between Southeast Asia and East Asia. She indicates three tasks of geopolitical studies as its legacy: the problem concerning the weakness of global organizations like the League of Nations; the need for a drastic social reform through the improvement of the mechanism of the capitalistic system; and the methodological problems of geography. In this way, Fukushima clarified the need for geopolitics at that time, relating it to its background, and pointed out tasks for geopolitical study.

Takeuchi (2000) investigated the geopolitical tradition, geopolitical practices and the social relevance of geopolitical discourse. He examined the ‘brain trust’ of Premier Fumimaro Konoe, especially Masamichi Royama, a leading figure of the *Shōwa Kenkyūkai* (Study Group of the Shōwa Period), adding them to the three geographer groups mentioned earlier. Takeuchi points out that members of the Study Group of the Shōwa Period such as Royama had much influence on the advent of the *Tōa Shin Chitsujo* (New Order in

East Asia) and the *Daitōa-Kyōeiken* (The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere).

Others such as political scientists and historians examined geopolitics in the 1930s in Japan. For example, Hatano (1981) examined Japanese geopolitics during the 1930s and included in his study the discourse of geographers during that time. He mentioned that Royama understood geopolitics quite well and used it as the basic theory of the *Tōa Kyōdotai* (the East Asia Community) and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Miwa (1986) also mentioned that geopolitics was used in both the economic rationalism of Royama and moralism of Komaki to insist on a larger economic sphere based on regional universalism.

As mentioned above, many studies have tackled geopolitics in Japan. However, there have not been enough investigations of how Japanese geopolitics influenced the Japanese masses. In order to answer this question, we must analyze the pieces published in periodicals for the masses, rather than pieces published in the professional journals for academics. From such a perspective, this essay will investigate articles written in *Kaijō*, a ‘general magazine’ (*sōgōzasshi* in Japanese) published for educated Japanese.

Investigating journals for mass audiences is related to ‘popular geopolitics.’ According to Ó Tuathail (1996), popular geopolitics is “used to explore how societies and states often attempt to represent the world and their position in consistent and regular ways.” “Formal architecture, such as monuments, and media sources, such as television, music, film, magazines and cartoons, provide resources and/or even actively construct particular vistas of world politics and specific places” (Dodds 2000). Therefore, popular sources offer many possibilities for discerning “how other places and peoples are represented within a variety of national and cultural contexts” (Dodds 2000). There is significance in examining articles in *Kaijō* in such a critical geopolitical context.

Many geographers wrote geopolitical articles and books during this period. *Geopolitics*, the journal of the Japan Geopolitical Association, was founded in January 1942 and many articles appeared in this journal. *Geography* and *Geographical Education*, both journals for geography teachers of elementary schools and secondary schools, sometimes had special issues on geopolitics to meet the wartime situation. However, there were no geopolitical articles in one of the primary journals for academic geographers, the *Geographical Review of Japan*, during this period. There were some general magazines, *Chūō-Kōron* and *Bungei-Shunjū*, besides *Kaijō* in Japan. These magazines did not have articles on geopolitics although they had articles that played up to the wartime sentiment. *Kaijō*, on the other hand, published some geopolitical articles during this period. This is why I will examine *Kaijō* in this paper.

2 Geopolitical writings in *Kaizo*

2-1 On *Kaizo*

The magazine *Kaijō* was founded in 1919 by Sanehiko Yamamoto who was a businessman and a politician. He intended to use the magazine as a means to enter the world of politics (Seki et al. 1977: 36). He designed *Kaijō* to be a general magazine that has various types of content like *Chūō-Kōron*. However, as the number of copies returned unsold was more than the number of copies sold in the first three issues, *Kaijō* was quickly driven into a crisis. After reshuffling the editorial staff and changing the contents of the magazine, *Kaijō* sold better to become a general magazine equal to *Chūō-Kōron* (Seki et al. 1977: 40-46). Compared with the *Chūō-Kōron*'s liberal readership, *Kaijō* was characterized by its left wing readership and many socialist writers contributed articles to it. The Japanese word *kaijō* means rebuilding or reorganization, therefore *Kaijō* literally became a magazine read by people who hoped to reorganize Japan.

As Japan entered the stage of total war during the Japan-China War in 1937, many of the contributors to *Kaijō*, who were socialist writers and academics, were arrested. After that, liberal writers came to

contribute to *Kaizō* instead of socialists. Some members of the Shōwa Research Group (*Shōwa Kenkyūkai*) who contributed articles to *Kaizō* were advisors to Fumimaro Konoe (who was twice the prime minister, from June 1937 to January 1939, and from July 1940 to October 1941). It is said that the idea of the East Asian Community (*Tōa Kyōdōtai*) they advocated was spread to the Japanese public through this magazine and Prime Minister Konoe declared Japan's New Order in East Asia (*Tōa Shin Chitsujō*) based on this idea on November 3, 1938 (Seki et al. 1977: 167-174).

After the Asia-Pacific War broke out in 1941, the special political police arrested most of *Kaizō*'s editorial staff and contributors in September 1942 (the Yokohama Incident). This incident severely impacted the continuation of the publication, and the situation got worse as ink and paper supplies became scarce. In June of 1944, *Kaizō* was forced to temporarily cease publication. Although it revived its publication soon after the war, *Kaizō* ceased publication permanently in February 1955 due to unsatisfactory sales figures.

Table 1 Articles written by geographers or articles with the word 'geopolitics' appearing in *Kaizō*

year	vol.	author	title
1938	20:11	Masamichi Royama	Tōa-Kyōdōtai no Riron (A Theory of the East Asia Community)
1940	22:14	Hiroshi Satō	Shinpan Sekai Chizu (The New World Map)
1941	23:7	Masamichi Royama	Daitōa-Kyōeiken no Chiseigakuteki Kōsatsu. (A Geopolitical Consideration of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)
1941	23:10	Joji Ezawa	Kokubō-Chirigaku to Seinan-Taiheiō (Geopolitics for National Defence and the Southwestern Pacific Ocean)
1941	23:16	Tadashi Yoshimura	Nanpō Seisaku no Chiseigakuteki Konkyo (Geopolitical Grounds for the Development Policy of the South)
1942	24:2	Koichi Itagaki, Hiroshi Satoh, Susumu Takamiya, Toshitada Katayama and Yoshitaro Hirano	Daitōa Atarashiki Kōsō (The Greater East Asia, a New Plan) Discussion Meeting
1942	24:3	Saneshige Komaki	Minami Ajia Tairiku no Chiseigaku (Geopolitics in the South Asian Continent)
1943	25:2	Saneshige Komaki	Chiseigakujō yori Mitaru Indo (India from a Geopolitical Point of View)
1943	25:5	Teiji Yabe, Tadao Takemura, Kenzo Kawakami, Nobuo Muroga and Yakichi Terada	Sōryokusen no Jūten Suikō: Nihon Sōryokusen Kenkyūkai Zadankai 4 (Priority Execution of the Total War: the 4th Discussion Meeting of Japanese Total War Studies)
1944	26:2	Saneshige Komaki	Daitōa Kesshū no Hongi (The True Meaning of Solidarity of the Greater East Asia)
1944	26:2	Nobuo Muroga	Indoyō Senkyoku no Tenbō (Prospect of the War Situation in the Indian Ocean)

2-2 Geopolitical Articles in *Kaizo*

Table 1 shows the articles geographers wrote or that had geopolitics in their titles in *Kaizō* during wartime. Four geographers, Hiroshi Satō, Joji Ezawa, Saneshige Komaki, and Nobuo Muroga, contributed articles to *Kaizō* during this period. Satō and Ezawa were professor and lecturer, respectively, at the Tokyo College of Commerce and its preparatory school (the present Hitotsubashi University) and Komaki and Muroga were professor and lecturer, respectively, at Kyoto Imperial University (the present Kyoto University). The other two people included in Table 1. were political scientists. Most notable was Masamichi Royama who was one of the primary members of the Shōwa Research Group. I will consider the characteristics of their articles in the following section.

2-2-1 Hiroshi Satoh

Satō published "*Shinpan Sekai Chizu* (The New World Map)" in 1940. Taking into consideration that the war was progressing favorably for Germany immediately after the outbreak of World War II, Satō

explained that the world divided into small nation-states by the Treaty of Versailles was shifting into a world with bloc economies or state unions. It meant that a new world map was being formed. According to Satō, this new world tended towards the realization of four autarkic blocs: the East Asian Bloc, which consisted of Japan, Manchuria, China and India; the European and African Bloc; the North and South American Bloc; and the Soviet Bloc. He anticipated that the four blocs would go into a world state or divide into (ethnic) nation states again. He insisted that Japan should develop its posture in any case.

Although the word 'geopolitics' does not appear in this article, it is clear that the idea of four autarkic blocs was under the influence of the idea of a 'Pan Region' advocated by the German geopolitician Karl Haushofer. Therefore this article was written under the influence of German *Geopolitik*. Furthermore, Satō mentioned the use of natural resources in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at a discussion meeting titled "Greater East Asia: The New Plan" in vol. 24-2 in 1942.

2-2-2 Joji Ezawa

Ezawa contributed his article titled "Geopolitics for National Defense and the Southwestern Pacific Ocean" in 1941. Based on Haushofer's *Webrgeopolitik (Geopolitics for National Defense)* (1932), Ezawa states that there are differences of *Lagenwert* (location values) between Western states and Japan, and that these differences mean geopolitical distortion which should be removed by war in the worst case scenario.

2-2-3 Saneshige Komaki

Komaki contributed three articles, the biggest contribution among geographers to *Kaizō*. In his article titled "Geopolitics in the South Asian Continent," Komaki calls the Australian Continent 'the South Asian Continent.' He insists that Japan, based on *Tennō*-ism (Japanese imperialism based on the Emperor), should be the leading state instead of Australia with their 'White Australia Policy.' We can read characteristics of fatalism and spiritual uplifting in his articles.

The article "India from a Geopolitical Point of View," written in 1943, when the Japanese army went into India after sweeping over Burma, explains India geopolitically. Komaki insists that Japan should expel the British from India and realize the unification of Asian nations in cooperation with India.

Komaki's next article appeared in February 1944. "The True Meaning of Uniting the Greater East Asia Nations" was written after the Greater East Asian Conference was held in Tokyo in November 1943 and the manifesto of the Greater East Asian nations was declared. He mentioned that it was necessary to unite the Greater East Asian nations based on *Tennō*-ism. As mentioned earlier, it is clear that these articles of Komaki's were fatalistic and aimed at uplifting the national spirit.

2-2-4 Nobuo Muroga

Nobuo Muroga wrote "Prospect of the War Situation in the Indian Ocean" in February 1944. He explained that the Indian Ocean was a unified area which should be called the 'Indian Ocean Empire' based on its natural conditions. Therefore it is important, he noted, to unite the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. Differing from his colleague and his senior Komaki, who repeated fatalistic spiritualism, Muroga's article rehearsed the characteristics of classical geopolitics, emphasizing geographical dimensions based on natural conditions.

2-2-5 Masamichi Royama

Masamichi Royama published "A Geopolitical Consideration of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in 1941. As mentioned above, Royama was well known as one of the key members of the Showa

Research Group. Royama wrote many articles and books on the *Tōa Kyōdōtai* (the East Asian Community) advocated by some of the members of the Showa Research Group. The East Asian Community was often identified with the *Tōa Renmei* (the East Asian Union), which was advocated by Kanji Ishihara, a military person. I differentiate the two because the former focused on the socio-political policy while the latter focused on militaristic and religious elements.

In a piece entitled “A Theory of East Asian Community” in *Kaijō* (20:11), 1938, he noted that the piece was an attempt “to organize a theory of the world from a regionalistic perspective based on geopolitical considerations” (Royama 1941: 98-99). Hatano (1981: 36) already pointed out that Royama had noted German *Geopolitik* before the Manchuria Crisis in 1931. It is clear that the political scientist Royama contributed a geopolitical article earlier than geographers in *Kaijō*. In this article (Royama 1938), Royama advocated overcoming western imperialistic nationalism and awakening oriental unification. This unification of the Orient was inherent in the process of the expansion of Japanese nationalism to the Asian continent. He stated that the expansion of Japan's influences in Manchuria meant not “a colonial economy but a regional destined community in which nations in a certain region are linked in cooperative relations” (Royama 1938: 16). He argued “that it is the theory of a regional destined community, suggested by the realistic process of Japan’s growth in the Asian continent, which is the guiding principle in realizing the unification of the Asian nations and the ideological weapon to overcome the tragedy of the Asian nations caused by mistaken European nationalism” (Royama 1938: 14-18). Furthermore, Royama stated that “there must be something other than natural immutability and cultural inharmoniousness,” and he stated “the elements in which the East will become a regional community are in its spirit and mind. It appears in the self-consciousness of regional destiny or *Raumsschicksal* of Asian nations” (Royama 1938: 20). In such statements, we can read the influence of German geopolitical ideas.

Royama advocated, then, five theoretical characteristics of the regional community. Especially in the third one he mentioned, “the oriental community must attach importance to the connection between unchangeable natural/geographical conditions and changeable economic/scientific/cultural factors...we must establish a new regional culturally unified entity” (Royama 1938: 21). It is clear, from what has been mentioned above, that some ideas originating from German *Geopolitik* were used in “the Eastern Asia Community” though there are no words of geopolitics in it.

The title of his 1941 article suggests that it was written under the influence of geopolitics. In this article, Royama stated that scientific consideration of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was needed, and that geopolitics and political geography contributed to such consideration. After mentioning that he has tried to construct a theory of the world based on regionalism, Royama stated that “if there exist any policies which realize the national power successfully in a certain region, the essential role of geopolitics is to render all sorts of things necessary for realizing such policies into a condition available for logical thinking” (Royama 1941: 100). However, “all kinds of scientific data must be available for logical thinking and there are many difficulties in the capacity of geopolitics to synthesize such data in relation to the evolution of certain historical movements” (Royama 1941: 100-101). “Similarly, there can exist things which do not necessarily have relations to a certain life space and restrictions on it, in considering human life matters involving principles and concepts. Therefore, geopolitics does not investigate all of the social and political phenomena.” Thus we see that Royama mentions the limitations of geopolitics.

After mentioning the significance and limitations of geopolitics, Royama elucidated the geopolitical structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He mentions that the sphere should be “a concept of a historical and political region” (Royama 1941: 102). Then he stated that a synthetic geopolitical study was needed. Namely, he stated that the sphere from a geopolitical perspective consisted of three sub-regions: 1) the Eurasian Continent Region, 2) the Continental Peninsular Region, and 3) the

Southwestern Pacific Archipelagic Region. And he states that these sub-areas should be investigated as “dynamic historical movements.”

According to Royama, historical movements in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were classified into three movements: 1) a movement towards the formation of nation states from communities based on organic entities from ancient times; 2) a movement towards the formation of imperial colonies by western countries from both oceanic and continental expansion; and 3) a self-determinative movement aimed at the liberation of imperial colonies (Royama 1941: 104-107). Then he advocated that it was necessary to unite these three movements to construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Royama stated it was difficult to construct the sphere without taking into account the characteristics of geopolitical structure and historical movements in the sphere as mentioned above. Finally, Royama pointed out three geopolitical problems in constructing the sphere: 1) problems of national defense geopolitics; 2) problems of resource geopolitics; and 3) problems of ethno-geopolitics.

Royama understood the essence and limits of geopolitics quite well. His article was notably different from the geopolitics of geographers who explained geopolitical ideas consistently.

2-2-6 Tadashi Yoshimura

Tadashi Yoshimura was a political scientist who was interested in the politics and foreign policies of China. He contributed an article titled “Geopolitical Grounds for the Development Policy of the South” in 1941. In this article, paying attention to the fact that the region developing under the policy of the south is the region called “the Inland Sea between Australia and Asia” which geopolitically has shared a certain unity and connectivity, he points out that it is necessary to unite this region which was divided by the colonization of western powers. We can see an advocacy here similar to Ezawa's article.

2-2-7 A Summary of These Articles

In summarizing the works by these six geopoliticians, I will try to consider the common characteristics of their geopolitical advocacy. First, I will discuss the 'new order' which was the logic of expelling the western powers who were dominating Asia. We can see the classic case for the new order in Royama's article on the East Asian Community (Royama 1938). Royama mentioned the defects the Versailles system caused, and the rise of Germany and Italy which owned no colonies. He also mentioned that Japan should take the initiative in establishing the new world order based on community-ism. This world order was advocated as the new order in place of western colonialism and evolved into the plan of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1941 and the declaration in the Conference of Greater East Asia in 1943. When the Declaration of Greater East Asia was called the Charter of Greater East Asia or the Pacific Charter (Arima 2002: 298-299), we can see this new order as the logic behind the 'Pacific-centered order' in opposition to the Atlantic Charter of the Anglo-Americans.

Of course, the logic of 'the Pacific as a counter idea of the Atlantic' has been considered self-deception for ruling Asian nations merely trying to replace the western powers, and I would not support this logic at all. However, we can certainly see a duality between the Pacific and the Atlantic, as Ó Tuathail and Agnew (1992) have mentioned. I would hastily add, though, that there is no duality seen here between 'civilized v. barbarian' or 'despotism v. freedom.' In this way, the community-ism and the new order as the counter-logic to western colonialism are represented geopolitically as 'Pacific Oceanism' or 'Asianism.' Komaki and Muroga's assertions, both of which emphasize the unity of the Asia Pacific region and Australia and/or India, are nothing but the logic of the 'Pacific region as counter-Atlantic,' one half of the geopolitical duality.

Second, I would point out that environmental deterministic opinions can be seen in these articles,

especially in Ezawa and Muroga. Both advocate that physical geographical conditions determine the geopolitical development of Asian countries. However, their advocacy lacks the idea of cultural unity. This is in contrast to German geopoliticians who spread the idea of *Volks- und Kulturboden* (nations and cultural region) (Herb 1997). It is certain that natural deterministic assertions could be a base for unifying the Greater East Asia region but they lack persuasion. It is difficult to have the widespread support of the people from only the perspective of physical determination unless this idea is developed to a community-ism as advocated by Royama. We can find here the limitations of geopolitics.

3. Conclusion

In this essay, I investigated articles on geopolitics which appeared in *Kaijō* which was one of the representative general magazines during the Asia-Pacific War. Although I could not read carefully all the articles that appeared in *Kaijō* due to time limitations, there were not many articles which had the term geopolitics in their titles or were written by geographers. There were hardly any articles in the other general magazines, *Bungei Shunjū* or *Chūō Kōron*. Judging from the trends mentioned above it seems that the geopolitical movement was being developed mainly in non-academic geographical journals and its influence on popular magazines was not that significant.

Finally I will compare the arguments by geographers and non-geographers especially in comparison to Royama's arguments, as a summary of this essay. The geopolitical articles written by non-geographers such as Royama appeared earlier than articles written by geographers in general magazines such like *Kaijō*. Royama and other members of the Study Group of the Showa Period advocated the theory of the East Asian Community as an alternative order based on geopolitics replacing western imperialism. His opinions on a geopolitical agenda for constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were realistic and practical.

On the other hand, the geographers' articles appeared in later issues than Royama's. They repeated the geopolitical logic based on physical conditions, and they could not produce a theory as significant as the East Asian Community advanced by Royama and others. That is to say, while Royama recognized the essence and limits of geopolitics and used it as a means and method for constructing the East Asian Community, geographers remained advocates of geopolitics itself.

While I considered only the geopolitical articles that appeared in *Kaijō*, it is still necessary to investigate other articles such as novels, essays, and reader responses to understand the context around the magazine. These are all future research topics. This piece was an experiment in popular geopolitics in this sense.

Note

This essay is a revised version of my paper written in Japanese and entitled "Zasshi 'Kaijō' ni mirareru chiseigaku no kijutsu ni tsuite (An Essay on Geopolitical Writings in the Magazine *Kaijō* during the Asia-Pacific War in Japan)" which appeared in *Shien* (the bulletin of the Department of History, Faculty of Humanities, Kyushu University), 142, 2005.

While writing this paper, I was informed that Keiichi Takeuchi, Emeritus Professor of Hitotsubashi University, passed away on June, 25 2005. I regret that I will never be able to hear his comments on this paper. May his soul rest in peace.

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Self and Others in the Social Construction of Nature: Critical Inquiry into the Afforestation Campaign in Modern Japan

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Introduction

In *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*, William Cronon describes the history of interpenetrating relationships between the growth of Chicago and the exploitation of nature in its hinterland. At the beginning of Chapter 4, "The Wealth of Nature: Lumber," he criticizes Marx's labor theory of value and insists that the value in commodities such as grain and lumber came directly from the wealth of nature that had been ultimately produced through the sun's energy¹ (Cronon 1991: 148-151). In this problematic chapter, Cronon situates 'Indians' on the side of a natural ecosystem. While no human labor produced either the fertility of the prairie soils or the abundance of the northern forests, only Indians had contributed to the natural wealth by living in such a way as not to diminish ecological accumulation of forest biomass or prairie soil (Cronon 1991: 149, 424). Within the dichotomy between first and second natures, the non-human and the human realm, and natural and human landscapes, Cronon situates Native peoples in the former and white settlers in the latter (Figure 1).




Figure 1 Representation of self and others in *Nature's Metropolis*

Although Cronon describes the settlers' exploitative processes over Native peoples' land, he pays little attention to the identification process of 'Indians.' He separates Native peoples from the Western human society that has been constructed on the basis of human labor, and situates them on the side of first nature in which they live their lives in harmony with the natural ecosystem. In considering the principal character of *Nature's Metropolis* as an American history as well as an environmental history, we should not overlook the problem of 'otherness.' In *Nature's Metropolis*, as Demeritt (1994: 178) points out, "nature operates to define culture and thus determine who/what counts within the category of environmental history's 'we.'" In other words, Cronon took part in an attempt to construct 'self' as differentiated from 'others' that are discursively connected with nature. In American history, nature appropriated physically by white settlers in the early nineteenth century has again been appropriated representationally in the late twentieth century.

This double appropriation of nature can be observed in various colonized and ex-colonized areas all over the world. In his stimulating book, Braun (2002) describes the scheme of (post)colonial linkages between nature and the Native, 'wilderness' and 'indigeneity' in the case of Canada's West Coast forest. By analyzing the colonial rhetoric of 'wilderness' in the environmental discourses on nature and nation of the Clayoquot Sound area, he makes it clear that "native peoples are conflated with nature, and areas are seen to remain 'natural' only if the cultures that live there remain 'traditional' (Braun 2002: 89). This identification process of Native people is also the process of constructing 'others' separated from the Western 'self' in postcolonial Canada.

Thus, the social construction of 'others' and 'nature' is intertwined (and vice versa in 'self' and 'culture'). Although the relationship between colonized culture and the production of nature in the Western colonial context is theoretically examined by Gregory (2001), there may be no general theories on this topic. Because of this, the (post)colonial relationships between 'self' and 'others' are diversified according to the modes of articulation between nature and nation in each region. As Gregory (2001) himself recognizes, the culture/nature dualism is a product of the modern European imagination, and the distinction between a Western 'self' and Native 'other' based upon that dualism is, in principle, applicable to the European context. In order to approach the social construction of nature and nation in something other than the (post)colonial context, it is necessary to elaborate a different theoretical framework for understanding 'self' and 'others.'

In this paper, I attempt to describe the (post)colonial relationships between 'self' and 'others' in modern Japan that are closely related to historical processes of the social construction of nature. First, I critically examine the forest-conservationist discourses in contemporary Japan, and point out the specific linkages between nationalism and environmentalism in forest conservation, in which Japanese 'self' and Western 'others' are differentiated according to the degree of affinity with nature. Second, in order to clarify the (post)colonial background of those linkages, I trace the history of forest conservation, especially the history of the afforestation campaign in modern Japan, through which the ideology and practice of forest conservation have become instilled in modern Japan. Last, I attempt to describe the (post)colonial relationships between 'our' and 'other' within nature, and to elucidate the hegemonic structure whereby 'self' and 'others' is constructed in modern Japanese society.

Environmental thoughts and nationalism in contemporary Japan

Shuichi Kito, one of the leading environmental ethicists in Japan, emphasizes the importance of retaining biodiversity in the natural environment to assure cultural diversity in time and space (Kito 1996). However his challenging attempt to explore cultural and biological diversity is easily linked to the nationalistic context of the Japanese view of nature. In his short article, "What the Rights of Nature suits have raised" (*Asahi Shimbun*, November 11, 1996), Kito advocates for the plaintiffs of the Rights of Nature suits that claim rights for wildlife. He says, "People generally set a proper value on nature in the United States, which is rich in wilderness areas, whereas Japanese nature has something more to do with humans. Therefore, the concept of 'Rights of Nature' in Japan is also different from that in the United States." Thus, Kito differentiates Japanese 'Rights of Nature' from Western ones, and appreciates the former as an alternative concept to the latter.

Such a tendency to criticize Western views of nature and to revive the traditional Japanese views has grown in recent Japanese environmental thought. For example, philosopher Takeshi Umehara and physical geographer Yoshinori Yasuda emphasize the superiority of Japanese culture to Western culture in the environmental problems in contemporary society (e.g. Umehara 1976; Umehara and Yasuda 1993; Yasuda

1991). Morioka (1994), who advocates his unique ‘life studies,’ criticizes the other studies as ‘eco-nationalism’ that aims to resolve environmental problems through spreading culture, tradition and the sense of values of one’s own nation. This ‘eco-nationalism’ is a discursive mechanism that forms the background of text and operates as an unconscious nationalism (Morioka 1994: 46-50). Augustin Berque (1996) examines the works of Umehara and Yasuda as examples of typical discourse of environmental conservationist thought in contemporary Japan. Berque points out that the contrast between the Orient and Occident frequently used in their works relates nature to their own identity on the one hand and non-nature to other identity on the other, thereby ascribing the good to the former and the evil to the latter (Berque 1996: 52-53). This simple dichotomy (Figure 2) often operates as an unconscious epistemological structure underlying our judgment of environmental issues. It is metaphorically reproduced in various environmental discourses, and constructs the nationalized difference between ‘self’ and ‘others.’




Figure 2 Dichotomy between self and others in Japanese eco-nationalism

This unconscious structure of ‘eco-nationalism’ has affected forest conservation discourses in Japan. For example, Japanese forestry expert Sugawara (1996) proposes the concept of ‘forest as Japanese culture’ and advocates conserving and creating traditional Japanese forests.

This traditional ‘forest as Japanese culture’ has been utterly transformed under the modernization of Japanese society. The modernized view of nature imported from Western Europe regards nature as a heartless ‘thing.’ Forests scientifically managed on the basis of this modernized view of nature have become just a ‘thing,’ too. As a result, the spiritual ties between forests and humans have been broken off, and the traditional ‘forest as Japanese culture’ has been destroyed (Sugawara 1996: 4).

Sugawara ascribes the recent devastation of Japanese forests to the degeneration of traditional Japanese culture owing to the wide spreading of Western modernism, and insists on conserving traditional ‘forests as Japanese culture’ and creating new ‘forests as Japanese culture’ which are based on close ties between humans and forests.

In general, recent discourses on forest conservation in Japan emphasize an essential connection between forests and Japanese culture. Some forestry experts (Shidei 1998; Kitamura 1995, 1998) also adopt a discursive strategy that appeals to the nationality or cultural identity of Japan in order to conserve the forests in Japan. They insist on the conservation of forests through emphasizing how necessary Japanese forests are for Japanese culture. In this rhetoric, Japanese forests and Japanese culture are considered to be inseparable. These discourses of forest conservation seek their theoretical bases from recent ecological theories on Japanese culture, for example the theory of East Asian evergreen forest culture (Sasaki 1982) and

the theory of beech forest culture complex (Ichikawa 1984). These theories on forest culture explore the underlying culture of Japan in the ecological environment based on the forest types. Although they trace the geographical distribution of each forest culture from Yunnan in China to Siberia in Russia, the ends of both cultural theories' exploration is the root of 'Japanese culture,' not Chinese or Russian culture. Their gaze at forests goes through China or Russia, and at last returns to the cultural identity of 'Japan.' Within this discursive structure, speaking of forests automatically leads to the narrative of Japanese cultural identity.

Recent forest conservationists have attempted to justify their assertions on the basis of the forest cultural theories. For example, depending on the theory of beech forest culture complex, Kitamura (1998) criticizes such fashionable phrases as 'Be nice to the earth,' or 'Affection for nature,' because they are the frivolous phrases that an outsider of the ecosystem speaks from the outside of nature. He advocates reviving the Japanese traditional sense of unity between humans and nature, which was lost by the introduction of the Western scientific view of nature. He says, "the original sense of unity is to be considerate of nature's feelings on behalf of nature" (Kitamura 1998: 198). Thus, he puts himself on the side of nature, and speaks for nature².

Those discourses speaking of/for nature in relation to the cultural identity of Japan seem to be increasing with rising interest in nature preservation and environmental conservation in Japan. Behind such specific types of discourse on forest conservation, there exists an epistemological structure that is characterized by specific ways of articulation between nature and nation in Japan (Nakashima 2002). Within this epistemological structure, there seems to be a stereotyped Orient-Occident dichotomy that is often considered as a relationship between Japanese 'self' and the Western 'other.' However, there is a hidden relationship within the Orient. In Japan, a certain environmental idea has been articulated with a conservative ideology of the nation (e.g. Watsuji 1971). The majority in Japanese society have been identified as the 'nation' in relation to Japanese nature, while minorities such as Ainu, Okinawan and other native Asian peoples in Japan's (ex)colonial territories have been identified as 'others' in relation to a different representation of nature. The differentiation of 'others' from 'self' is based on the social construction of different meanings of nature. In other words, nature is differently represented according to the colonial relationships between the Japanese nation and others. In the next chapter, by tracing the history of the afforestation campaign in modern Japan, I examine the modes of production and representation of nature under Japanese colonialism.

History of the afforestation campaign in modern Japan

One of the features of forest conservation in modern Japan is its close ties with the forestry industry. In contrast to American forest conservation, forest conservation in modern Japan has been conducted under the strong influence of the Japanese forestry industry. The concept of 'forest conservation' in modern Japan has long been considered to mean the production and the maintenance of plantation forests³. In that sense, forest conservation in modern Japan has been developed by the forestry industry along with the history of the afforestation campaign. The afforestation campaign in modern Japan is a kind of forest conservation movement conducted by semi-national forestry organizations. It includes various forestation events, construction of forest parks, enlightenment and propagation of 'forest conservation' and other forestry-related activities. The afforestation campaign has dominated much of the history of forest conservation in modern Japan. When a forest is produced through the events of forestation or tree-planting in the afforestation campaign, for example, that does not only mean the material production of nature, but also produces an ideology of nature with a specific sense and values, through which people's relationships with nature are stylized into the specific mode of production.

The history of the afforestation campaign in modern Japan is closely connected with the history of Japanese colonialism and post-colonialism, in which representation of nature and nation constitutes two sides of the same coin. The nature of Japan has been identified as ‘our nature,’ being differentiated from ex-colonized Asian ‘other nature’ as well as Western ‘other nature.’ I will attempt to grasp the concepts of nature in modern Japan both in their geographical and historical contexts.

1. Beginning of the afforestation campaign

The beginning of the modern afforestation campaign in Japan was the school afforestation guidance by the Ministry of Education in 1895, which was inspired by Arbor Day and school afforestation projects in the United States (Tezuka 1990). This guidance was first conveyed to the normal school in each prefecture and then introduced to each local area. After the introduction of Arbor Day in Japan, local forestry associations individually organized various events for Arbor Day with different dates and activities. Since the late 1920s, those events have been integrated into the national afforestation campaign. In 1934, the Japan Forestry Association established an official Arbor Day on April 3rd and organized national events all over the country.

Although forestation or tree planting had already been done in various areas of Japan before the early modern era, it did not directly lead to the afforestation campaign of the modern era. This implies the nationalized and modernized character of the afforestation campaign - despite its ‘traditional’ and ‘native’ appearance, it was the American Arbor Day that got the Japanese afforestation campaign started. Ideas of Arbor Day and techniques of school afforestation newly introduced from the United States were, however, re-invented or re-discovered as a ‘national afforestation campaign’ by Japanese forestry experts. For example, Ichiro Sonobe (1934), an executive director of the Japan Forestry Association, admits the existence of American influences on Japanese Arbor Day, however, he emphasizes the significance of Japanese Arbor Day as follows:

The establishment of Arbor Day in Japan is not only a restoration of the memorial forestation or the house planting as traditional customs in this country, but also has a more important significance and different contents. First, its date was decided as April 3rd in memory of Sacred Emperor Jinmu⁴ who had planted our Great Empire to be flourishing forever. Second, the area where Arbor Day is observed should be extended all over our territory from Sakhalin to Taiwan wherever our rising-sun flag is raised (Sonobe 1934: 14-15).

Sonobe apparently situates the afforestation campaign in the geographical and historical context of ‘the Empire’ of Japan. In other words, the national afforestation campaign is defined as an ‘imperial event’ suitable for the Great Empire of Japan.

2. The afforestation campaign as a ‘national event’

Table 1 shows the history of Japanese colonialism and the national afforestation campaign. There have been four national campaigns since the late 1920s: the Enthronement Memorial Afforestation Campaign (1928), the Love Forests Campaign (1934-1949), the Whole Nation’s Afforestation Campaign (1942-1944) and the National Land Afforestation Campaign (1950-). Among the three campaigns before 1945, the Love Forests Campaign is the most representative because the Love Forests Campaign produced the spirit of ‘forest conservation,’ and embodied it into the concrete activities of the afforestation campaign. The Love Forests Campaign literally aimed at promoting the ‘love’ of forests. Wada (1934), President of the Japan Forestry Association, defined the purpose of the Love Forests Campaign as being “to get the thought

of forest conservation to pervade all over the country.” In that sense, the Love Forests Campaign was a kind of spiritual movement that promoted forest conservation at a national scale. The ‘forest’ in this campaign broadly implies a concept of nature that includes trees, birds and mountains. The contents of the campaign were, for example, the setting up of nest boxes for birds and forest signs, preservation of old growth, and prevention of forest fires, as well as distribution of seedlings, planting and thinning. They are roughly summarized into four activities: First, to plant trees in shrines, temples, sightseeing locations, common forests, and schools. Second, to preserve nature through saving old growth, maintaining forest trees, controlling injurious insects, and protecting birds. Third, to popularize the notion of forest conservation in school education. Fourth, to propagate this campaign by means of movies, lectures, and the commendation of persons who have rendered distinguished services in afforestation (Murakami 1934).

Table 1 History of Japanese colonialism and the afforestation campaign

Year	Japanese colonialism	afforestation campaign
1869	Establishment of the Hokkaido Colonization Office	
1879	Abolishment of Ryukyu Kingdom and establishment of Okinawa Prefecture	
1882		Establishment of the Japan Forestry Association
1894	Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)	
1895	Colonization of Taiwan	
1904	Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)	
1905	Colonization of southern Sakhalin	
1906	South Manchuria Railway incorporated	
1910	Annexation of Korea (Colonization of Korea)	
1914	Japan enters World War I	
1919	Japan governed the Pacific Islands under mandate granted by the League of Nations	Establishment of the Imperial Forestry Association
1924		Establishment of the National League of Forestry Associations
1928		Enthronement Memorial Afforestation Campaign (1928)
1931	Manchurian Incident	
1932	Establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo	
1934		Love Forest Campaign (1934-1949)
1937	Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)	
1941	Japan enters World War II	
1942	Occupation of Southeast Asia	Whole Nation's Afforestation Campaign (1942-1944)
1945	Japan's defeat and the end of World War II	
1950	Establishment of the Hokkaido Development Agency	Establishment of the National Land Afforestation Promotion Committee National-Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign (1950-)
1972	"Reversion" of Okinawa to Japan and establishment of the Okinawa Development Agency	

Another feature of the Love Forests Campaign was the rise of imperial awareness. This campaign brought about ‘national events’ in the afforestation campaign. The Japan Forestry Association has held the ‘National Afforestation Event’ on Arbor Day (April 3) every year. Although several afforestation events were individually performed in each prefecture, the Love Forests Campaign integrated them into one

national event. Nakao (1934), chief officer of the forestry policy planning department of the forestry bureau, emphasized the necessity to conduct the Love Forests Campaign “at the same time, on the same line, and all over the country.” It is this synchronism and homogeneity on a national scale that distinguished the Love Forests Campaign from previous afforestation campaigns. Murakami (1934: 6), director of the forestry bureau, also said, “it is not a local issue to think of the importance of forest and to love forests and trees. We should conduct this enterprise nationally all over the country in regulatory ways.” As suggested in Sonobe’s (1934) explanation of Arbor Day, this national event of the Love Forests Campaign was held all over “our territory from Sakhalin to Taiwan wherever our rising-sun flag is raised.” Thus the Love Forests Campaign reconstructed the afforestation campaign as a national event of the empire.

3. Afforestation campaign and colonial forestry: geopolitics of nature

The history of the national afforestation campaign since the late 1920s has also been a history of the Japan’s imperialistic war over the Asia-Pacific region. As Sonobe (1934) insisted, the national afforestation campaign was extended toward Japan’s colonial territories such as Korea and Taiwan. Furthermore, Manchuria, Sakhalin, Southeast Asia and many Pacific islands were also involved in the Japanese geopolitical arena, and their forests were made the target of Japanese forestry. While major Japanese forestry organizations such as the Japan Forestry Association and Imperial Forestry Association actively promoted the national afforestation campaign in the domestic area of Japan, they made inroads into other Asian countries in order to exploit forest resources.

Along with the rapid decrease of forest area on the Japanese mainland due to over-cutting for munitions, the national afforestation campaign accelerated more and more (i.e. the Whole Nation’s Afforestation Campaign). At the same time, the national afforestation campaign became situated in Japan’s territorial expansionism. In fact, enthusiasm for the Whole Nation’s Afforestation Campaign entailed an increase in the interest in colonial forestry. For example, the Vice President of the National Forestry Cooperative Association, Kawai (1942) emphasized the necessity to secure forest resources in overseas colonies as follows:

We should willingly plan the development of forests in whole areas of East Asia. That is to say, we should set about exploiting the forest in Manchuria, the Maritime Provinces of Siberia, and South Pacific countries; at the same time, we have to endeavor to plan and accomplish the afforestation program in Manchuria and China (Kawai 1942: 9).

As suggested in this propagative phrase, the afforestation program itself constituted a part of colonial expansion. In other words, an increase of the interests in the colonial forestry was closely connected to a rise in geopolitical consciousness.

According to the Japanese historian Ōe (1992), the territorial structure of Japanese colonialism is described as a concentric circle centered on the Japanese mainland. This structure corresponds to the geopolitical order of the Great Empire of Japan, that is to say, the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, the ‘New Order in East Asia,’ ‘Royal Colonies,’ ‘Domestic Colonies’ and ‘the Main Land.’ Adding two axes of environmental order to it, I illustrate that geopolitical structure in Figure 3. During wartime, while the domestic forest of the Japanese mainland was carefully conserved and maintained through the national afforestation campaign, overseas forests on colonial territory were made the target of exploitation. In fact, eleven Japanese timber corporations were running their logging business in Northeast China (afterwards, Manchuria) in the 1920s.




Fig.3 Geopolitical structure of Japanese colonialism and environmentalism

The Imperial Forestry Association had conducted forest resource research and forestation experiments more than ten times in Sakhalin, Taiwan, Manchuria, the Philippines and some South Pacific areas. In particular, tropical forests were expected to be a new source of timber supply, alternative to the suspended timber imports from the United States and Europe. In this context, we can point out the existence of a colonial relationship between core and periphery in which Japan had hegemony over the forest resources. Within this colonial relationship, forests in the periphery are marginalized as mere ‘resources’ to be exploited, while forest in the center is identified as ‘nature’ to be conserved.

4. Reconstruction of nature and nation: the postwar afforestation campaign

Since Japan’s defeat in 1945, there have been frequent natural disasters such as floods and mudslides all over the country. Most of these disasters were attributed to the devastation of the forests resulting from their over-cutting and exhaustive use. Therefore, the Diet adopted several resolutions on afforestation for the prevention of such natural disasters: the ‘Resolution on the Preservation of National Land’ (1948), ‘Resolution on National Afforestation’ (1949), ‘Resolution on the Promotion of National Land Afforestation’ (1951). Those resolutions say in common, “reviving the devastated forests is necessary for the reconstruction of the defeated nation,” or “devastation of forests is also a crisis for the nation.” Reviving

the forest and reconstructing the nation were analogically related. The purpose of the ‘Resolution on National Afforestation’ is explained as follows: “Now is the time for all of us to be aware of the national responsibility for reconstructing the nation under the strong pressure of our defeat, therefore we must plant trees.” The text goes on, “Producing and maintaining the forests are the basis for preserving national land and stabilizing people’s lives. There will be neither reconstruction nor prosperity for the nation without reviving forests” (National Land Afforestation Promotion Committee 1965: 112-113).

Under such circumstances, the National Land Afforestation Promotion Committee (NLAPC) was established in 1950 as an agent of the postwar National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign.⁵ Although the NLAPC was a private organization, members of the steering committee included some forestry related government officials and members of the Diet as well as members of other forestry related organizations. The NLAPC has been strongly affected by government forestry policy and vice versa. The first chairperson of the NLAPC and Speaker of the House of Representatives, Kijuro Shidehara’s speech at the founding meeting of the NLAPC shows the typical style of those narratives on the national afforestation campaign:

The afforestation campaign has the closest relationship with reconstruction of the nation. Devastation of forests observed in local areas is the most terrific and it makes me shudder. Now, the nation of Japan must be reconstructed by forests. All those who are sensible will agree with me (National Land Afforestation Promotion Committee 1965: 119).

This type of narrative that speaks of national afforestation with the analogy of reconstruction of the nation was very popular in the postwar afforestation campaign. Table 2 shows the slogans presented by the National Land Afforestation Campaign posters from 1951 to 1975. These slogans and poster designs were picked from school contests. They were then distributed all over the country through local Afforestation Promotion Committees. Most of the slogans include such words as ‘country,’ ‘nation,’ and ‘Japan,’ which imply the reconstruction of the nation and the development of Japan. Thus, the National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign was analogically linked with the reconstruction of the nation in the postwar Japan.

At the beginning of the postwar National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign, forest conservation was situated within the national context of linking the revival of forests with the reconstruction of the nation. In other words, it is the narrative that entrusted the political task of reconstructing the defeated nation to the cultural task of the afforestation campaign. In that sense, the postwar national afforestation campaign started as a politico-cultural event.

5. Production and consumption of forests, and social construction of public identity

After the postwar rehabilitation period, Japan entered a period of high economic growth. Along with this economic growth, the national afforestation campaign also entered an ‘afforestation boom’ during the 1950s~1960s. In this period, the area of forest plantings per year increased to the highest level in history. Simply speaking, this was due to the steep rise in timber prices and a government subsidy for forest owners to plant seedlings. The National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign strongly promoted this ‘afforestation boom’ by mobilizing mass media, municipal government, and various local groups in the afforestation practices. For example, ‘Green Feather Fund - Raising’ for the afforestation campaign was conducted all over the country, including at schools, offices, factories, stations, and in the streets. Contests for afforestation posters and slogans were held that students, workers and housewives entered.

Furthermore, the ‘National Afforestation Festival’ was held, rotating between the prefectures, with the annual attendance of the Emperor and the Empress, which stirred people up with the idea of afforestation in each prefecture.

Table 2 Slogans presented in the National Land Afforestation Campaign poster

Year	Slogan
1951	Japan growing up in the green land
1952	One person, one piece, afforestation of the <i>country</i>
1953	Dress the devastated <i>country</i> in Sunday best of the green
1954	Make bright and green <i>country</i> by afforesting
1955	Let's afforest in field and mountain
1956	We play a role in afforestation of the <i>country</i>
1957	Let's fill bright <i>Japan</i> with the green
1958	Growing sapling, the light of hope
1959	Cut it, plant it and rear it
1960	Mountain is waiting for an offer of love
1961	Show your love of your <i>country</i> by afforesting
1962	The hand planting a piece of tree makes the <i>nation</i>
1963	Green the first, it is the word of ninety millions of people
1964	Trees planted, trees growing up and the <i>nation</i> developing
1965	Afforestation is the light shining in the future <i>country</i>
1966	Plant, rear and make green <i>country</i>
1967	Let's make bright country by planting trees
1968	I also plant this seedling in memory of Meiji Centennial
1969	Let's plant this seedling for our future
1970	Livability and youth of the <i>country</i> come from the green
1971	The green produces our health and affluent lives
1972	Happiness and beautiful <i>country</i> come from the green
1973	Offer love of the green for the <i>country</i> becoming dirty
1974	The green brings the dream to our lives
1975	The green raises the affluent future

Source: National-Land Afforestation Promotion Committee (1982)

These various events and activities of the National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign created enthusiasm for further afforestation, and mobilized people into a national movement intertwined with the development of the forestry industry.

However, along with the increase of imported tropical timber from Southeast Asian countries and, the declining price of timber in the domestic timber market, the ‘afforestation boom’ fell off after the late 1960s. During the 1950s and the early 1960s, the aim of the National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign was the development of forestry and the creation of more productive forests. From the late 1960s, however, the aim of the campaign shifted from the development of forestry to nature preservation and the increase of greenery in the urban environment. As a result, the forests produced through the National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign have changed their meanings and roles. In short, such a change can be

described as a shift from forests for production to forests for consumption.

Such a shift entailed an increase in people who consume the forest for recreation. As noted above, the 'afforestation boom' fell from the late 1960s, and the area planted in forest per year declined, as well. However, the changes in the National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign have not only led to a quantitative change but also to a qualitative change in the forest itself. Since the late 1960s, various forests have been newly produced all over the country through the National Land Afforestation Promotion Campaign. In particular, the Meiji Centennial Memorial Afforestation Campaign in 1968 produced distinctive forests all over the country⁶. This campaign provided 'new' nature to be consumed by the Japanese nation as recreational places. Forests were no longer a naively given material environment, but a nationally constructed social nature.

Forest Park (*Shinrin Koen*)

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, eleven forest parks were constructed by the Ministry of Construction and local governments. They comprised one national forest park and ten prefectural or municipal forest parks. They were founded as one of the Meiji Centennial Memorial Projects. One national forest park was located at Musashi Hill (Saitama Prefecture), in the northern suburbs of the Tokyo metropolitan area about 60 kilometers distant from the center of Tokyo. The forests produced in this project of forest park were no longer wild nature located in the mountains, but an artificial nature located near the city. In other words, necessary conditions for the forest were not a wild and raw nature, distant from the city, but a familiar and humanized nature easily accessible to city dwellers.

Nation's Forest (*Kokumin no mori*)

The Nation's Forests were founded by the Forestry Agency as one of the Meiji Centennial Memorial Projects. The Nation's Forests consisted of eight national forests within the jurisdiction of each Regional Forest Office in Sapporo, Akita, Maebashi, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kōchi and Kumamoto. Most of those forests were located near large cities or regional cities, and endowed with advantageous traffic conditions. In the forests of each Nation's Forest, five districts are arranged: (1) the preservation district, which prohibits cutting down trees and is to be preserved for its present scenic beauty; (2) the scenic district, to be controlled so as to maintain the scenic beauty of the forest; (3) the special afforesting district, to be afforested as a memorial forest and an exhibition forest for propagating knowledge of forestry; (4) the roadside district, to cut down and plant trees for the use of roads; and (5) the facility district, for constructing the recreational and scenic facilities. The management of the national forest had formerly focused on the development of the forestry industry. However, the Nation's Forests project introduced a recreational utilization of forests into the management of the national forests. The nature of the National Forest was preserved as a place to be observed, touched, and played in by the nation.

Prefectural forest (*Kenmin no mori*)

Prefectural forests were also founded in memory of the Meiji Centennial by the prefectural governments. For eight years between 1967 and 1974, twenty prefectural forests were produced around the country. However, their purpose and functions were almost the same as that of the Nation's Forests, namely, monuments, visitors centers, public squares, camp sites, walking (or cycling) roads, exhibition forests, and so on. Most of them were constructed for recreational use of the forest.

While the Nation's Forests were supposed to be used by the nation, prefectural forests were supposed to be used by the citizens of the prefecture. The state government provides nature for its citizens, the prefectural governments provide it for their inhabitants, and the municipal governments do so as well. In

fact, a large number of municipal forests were produced by municipal governments. For example, Citizen's Forests, the Townsfolk's Forests, and Villager's Forests were produced by municipal governments. From the state to the village, each scale of government has produced its own forests and provided it to the inhabitants at each scale. Production of the forest was always accompanied by the inhabitant's public identity.

Furthermore, those forests are no longer a natural resource but a social resource, produced and provided by the state and local government, just as water, electric power, gas, roads, schools, hospitals, and so on. Those social resources enable the inhabitants to live healthy, comfortable, and convenient lives. The forest was also incorporated into the social resources with which people could live healthy and recreational lives, and thus revive humanity, which was the humanity of the nation leading to sound bodies and minds. Production and distribution of nature lead to the social construction of the public identity of consumers according to the geographical scale of government.




Figure 4 Difference between the wartime afforestation and the postwar afforestation

Conclusion

There is a fundamental difference between the wartime national afforestation campaign and its postwar counterpart (Figure 4). It is the presence/absence of ‘others.’ In the wartime afforestation campaign, the ‘other nature’ of the overseas colonial territories is present in relation to ‘our nature’ of the Japanese mainland, even if the former is marginalized as a mere resource to be exploited. In the postwar afforestation campaign, however, the ‘other nature’ of the ex-colonial territory is completely absent. The narrative of forest conservation is solely aimed at Japanese nature, not at any other nature. Although Japan lost most of its colonial territory by its defeat in World War II, that does not mean Japan had lost any environmental linkages with other Asian countries. On the contrary, as noted above, since the 1960s, Japan has again started to import tropical timber from Southeast Asian countries and South Pacific islands. As Knight (1997) criticizes, Japan has on one hand imported a great quantity of tropical timber and triggered deforestation in Southeast Asia and South Pacific islands to provide resources for its own demand, while on the other hand it has practiced a selfish, nationalistic forest conservation policy within its own country. This situation is exactly what the wartime forestry experts had envisioned. The executive director of the Japan Forestry Association, Hayashi, says in his discussion of tropical forestry in 1942, “Recently people have misgivings about the disaster because of over-cutting in Japanese forests. Therefore, I propose to rest Japanese forests for a while and to seek other ways to make it up in other areas” (“Discussion on the future of the forestry in Greater East Asia,” *Sanrin*, No.711: 38). The wartime forestry experts were aware of the colonial relationship between Japanese forests and overseas forests, and dared to exploit other natural areas. However, postwar forestry officials or forestry experts do not seem to be aware of it. They speak of/for only Japanese nature.




Figure 5 The visible and invisible others in the postwar forest conservation

Despite the existence of actual transactions with other natural areas, their environmental gaze eventually returns to ‘our nature.’ According to the *Forestry White Paper 2000* edited by the Forestry Agency, the Japanese government has been contributing to the problems of the global environment such as desertification and global warming. However, there is no proposal to make linkages between ‘our nature’ and ‘other nature.’ The ongoing project of ‘Forest creation by the nation’ jointly organized by the Forestry Agency and the National Land Afforestation Promotion Organization still remains within the same context of the ‘Nation’s Forests’ noted above. It aims to raise domestic forests for the sake of the Japanese nation. We cannot find any ‘others’ in that project despite actual ‘contributive’ linkages with tropical forests in Indonesia, Malaysia, Brazil, etc.

Therefore, the problem of the postcolonial relationship between ‘our nature’ and ‘other nature’ in contemporary Japan is not the presence/absence of others, but the visibility/invisibility of others. In other words, the problem is not the ontological structure of the others’ absence, but the epistemological mechanism making the others invisible (Figure 5). The postwar afforestation campaign is an epistemological apparatus that makes our gaze converge on Japanese nature, and turns our eyes away from the hidden other nature through various events, activities, and discourses. In order to break through such an epistemological mechanism, we need encounters with the other hidden nature. Such an encounter with the other hidden nature will not be realized via universalized ecological environmentalism or exclusionary national environmentalism. Criticizing the processes of the nationalization of nature, and at the same time looking for the possibility of constructing an alternative nature emancipated for others, is the task of ‘the social construction of nature.’

Acknowledgment

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Notes

- 1) Demeritt (1994) criticizes Cronon’s explanation as an ecological essentialism. Furthermore, some articles in *Antipode* Special Issue (1994: 26-2) make critical comments on this problem. My introduction was partly inspired by those comments though not quoted in detail.
- 2) I remember an episode of environmental conflict over the temperate rainforests of Clayoquot Sound in 1993 (Braun 2002: 68-71). Braun pays much attention to the mode of representation of forests in that conflict. When a protester was caught by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and was dragged to the waiting bus, he cried out “Here I stand for the wild things...I speak for the wolves, the trees, and eagles” (Braun 2002:69). On this ethical statement, Braun raises questions: “Why was it *this* man, rather than someone else, who spoke for nature? ...And does not ‘speaking for’ nature presuppose a ‘nature’ to be spoken for? If

nature is ‘without voice,’ as the man claimed, who decides the words in which nature speaks?” (Braun 2002: 71). These are the decisive questions to consider the representation of nature. It is the postcolonial power relationships between the majority of whites and the minority of First Nations that makes it possible for *this* man to speak for nature like this. However, despite the similar forms of the discourses, it is not the same power relationships as with the Canadian case that make it possible for Kitamura (1998) to “speak for” nature.

- 3) It is since the late 1950s that some ecologists and scientific researchers have advocated conservation of the virgin forests in Japan (a famous biologist, Tatsuo Kira, advocated conservation of the virgin forests at the Nature Conservation Society of Japan and the Ecological Society of Japan co-symposium on nature conservation in 1959). However, was only after the designation of Mt. Shirakami and Yakushima Island as World Natural Heritage Sites in 1992 that ordinary Japanese people have become interested in the conservation of virgin forests in Japan.
- 4) April 3 is the celebration day in honor of the legendary Emperor Jimmu. That day was called “*Jimmu Tennō Sai*” (Emperor Jimmu Feast), and was a national holiday before 1945. Although Emperor Jimmu is considered to be the first emperor of Japan, he is, in fact, an imaginary character in Japanese ancient myth.
- 5) The Japan Forestry Association has remained as a forestry industry-related organization, and is substantively separated from the national afforestation campaign.
- 6) In 1968, Japan marked the centennial of the Meiji Restoration. A lot of events, projects and festivals were conducted in observance of the Meiji Centennial by the national and local governments and private groups. NLAPC conducted the Meiji Centennial Memorial National Land Afforestation Campaign, which included memorial afforestation, construction of monuments, distribution of memorial leaflets, a poster contest, and the construction of forest parks (Nakashima 1999).

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Representations and Practices Concerning *Kyōdo* (home place, homeland, *Heimat*)

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1 Introduction

In March 2003, when the final report of the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education was brought before the public, the question of Japanese national identity came up due to the focus on an argument regarding a controversial phrase in the interim report on the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education which was written as follows:

It is important to respect Japanese tradition and culture because they form the foundation of our own national identity and help to develop loyalty to our origins or loyalty to our country among the Japanese people.

The especially controversial part in this phrase was “loyalty for our own country.” “Loyalty for our own country” is, in other words, ‘patriotism.’ These words were frequently used and emphasized particularly before and during WWII. Therefore, the phrase “loyalty for our own country” in relation to the issues surrounding Yasukuni Shrine, which has been the symbol of nationalism since imperial times, we see even now as provocative. The words remind many Japanese people of the period of mobilization by the government under the war regime, and many of them still cannot accept such memories.

Even within ruling parties, there were some politicians opposed to the use of the phrase “loyalty for our own country.” These politicians proposed the substitution of the Japanese syllabary word *kuni* (くに) for the term country instead of the Chinese character ‘国’, or using the Chinese characters ‘郷土’ that can be read as *kuni*.

The ruling parties could not reach an agreement on this issue, and therefore they did not submit the agenda to the National Diet. Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi issued instructions to the Investigative Commission of Fundamental Law of Education for the ruling parties in the Office of the Prime Minister after the briefing in July 2003.

He said, “It is an area within a sphere untouched for the last 50 years. But now we are in the 21st century. I expect you will discuss the problems of the ongoing system and concepts firmly and form a conclusion.” Prime Minister Koizumi has a hawkish opinion. He evoked controversy for his worship at Yasukuni Shrine and showed no remorse for it. Therefore he has come under criticism from neighboring countries. We should examine the statements of such a politician critically.

2 Problematic

The main concerns of the study I would like to now turn our attention to are the terms *kyōdo* and ‘patriotism.’ The term *kyōdo* is not special when it is simply used to mean locality. But once it is used in a specific political context, it may contain nationalistic meanings that can be formidable. With regard to the

term ‘patriotism,’ many Japanese people have perceived this term as taboo until now because these people believe that patriotism was used as a device to instigate nationalism.

However, herein is a problem: How can we replace such a small area like *kyōdo* (home place) with the national realm, and how is loyalty for one’s own province able to develop into patriotism?

I will discuss the fact that the idea of *kyōdo* has a variable character with regard to spatial scale, and this characteristic may enable the word to become one containing national meanings.

3 *Kyōdo* in elementary education

Here I would like to start my explanation with the historical background of the term *kyōdo* focusing on how the representations of this specific spatial realm have been connected with nationalistic emotions. People needed to be trained to connect such representations to affections for the nation.

First, I would like to discuss geographic education and set out the instruction in *kyōdo* in elementary schools in 1890 and 1891. In education about *kyōdo*, children studied the larger spatial scales that were thought of as the shapes of concentric circles as they proceeded through the grades (Fig. 1).




Fig.1 Relation of course materials in geography in elementary education (1941) Source: Sekido (2003).

Children studied about *kyōdo* as a visible scale that they could experience (Fig. 2). The children then studied the larger scales of geography such as the nation and the world, both of which these children were unable to recognize easily. Teachers also believed that they could develop their students' loyalty for *kyōdo* by raising awareness of it.




Fig.2 Educational concept of *Kyodo*. Source: Kato (2003).




Fig.3 Guiding principle for *kyodo* education. Source: Sekido(2003)

These teachers believed that loyalty to *kyōdo* could eventually lead to loyalty to the country, i.e. patriotism (Fig. 3). Loyalty to *kyōdo* and patriotism constituted one module that appeared in different forms. *Kyōdo* could be related to patriotism because of the intuitional and instructional efforts to imprint the geographical images in student's mind.

As a result, the ties between loyalty to *kyōdo* and loyalty to the country were reproduced through both connecting with different forms of emotion, loyalty to *kyōdo* and loyalty to the country, to particular types of spatial categories, and imagining that these forms of emotion existed.

We can also find the relationships between teachers and students in elementary geography education of interest as Figure 3 shows.

4 *Kyōdo* as subject of studies

While *kyōdo* education was institutionalized in elementary schools, the idea of the local was articulated in and outside the academic community. Not only geography but also folklore studies and *Kyōdo* studies were established by using the idea of the local.

In Japan, folklore studies were started by Kunio Yanagita. In the beginning, he called folklore studies '*kyōdo* studies.' It is an important point that Yanagita used concentric circles in his study on folklore. He applied concentric circles only to the Japanese case to explain the patterns of distribution of folklore such as a "common point among rural areas"(Fig. 4). He also attempted to show a spatial distance by a distance majored in time.

There was a problem in his folklore studies. It was a sort of fiction in the sense that his studies focused only on the inside of the nation-state and was based on his assumption that there were no ties and no continuities between the inside and outside of national boundaries. The differences between the peripheral areas of national territories should have been regarded in order to represent the particularity of these areas. However, such particularity was seen as a mere part of many kinds of characteristics of the nation. Common characteristics between the areas inside and outside national boundaries were ignored by folklorists. The use of concentric circles in *kyōdo* education was based on the assumption of geographical scales and expanded gradually. Yanagita's idea of concentric circles applied to *kyōdo* studies was also based the assumption that cultural areas did not exist outside Japan.

Such closed senses of territoriality can be called 'the concentric circles syndrome.' In sum, by drawing circles or unconsciously using the concept of the nation-state, *kyōdo* scholars forgot the continuity between a given place and its outside areas.




Fig.4 Yanagita's schema on dialect distributions. Source: Yanagita (1990).

5 *Kyōdo* education in Japan's colonies

In *kyōdo* education, Japan's colonies were in a complicated position in regard to sorting places into either the inside or outside of the circles. The Japanese government started the policy of Japanization of people in the colonies and forced these people to use Japanese language.

At that time, *kyōdo* education was not necessarily useful for the government to develop patriotism among the colonized towards Japan. This was because *kyōdo* education might have furthered antagonistic attitudes of the colonized against the Empire of Japan by teaching about the history and the heroes and heroines of their local areas.

Thus, the mainland Japanese assumption that loyalty for the local area contributed to development of patriotism would fail both theoretically and practically in the colonized areas. Therefore at school in the

colonies people were coerced into accepting the concept of *kyōdo* as the representation of the nation-state. We can see a problematic nature in the idea of *kyōdo*.

As Doreen Massey(1993) pointed out, the sense of place can be regarded as conservative and static. However, we should be aware that these conservative and static characteristics come from the closed and retrospective thinking that leads to avoiding contact with the outside world and rejecting change and hiding references in their own world. We need to understand the concept of *kyōdo* from a progressive perspective and create the new idea of *kyōdo*.

6 Conclusion

To summarize the main points of my paper, first, the term *kyōdo* is a social construction based on the module of the imagined community. Second, this module is dynamic and changeable with regard to geographic scales. Third, *kyōdo* can be imagined only by intuition and the minimum unit that can provoke the collective emotions. Fourth and finally, the sense of *kyōdo* has a closed and conservative nature because it is based on the idea of the imagined community that is perceived as uniform.

Based on these points discussed here, I would like to conclude my presentation with some remarks on an ideal new concept of *kyōdo*. The ideal new concept of *kyōdo* should have an open nature for others. That said, a concept of *kyōdo* that is open to others should not be confused with ideas such as the five ethnicities concordance (五族協和). This idea appeared to be open for others but was actually used to control people in Manchuria before the end of WWII.

In contemporary Japanese cities, a large number of multiethnic people live and work. We need to develop a new concept of *kyōdo*, which can foster a positive attitude towards differences in society.

Note

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The Development of the *Posyandu* : Historical and Institutional Aspects

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the historical and institutional aspects of the establishment and development of the *posyandu*¹ in Indonesia under the Soeharto [Suharto] regime. The *posyandu* is a community health activity that was introduced in Indonesia as a national program in 1985. Although the *posyandu* was formally established in that year, precursory community health efforts had begun beforehand at the local level, at the initiative of either local governments or NGOs. Through a historical examination of the precursory health activities and supporting organizations, I will show that the *posyandu* is an achievement of the Soeharto regime.

By this, however, I mean more than just the obvious fact that the *posyandu* was devised by the Soeharto administration; rather, this paper will reveal that the *posyandu* actually contains several basic elements of Soeharto's authoritarian developmental regime.

Many previous studies have attempted to analyze the *posyandu*. However, these studies appear to be very partial in their examination of the history and background of the *posyandu* and the community health efforts which preceded it. Furthermore, they do not explain the *posyandu* within the context of the developmentalism of the Soeharto regime. In short, previous studies have not explained how community health efforts were integrated into the national development program. While some authors have pointed out that the *posyandu* was an integration of government mobilization with community participation [Achmad 1999; Kurasawa 1998; Yoshihara and Dwianto 1999], they neglected to thoroughly explain how Indonesia's national development affected the *posyandu* program.

In this paper, I will show how the elements and activities that comprise the *posyandu* reflected, to a great extent, Soeharto's developmentalist ideas. One characteristic of the Soeharto regime was a high centralization of power and authority. After a brief explanation of the *posyandu* (Section 2), I will proceed to explain its institutional configuration by describing the institutionalization of the LSD/LKMD and PKK² organizations (Section 3). Then, I will discuss the precursory health initiatives and the family planning program (Section 4), before closing the paper with an explanation of the importance of studying the *posyandu* of today and the situation for future community studies (Section 5).

2. The *Posyandu*: An Integrated Health Service Post

The *posyandu* is a community health activity that was formally introduced as a national program in Indonesia in 1985 by a Presidential Decree. The main goal of the *posyandu* program was to decrease infant mortality and fertility rates. To achieve this goal, several pre-existing health activities were integrated into the *posyandu*.³

Posyandu activity rapidly flourished throughout the nation following the Presidential Decree, as reflected by the dramatic increase in the number of *posyandu*: a jump up from only 25,000 in 1985 to 244,382 in 1990

(Table 1 and Table 2).

Table1. Health Infrastructure in Indonesia

Year	Hospitals	Beds (general hospital)	Family planning clinics	Community health centers (district)	Community health centers (village)	Community health centers (circulating)	<i>Posyandu</i>
1969	-	-	-	1,058	-	-	-
1970	824	-	-	1,637	-	-	-
1971	715	69,042	1,465	2,020	-	-	-
1972	716	69,163	1,861	2,175	-	-	-
1973	-	-	2,137	2,175	-	-	-
1974	-	-	2,235	2,343	-	-	-
1975	1,117	67,087	2,482	3,179	-	-	-
1976	1,138	82,945	2,645	3,443	-	-	-
1977	-	-	2,620	3,893	-	-	-
1978	1,168	94,831	3,783	4,053	-	-	-
1979	1,181	96,540	4,134	-	6,632	-	-
1980	1,208	98,543	5,118	4,553	7,342	-	-
1981	-	-	5,609	4,753	8,342	-	-
1982	-	-	-	4,953	10,342	-	-
1983	1,244	103,412	6,586	5,021	12,342	-	-
1984	1,321	108,511	7,064	5,353	13,636	-	-
1985	1,367	110,426	7,509	5,453	15,136	-	25,000
1986	1,408	111,456	8,073	5,553	16,636	-	67,986
1987	1,408	111,300	8,464	5,639	17,302	-	185,660
1988	1,456	114,318	8,878	5,590	12,894	-	213,617
1989	1,500	116,847	9,388	5,563	13,415	-	226,162
1990	950*	109,387*	9,685	5,656	15,437	-	244,382
1991	982	111,160	11,327	5,976	15,944	-	251,815
1992	971	112,779	12,094	6,224	18,264	5,623	242,255
1993	994	114,474	12,739	6,954	19,977	6,024	233,061
1994	1,039	116,847	13,155	6,984	20,460	6,382	251,459
1995	1,062	118,306	14,318	7,105	20,672	6,514	244,470
1996	1,074	120,083	16,204	7,177	21,071	6,849	244,107
1997	1,090	121,998	16,681	7,243	21,115	6,605	242,881
1998	1,112	123,168	19,354	7,181	21503**	6,310**	246,122
1999	1,111	123,398	16,939**	7,195	21417**	6,440**	248,354
2000	-	-	17,182**	-	-	-	202,354

Source: Indonesia dalam Angka (yearly), Depkes (2002), and Yoshihara and Dwianto (1998).

-: no data

* the reason for the drastic decrease is unknown

**except for East Timor

Table2. Health Infrastructure in Jakarta

year	Hospitals	Beds (general hospital)	Maternity hospitals	Mother and child welfare clinics	Family planning clinics	Midwives	traditional midwife	Community health centers (district)	Community health centers (village)	community health centers (private)	Community health centers (circulating)	Posyandu	Kader
1968	38	5,345	94	133	51	686	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1969	38	5,377	110	121	62	791	-	27	-	-	-	-	-
1970	38	5,629	112	137	108	877	-	27	16	-	-	-	-
1971	39	6,178	127	146	134	962	-	27	16	-	-	-	-
1972	27	6,362	135	132	156	1,038	-	27	24	-	-	-	-
1973	27	6,583	140	137	163	1,284	-	27	69	-	-	-	-
1974	38	6,950	155	132	174	1,347	-	27	126	-	-	-	-
1975	49	7,253	163	155	173	1,388	-	28	146	-	-	-	-
1976	49	7,380	171	198	184	1,434	-	30	215	-	-	-	-
1977	41	7,627	171	238	199	1,497	-	30	217	-	-	-	-
1978	43	8,672	179	277	216	1,546	-	30	237	-	-	-	-
1979	45	8,840	179	293	219	-	-	30	238	-	-	-	-
1980	46	8,871	186	335	265	1,700	-	30	246	-	-	-	-
1981	44	9,137	196	336	228	1,755	-	30	261	-	-	-	-
1982	45	9,336	196	336	287	1,948	-	30	291	-	-	-	-
1983	45	10,836	196	342	336	1,946	-	30	290	-	-	-	-
1984	47	10,813	339	336	376	1,948	-	30	290	-	-	-	-
1985	82	11,195	219	336	394	1,946	-	30	242	-	-	-	-
1986	58	11,876	215	382	429	1,043	-	30	258	-	-	-	-
1987	61	12,128	215	480	428	1,996	-	30	266	31	28	2,886	20,066
1988	63	12,283	217	512	483	1,996	904	29	272	45	30	4,825	24,621
1989	69	12,622	224	523	492	2,081	1,104	29	275	30	31	5,436	32,935
1990	75	13,243	243	647	513	2,042	943	43	268	91	42	5,309	27,666
1991	86	14,127	256	830	513	831	910	43	270	106	43	4,799	28,087
1992	89	14,585	266	844	513	843	833	43	271	59	43	4,209	22,319
1993	93	14,694	283	852	589	1,417	732	43	272	37	43	4,799	28,087
1994	99	14,855	285	680	679	1,489	833	43	272	37	60	4,939	25,032
1995	99	15,011	215	798	708	1,889	741	43	278	84	60	3,889	22,235
1996	98	14,976	212	731	647	1,821	909	43	280	90	61	3,776	24,226
1997	99	15,277	216	654	618	1,481	909	43	280	36	83	3,764	24,225
1998	100	15,687	220	709	699	998	934	43	285	36	79	3,678	24,225
1999	104	15,655	230	693	697	1,982	454	43	286	43	79	3,808	23,819
2000	102	15,557	219	693	573	1,379	454	43	288	43	60	3,673	24,160

Source: Jakarta dalam Angka (yearly)

-: no data

The Joint Instruction of the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Health, and the Head of the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) in 1985 provides us with some clues to help understand the success of the *posyandu*. The Joint Instruction consists of a number of sub-instructions, among which three⁴ are particularly important to discuss. These are:

1. Strengthening inter-sectoral coordination to implement the *posyandu* within the LKMD domain and involving the PKK in efforts to reduce infant mortality and fertility rates, which in turn will bring 'Small, Happy and Prosperous Family (NKKBS)' norms into reality.⁵
2. Developing community participation by upgrading the functions of weighing posts for children under five years old, vaccination posts, ORT⁶ posts, and Village Contraceptive Distribution Centers (VCDCs); and strengthening community participation in programs such as the PKMD (Village Community Health Development), P2GMPK (Developing the Young Generation's Role in Health Development),⁷ P2WKSS (Integrated Program for the Development of the Role of Women to Foster Healthy and Prosperous Families),⁸ BKB (Development of Families with Children under Five)⁹ and the DKIPKM (Intensive Working Area for Community Health Education Program).
3. Strengthening the functions and roles of the LKMD and the PKK by emphasizing the role enforcement of development *kaders*¹⁰ [Mendagri, Menkes dan KBKKBN 1985].

As these sub-instructions illustrate, apparently the *posyandu* was based on the LKMD, the PKK, the family planning program, and several other community health programs. Organizationally, the *posyandu* has been closely related to the LKMD and the PKK since its inception. The *posyandu* is related to the LKMD's seventh sector (health, population and family planning) as well as the PKK's seventh (health) and tenth (sound planning) programs [Mendagri 1979; 1984; Yoshihara 2000: 202].

In other words, one realizes that the *posyandu* owes a significant debt to the LKMD, the PKK, the family planning program, and other community health programs. The LKMD and the PKK were devised to promote village development from the late 1970s to 1980s [Shintani 2001: 28-29]. Through the involvement of these organizations, the villages and people were integrated into national development and developmentalism. The *posyandu* was also integrated into national development, and therefore can be regarded as an achievement of the Soeharto regime. To understand this point more clearly, it is first necessary to examine the establishment of the LKMD, the PKK, and other health programs.

3. Institutional Configuration

3.1 The Establishment and Development of the Administrative Structure

Before examining the PKK, it would be helpful to look briefly at the reorganization of the administrative structure in the 1970s and early 1980s, which still influences the administrative structure of today. Through the reorganization, the administrative structure in Indonesia came to be as follows (from the highest to the lowest): central government-province/special district-regency/city-district-village/town. The single-track vertical and highly hierarchal administrative structure from the central government down to village/town (*desa/kelurahan*) was established by the enactment of Law 5 of 1974 and Law 5 of 1979. In particular, Law 5 of 1979 defined the village as the lowest unit of the administrative structure.

Law 5 of 1979 was substantially different from prior regulations in terms of its influence, since the new law enabled the penetration of villages by the standardized and bureaucratic village administrative system. At the same time, a standardized administrative system (which included procedures for electing a village's head or administrative organization) was introduced [Shimagami 2003: 168-172]. Furthermore, Ministerial Decree of Internal Affairs 7 of 1983 formally defined RT/RW¹¹ as the lowest unit under the government's administrative organization [Yoshihara 2000: 124]. Hence, the basis of the hierarchal administrative structure was established throughout the nation at the neighbourhood level.

Since the LKMD was a successor to the LSD [Keppres 1980], it would be logical to preface a discussion of the former with a discussion of the latter. The roots of the LSD can be traced back to Central Java in 1946, when a government officer in Yogyakarta—who later became Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Affairs—hit upon the idea of 'self-development,' and named it *Bimbingan Sosial* (social guidance).¹² Later, another officer who inherited the idea of *Bimbingan Sosial* developed the idea further and devised the LSD.¹³ With the permission of the Regent (*bupati*)¹⁴, the officer put this idea into practice and a directive was issued in 1952. Initially, the LSD was designed as an autonomous private institution that would mediate between the village administration and villagers' needs [Schulte 1987: 48-52]. "LSD was to be an autonomous private institution and the government's influence was to be restricted to assistance in its formation and implementation (*bimbingan*-guidance) and provision of some financial aid by way of the social committees at the sub-district level" [Schulte 1987: 51].

As the concept became more popular, many LSDs were established in the regency. Furthermore, the range of their activities expanded. These activities were not limited to social issues (such as caring for orphans, widows and the handicapped), but also included economic issues which were incorporated into the activities¹⁵ [Schulte 1987: 51].

Later, LSDs became prevalent in Central Java. To a certain extent, the rapid growth of the LSD in the province was caused by the promotion of the Regent to the position of Governor of Central Java [Schulte 1987: 53]. Furthermore, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Social Affairs—who originally came up with the idea of the LSD, recall-supported the program. Due to the economic stagnation during the early 1960s, the LSD was incorporated into the national eight-year plan¹⁶ to put the responsibility for development onto the people. Nevertheless, incorporating the LSD into the national development plan weakened its original “autonomous” character.¹⁷

In the early 1970s, the LSD was placed under the umbrella of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and defined as an agent of village development. According to Schulte, this was the result of a power struggle between the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The dispute between the two ministries over the affiliation of the LSD was somehow spawned by the incident of September 30, 1965.¹⁸ After the incident, the Ministry of Internal Affairs attempted to gain greater influence over social organizations, including the LSD. The Governor of Central Java who had supported the implementation of the LSD was replaced by Brigadier General Munadi from the army in 1966.¹⁹ In his provincial domain, Munadi tried to transfer the authority over LSD from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The launch of the Five-Year Development Plan (*Repelita*)²⁰ by the Soeharto regime forced the LSD to play the role of implementing development at the village level, as a significant amount of money was allocated to each village. Since the funds for village development were made available via the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry was eager to gain control over the LSD and prevent the Ministry of Social Affairs from interfering with the village development policy. Ultimately, the Ministry of Social Affairs lost the fight and control of the LSD was taken over by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [Schulte 1987: 55-56].

Based on Presidential Decree 28 of 1980,²¹ the LSD was developed further, becoming the LKMD, through the strengthening of its function of development implementation. The LKMD was expected “to advise the village head in matters concerning village development” [Schulte 1987: 60].

To support village government, the LKMD performs the following tasks:

- (1) Planning development based on the principle of *musyawarah*.
- (2) Mobilizing and strengthening community participation initiative to implement comprehensive development, which comes from either the government or the community’s self-help activities (*gotong royong*)
- (3) Cultivating the dynamic condition of the community to develop the social resilience of the village [Keppres 1980: Chapter IV, Article 5].

Ministerial Decree 4 of 1981 further elaborated the LKMD’s advisory function [Schulte 1987: 60]. Meanwhile, based on the Ministerial Direction of Internal Affairs in 1984 [Mendagri 1984], the LKMD’s organizational structure and procedures were determined and its sectors were established. The seventh sector was “health, population and family planning,” while the tenth sector was the “PKK.” In 1985, the hierarchal administrative structure was established, and the foundation for the general participation of villagers through the LKMD was laid.

3.2 Women and the Development of the PKK

The root of the PKK as a social activity goes back to an activity that was held as part of social education by the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1950s [Yoshihara 2000: 198]. In 1957, the concept of the PKK (*Pendidikan Kesejahteraan Keluarga*: Family Welfare Education) was launched, and a pilot project

was implemented in a village in Central Java. After the pilot project had succeeded, the Governor of Central Java issued an instruction in 1967 to establish the PKK throughout the province. Since then, the PKK grew rapidly in the province, owing to its organization and implementation through administrative channels [Soemardjan and Breazeale 1993: 48].

In 1972, the name PKK was retained but the meaning was changed to *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (Family Welfare Development). That same year, the PKK was adopted as a national movement by the central government [Kurasawa 1998: 106]. At the same time, the PKK (which was originally under the Ministry of Education and Culture) was taken over by the Ministry of Internal Affairs [Yoshihara 2000: 198-201]. The Minister of Internal Affairs' guideline in 1973 [Mendagri 1973] and the Minister of Internal Affairs' Letter in 1979 (no. 411.2/9319/Bandes) clarified the linkages between the PKK and the LSD:

In reality, the LSD and the PKK function as coordinating institutions and absorb the aspirations, participation, activities, and roles of the community in village development. Therefore, it is appropriate for all ministries, which by sector have activities and tasks related to village development, to join arms in establishing the LSD and the PKK.

Village development that includes community activities and participation in general should use the LSD as the channel. Meanwhile, village development that particularly includes women's participation should make use of the PKK as a coordinating institution of mobilization [Mendagri 1979].

In the 1973 Indonesian National Guidelines (GBHN 1973), the role of women was emphasized in terms of contribution to national development. The Guidelines stressed the need for education, training and research to facilitate birth control acceptance in order to promote family welfare through the norm of the "small, prosperous and happy family" [Wagemann 2000: 308-309]²². In the 1978 GBHN, women's participation in all fields of national development was emphasized. The 1983 GBHN, meanwhile, stressed the role of women through the PKK activities [Tim Penggerak PKK Propinsi DKI Jakarta 2001: 1-2; Wagemann 2000: 309].

In 1980, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an instruction (10/1980) to establish a PKK mobilization team [Mendagri 1980; Yoshihara 2000: 202], but the details of this team were not defined in the instruction. The Minister of Internal Affairs, by a 1984 ministerial decision, made it obligatory for the wife of the administrative head at each level in the hierarchy of provincial administration (province, district, sub-district and village) to serve *ex officio* as the PKK chair in her husband's area of jurisdiction [Soemardjan and Breazeale 1993: 50].²³ The mobilization of women through the hierarchal administrative structure was thereby enforced by this ministerial decision.²⁴ As a result, in *Repelita* IV, the PKK's involvement in community health activities was expected [Repelita IV 1984b: 23-82].

Although the PKK was one of the most popular women's organizations, it was not the only one that had been developed during the 1970s.²⁵ Other women's organizations were also established, particularly for wives of the armed forces officers and civil servants. For example, the KORPRI (*Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia*: Indonesian Civil Servants' Corps) was established in 1971 [Buchori and Soenarto 2000: 139]. The Dharma Wanita (an organization for the wives of civil servants), which had a unit in each government department and non-departmental institution, was established in 1974 [Suryochondro 2000: 235]. The Dharma Wanita was a functional organization, and it had a hierarchal structure that was based on the status of each member's husband. The inclusion of women started at an early stage; hence it was expected that women would contribute to national development in general and to the establishment of the PKK in particular.

Official women's organizations (the PKK and Dharma Wanita) replicated the functional role and position of members' husbands within the bureaucratic hierarchy. As stated by Elderidge,

The explicit function of the local PKK units, according to the government's own official statements, remains a passive one of transmitting government directives and promoting state ideology to the mass of ordinary women.... One consequence at village level is that the village head's wife is automatically assigned responsibility for the family planning programme within the framework of the PKK programme. [Elderidge 1995: 154].

4. The Development of Community Health Care and *Posyandu*

4.1 The UPGK²⁶

The *posyandu* is considered a form of Primary Health Care (PHC),²⁷ for it provides basic health service at the community level by using health workers, including volunteers from community and village associations. PHC stresses prevention and primary care in the community [Chen 1987]. Internationally, the PHC concept was formalized in 1979 by the Alma-Ata Declaration. The declaration was based on the recognition of the existence of inequalities in the status of health between those living in developed countries and those in developing countries. The PHC idea was publicized in the international conference at Alma-Ata. Nevertheless, prior to the meeting, the method had already been introduced and put into practice in many countries [Nugroho *et al.* 1987].

In Indonesia, activities to involve people and communities in the health care system²⁸ had started prior to the Alma-Ata Declaration, examples being the UPGK, the PKMD, and family planning. These activities were later integrated into the *posyandu*. The UPGK started in the 1950s,²⁹ while the PKMD began in the 1970s, and the family planning program in the late 1960s.

In the following section, three points will be discussed: (1) the integration of local activities/organizations into a national program; (2) each program's development and the establishment of a hierarchal administrative structure; and (3) the mobilization of people within the national development framework.

Before thoroughly addressing each effort, it would be useful to briefly describe the general tide of health development. At the time that *Repelita* I was designed, the Soeharto regime faced severe problems in many areas of public health, such as poor health facilities, a shortage of health personnel and medicine, and low levels of health, hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition. Among these problems, priority was placed on improving health infrastructures. Later, in *Repelita* II and more strongly in *Repelita* III, the poor and the development gap between Java/Bali and other islands were considered to be important issues to solve [Repelita II 1968b: 239; Repelita III 1979b: 90, 92].³⁰

During *Pelita* I,³¹ community health centers (*puskesmas, pusat kesehatan masyarakat*) were established. During *Pelita* II, two Presidential Instructions (numbers 5 of 1974 and 7 of 1975) called for renovation and new development of health infrastructure, including community health centers [Depkes 1980: 18]. Community health centers were expected to have three main functions: (1) curing the sick, (2) prevention and health education, and (3) environmental sanitation [Repelita I 1968b: 54]. In subsequent development plans, the community health center was designed as a core institution for PHC, in accordance with the establishment of a referral system.

The UPGK is a program to improve the nutritional level of families through various efforts. Since this program has been implemented in many provinces over a long period of time, details of the program may differ geographically (from province to province), and historically (from period to period). In this

section, I will mainly rely upon an evaluation report on the early UPGK by Sajogyo [1975] to describe the characteristics of the UPGK in the early 1970s. Here the object is not to describe the specifics of the UPGK program, but rather to see how a community health initiative was integrated into a national program.

The roots of the UPGK in Indonesia can be traced back to the province of Central Java in 1954. Based on a governor's decree, a committee was established in that year for the purpose of improving the nutritional level of the people. The activities of the committee covered the education of *kader*, cooking demonstrations, and other nutritional projects [Sajogyo 1975: 114]. The same efforts also took place in North Sumatra province. Although efforts to coordinate several departments for pursuing such goals were seen in Sumatra during the 1950s, they appeared to be unsuccessful. Only after the early 1960s was an integrated program of food production, education of *kader*, and nutritional counselling put into practice [Sajogyo 1975: 115].

It was in 1963 that UNICEF, FAO, and WHO began to provide technical support for the UPGK, as a part of the worldwide ANP program. According to Sajogyo, the definition of the ANP program in 1965 by FAO/WHO was that it was an "integrative and comprehensive educational activity, whose objectives are the improvement of local food production, consumption, and distribution, that is beneficial to the village/*desa* (in particular for village mothers and children); giving guidance about the principle of coordination between the government and organizations, and about active participation by the community itself" [Sajogyo 1975: 75].

In Indonesia, the UPGK's most important priorities consist of: (1) training health personnel, village *kaders*, and departmental leaders to raise their 'nutritional consciousness'; (2) motivating villagers to increase the output of food production; (3) showing examples of activities and developing UPGK-lead pilot projects at the village level, based on self-sufficiency and the responsibility of local leadership; and (4) attempting to formulate "local family nutritional problems" [Sajogyo 1975: 41].

Although the UPGK in its early stage was characterized by community involvement and village development, it did not flourish nationwide until the late 1970s. In the early stage, LSD and nutrition *kaders*, many of whom were appointed by village heads, were involved in the activity [Sajogyo 1975: 41]. *Kaders*, who were trained to give nutritional education to people, were expected to develop manpower for nutritional education, provide advice and information, and support activities. Nevertheless, during the first Five-Year Development Plan, the *kaders* did not grow sufficiently in number to take the initiative to lead community organizations as centers for nutritional improvement and education. The *kaders* were already trained, but community participation did not extend to the village level.³²

In short, although the concepts of 'coordination among sectors' and the 'participation of the people' were apparently evident in the UPGK at an early stage, they were not implemented completely. Therefore, in Sajogyo's evaluation, these two points were strongly recommended [Sajogyo 1975: 12-13]. Moreover, Sajogyo pointed out the necessity of a stronger organizational base and increased community participation through inter-sectoral cooperation and the involvement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [Sajogyo 1975: 37].

It was only after it was integrated into the family planning program that the UPGK (which was originally a local project) flourished throughout the nation. By improving coordination among related sectors, the UPGK spread throughout the nation rapidly (especially after 1981 when the UPGK became a joint program under the initiative of the Ministry of Health and BKKBN) [Judd 1987: 2; Williams 1986: 14].

The coverage of the UPGK, which initially included four provinces³³ in 1969 [Sajogyo 1976: 41], had expanded to eight provinces by 1972.³⁴ Moreover, by the end of the third five-year plan, it had stretched into twenty-seven provinces and 31,000 villages [Judd 1987: 2; Repelita IV 1984b: 23-4].

4.2 The PKMD

Here we turn to the PKMD (*Pembangunan Kesehatan Masyarakat Desa*: Village Community Health Development) program. The government launched the PKMD in 1975 to involve the community in health development [Achmad 1999: 77]. The PKMD programs are more developed than those of either the UP GK or the PHC. The PKMD covers eight basic health services:³⁵ (1) public education about prevailing health problems; (2) local endemic disease prevention and control; (3) an expanded immunization program; (4) maternal and child health and family planning; (5) the provision of essential drugs through drug posts or health posts; (6) nutrition and food production; (7) the treatment of common diseases and injuries; and (8) ensuring a safe water supply and environmental sanitation [Achmad 1999: 75]. Additionally, the PKMD includes other activities, such as village health insurance, providing village drug posts, the training of community health workers (the *kaders*), and holding income-generating activities [Gunawan 2001: 15-16].

Prior to the realization of the PKMD, three famous examples of community health initiative were founded in the 1960s and the early 1970s: *Dana Sehat* (community health insurance scheme) in Solo, the community health programs using volunteers in Banjarnegara, and the project in Karanganyar. Initially in Solo, and rooted in a voluntary organization known as YAKKUM, a community health program was developed in the late 1960s. It was designed as a program to establish community health insurance, but failed to meet its objective [Gunawan 2001]. YAKKUM launched another community health program in the Banjarnegara district of Central Java province in 1971 [Haliman and Williams 1983: 1449; Gunawan 2001]. Other NGOs also introduced an integrated development program to improve the status of people's health [Haliman and Williams 1983: 1450]. In 1973, a community health improvement effort was launched in Karanganyar by the Health Services Research and Development Center of the National Institute of Health Research and Development [Gunawan 2001]. This project promoted the establishment of *Dana Sehat* schemes, and trained health volunteers.

Inspired by these community health initiatives and the advice of WHO, in 1975 the Ministry of Health set up a working committee to plan and develop a viable PKMD program³⁶ [Gunawan 2001]. In 1977, at a national conference on the subject, the PKMD was adopted as a "strategy for health development and integral part of overall village development" [Gunawan 2001]. Especially after the launch of the LKMD, the PKMD was to be coordinated by a sector of the LKMD [Depkes 1982: 31]. Consequently, community participation in terms of manpower, funds, and ideas [Depkes 1982: 22] was expected to support the poor people in the area covered by the PKMD.³⁷

As shown above, the idea of community participation in health programs was reflected in many earlier health efforts. Later, this idea became a national policy. In the health section of *Repelita* II, the concept of community participation was introduced. In particular, women began to be encouraged to act as implementers of community health activities. *Repelita* II had already suggested that women's organizations be expected to help coordinate health activity [Repelita II 1974b: 261]. Moreover, in *Repelita* III, this tendency became stronger, and in *Repelita* IV the PKK was mentioned by name [Repelita III 1979b: 102, 126-127; Repelita IV 1984b: Chapter 23, 64-67]. As explained previously, the integration of women's organizations into national projects was supported by the establishment of the administrative structure.

Although efforts to establish the PKMD had started in 1975, it was only since *Pelita* III that the PKMD was introduced throughout the nation [Repelita IV 1984b: 23-26].³⁸ By the end of *Pelita* III, the PKMD had spread throughout the nation. Through this approach, 20,400 village health promoters and 172,000 nutrition *kaders* had been trained [Repelita IV 1984b: 23-26]. Later, the PKMD and other health efforts including family planning were integrated into the *posyandu*.

In the next section, I will examine the development of the family planning program, which significantly contributed to the development of the *posyandu* and the mobilization of women for national projects.

4.3 The Family Planning Program

The main objective of this section is not to provide a comprehensive account of the development of the family planning program, but rather, to elucidate it in terms of the three points mentioned above (see 4.1, paragraph 3). Before turning to these points, however, it would be helpful to sketch a brief outline history of the establishment of the family planning program.

In Indonesia, a pioneering NGO (PKBI),³⁹ which was to significantly contribute to the implementation of family planning, was established in 1957. Some time after its establishment, the PKBI issued a statement appealing to the government to implement a family planning program at the national level. In 1968, Presidential Instruction 26/1968 was issued which suggested establishing a semi-governmental institution to coordinate all family planning activities. Following this instruction, the Minister of People's Welfare issued a Ministerial Decree (No.35/Kpts/Kesra/X/1968) to establish a team, whose task was to prepare for the establishment of a family planning institution.

In the same year, the same minister issued a Ministerial Decree (No. 36/Kpts/Kesra/X/1968) which established the National Family Planning Institute (LKBN, *Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional*) [BKKBN 1986: 40-41; 1990: 20-21]. Later, in 1970, the LKBN was reorganized as the National Family Planning Coordination Board (BKKBN) by Presidential Decree 8/1970. Moreover, by Presidential Decree 33 of 1972, the BKKBN underwent reorganization and emerged as a Non-Departmental Government Institution.

Initially, following its institutional establishment, family planning was integrated into the national development program in *Repelita* I. Six provinces were selected as initial implementation fields: DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Bali [BKKBN 1986: 14]. In the subsequent *Repelita* II, the coverage was extended to ten other provinces outside Java-Bali: Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, West Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara [BKKBN 1990: 32].

Unlike other community health organizations and activities, family planning was originally planned as a national program in Indonesia. This is readily apparent since the very establishment of the LKBN in 1968 was based on a presidential instruction. In short, the other community health activities and organizations discussed thus far were not originally concerned with the nation and saw no role for the Ministry of Internal Affairs; by contrast, with family planning the direct involvement of the president and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was evident.

When the BKKBN was established, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was already involved in the process, because the Minister of Internal Affairs had been assigned as a member of the Advisory Council (*Devan Pembimbing*) of the BKKBN by Presidential Decree 8 of 1970. Furthermore, the role was strengthened because the Minister of Internal Affairs was also assigned as a vice chief of the Council under Presidential Decree 33 of 1972. In addition, the Secretariat General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was assigned to the Program Operation Advisory Team.

It is important to note that the family planning program was expanded into the nation through the administrative structure of local governments. In this regard, the role of governors was defined in Presidential Decree 33 of 1972. "General responsibility for implementing the National Family Planning Program at the regional level is in the hands of the Governor (*gubernur*)⁴⁰ /Head of Region (*kepala daerah*) for the first level of local administration, and of the Regent (*bupati*)/Head of Region (*kepala daerah*) for the second level of local administration"[Keppres 1972: Chapter I, Article 1].

These characteristics of family planning as a national program contributed significantly to the success of the program. Later, the integration of family planning into the *posyandu* also considerably affected the success of the *posyandu*.

A community approach was also applied in the family planning program. To widen access for people to family planning services, a family planning field worker (PLKB)⁴¹ project was launched by the PKBI in 1970 and later was improved by the BKKBN [BKKBN 1986: 75]. The field workers “motivate the individual and the community members to accept and implement the family planning program.” Furthermore, they “collect information derived from the people’s responses towards the family planning program and report the activities to the supervisors.” They also recruit and maintain those who accept family planning in their respective areas [BKKBN 1986: 75].⁴²

The family planning program met its objectives in many places. Members of a community in Java and Bali had established a VCDC by the end of *Pelita* I. In preliminary stages, the VCDC activities were limited only to providing information, motivating people, distributing and re-supplying contraceptives, and recording the number of those who accepted family planning. The VCDCs⁴³ and sub-VCDCs were later developed into a unit that implemented integrated programs, such as family-planning nutrition programs, cooperatives, home industries, farming, cattle-breeding, etc. [BKKBN 1986: 54-55].

In 1975, volunteer participation was introduced, with volunteers known as PPKBDs (village contraceptive distributors, *Pembantu Pembina Keluarga Berencana Desa*). The main task of the PPKBDs was to support and maintain those who accepted family planning, by providing contraceptives and popularizing family planning concepts. In 1977, the PPKBD program began to flourish outside Java/Bali [BKKBN 1986: 72; 1990: 36]. The number of PPKBDs and receptive groups increased drastically. In 1974/75, there were only 11,837 PPKBDs and 2,200 groups accepting family planning, while in FY 1978/1979 these had increased to 34,780 PPKBDs and 55,285 groups. Moreover, by the end of FY 1983/1984, the number had risen to 57,440 PPKBDs and 126,751 groups [BKKBN 1986: 156; 1990: 36].

A large part of those volunteers were women. How were they integrated into the program? It was during *Pelita* III that the importance of the role of women in family planning was recognized. At the beginning of *Pelita* III, the BKKBN and the office of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs agreed to work together to motivate women’s involvement in family planning and the later P2WKSS (Integrated Program for the Development of the Role of Women to Foster Healthy and Prosperous Families) program, and to integrate women’s other activities [BKKBN 1986: 78]. On the other hand, as was already explained earlier, the family planning program was integrated with other health and nutrition programs.⁴⁴ The integration had been implemented in ten provinces by the end of *Pelita* III [BKKBN 1986: 76-79].⁴⁵

In 1984, President Soeharto declared “Safari KB Senyum Terpadu” on August 27 “to increase community participation in the delivery of integrated family planning” [BKKBN 1986: 80]. Furthermore, coordination among Governors, District Heads, Sub-district Heads, Village Heads, Dharma Wanita, and the Women’s Organization (i.e. the PKK) was encouraged for the success of the program [BKKBN 1986: 15, 37; BKKBN 1990: 53-54]. At that time, the foundations for the later establishment of the *posyandu* were laid [BKKBN 1986: 77]. When the *posyandu* was formally introduced as a national program in 1985, it came under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs by Presidential Decree.

5. Concluding Remarks

This paper began with an examination of the history of the community organizations and community health activities that became the precursors of the *posyandu*, such as the LSD/LKMD, the PKK, and the family planning program. By considering its background, there can be no doubt that the *posyandu* was embedded with basic elements of the Soeharto regime: the incorporation of people and communities into the national development framework through the administrative structure of the government under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the backbone of which consists of the National Military and

military officers [Shiraishi 1992: 8].⁴⁶

More specifically, the *posyandu* was highly influenced by the centralizing and authoritarian characteristics of the New Order, as shown by the following historical evidence. First, the organizations and activities that preceded the *posyandu* (such as the LKMD and the PKK) were originally local in nature before the New Order government absorbed them as a national program under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Second, the standardized type of *posyandu* was designed to be implemented at the community (RT/RW) level through the administrative government structure. To achieve this objective, the New Order government established a hierarchical administrative structure from the Central Government down to the village and even community (RT/RW) levels. Under the regime, a top-down order was thus implemented throughout. Third, the *posyandu* was transformed into a national program and integrated into the national 'development' framework through the channels of the LKMD and the PKK. By integrating the formalized organizations in this way, the New Order government was able to mobilize people, particularly women. In this sense, the *posyandu* could be declared to be an 'achievement' of the Soeharto regime.

Facing global economic changes and the demise of the Cold War, the Soeharto regime gradually began to lose its authoritarian grip from 1985 onwards [Sato 2002: 65]. It is important to note that 1985 is the very year when the *posyandu* was established nationally. In 1998, Soeharto stepped down from his seat due to economic and political unrest following the 1997 currency crisis.

Prior to the succession of leadership in Indonesia, the *posyandu* had already reached a turning point. The number of *posyandu* in the country did not increase, and may have even decreased, in the mid-1990s (Table 1 and Table 2). A low birth rate and low fertility rate undermined the very basis for the *posyandu* [Yoshihara and Dwianto 1999: 57, 68].

However, taking the monetary crisis as momentum, the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to re-emphasize the *posyandu*'s function and issued guidance to revitalize the *posyandu* in 1999 [Departemen Dalam Negeri dan Otonomi Daerah 2001]. On the other hand, the subsidence of the crisis questions again the necessity and reason for the continued existence of the *posyandu* activity today, especially in urban areas where the accessibility of health facilities has relatively increased.

Furthermore, the current configuration of the *posyandu* in the community and in development is also in question. In accordance with instructions, the *posyandu* was placed under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and involved with development through the channels of the LKMD, the PKK and RT/RW. Even so, in the actual implementation of the *posyandu*, the PKK and the LKMD did not function and support the *posyandu* as much as had been expected [Köllmann and van Veggel 1996: 104]. Therefore, the dismantling of the New Order regime may have had a significant impact on the vividness of *posyandu* activity. By the end of the New Order regime, the power of controlling and mobilizing people through the PKK and the LKMD weakened. This means that if the *posyandu* remains as an organization that exists merely on the basis of mobilizing for the government, its role will decline in the future. Therefore, now would be an apt time to measure the autonomous aspects of the *posyandu* by observing its activities.

Finally, regional autonomy and decentralization, which were introduced by former President Habibie, have brought changes to all of the systems that were established under the New Order regime, including the *posyandu*. Community organizations also experienced several, but relatively minor, changes. For example, at the village level, the BPD (*Badan Perwakilan Desa*, Village Assembly Institution), in contrast to the LKMD, came to play a greater role in village development and autonomy. In Jakarta, the *Dewan Kelurahan* (Village Committee) was established in April 2001. In the case of the PKK, drastic changes due to regional autonomy did not take place. Nevertheless, several minor changes have occurred. For instance, at least in Jakarta, the wife of a *lurah* does not necessarily become the chief of the PKK at that *kelurahan*. Moreover, the PKK was redefined as the "Family Welfare Empowerment" movement [Tim Penggerak PKK Propinsi

DKI Jakarta 2001].

Therefore, the *posyandu* in the Post-Soeharto era enjoys the possibility to develop itself to become an agent for intermediating between the needs of the community and the will of the government. On the other hand, it may be absorbed into the authority of the government and/or community again. To clarify these issues, further observation of the *posyandu* based on actual cases are needed. One method would be to understand the structure of the *posyandu* in each community's power configuration.

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Notes

- 1 Translated literally, the *posyandu* (*pos pelayanan terpadu*) is an 'integrated service post,' which means the place where health activity is conducted. Nevertheless, in this paper, following Indonesian practice, the author means by *posyandu* not only the place, but also the organization and activity itself.
- 2 LSD is an abbreviation of *Lembaga Sosial Desa* (Village Social Organization), LKMD of *Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa* (Village Society Resilience Organization), and PKK of *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (Family Welfare Development). In the Post-Soeharto regimes, the PKK was renamed *Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (Empowerment and Family Welfare) [Tim Penggerak PKK Propinsi DKI Jakarta 2001]. All of these are semi-governmental organizations.
- 3 According to Williams [1986], the *posyandu* basically covers five main programs: (1) Nutrition: growth monitoring through weighing and referrals to Public Health Centers, nutrition education, provision of vitamin A capsules, raising food production through training in intensified gardening, and animal husbandry; (2) Diarrhoeal Disease Control: health education concerning hygiene, sanitation, and safe drinking water; provision of oral rehydration salts (ORT); (3) Immunization: vaccinations for babies and women; (4) Family planning: provision of contraception and information about family planning; education about birth spacing (insertion and checking of IUDs); (5) Mother and Children's health; pre-and post-natal care including examinations by midwives, vaccination against tetanus toxoid (TT), provision of iron folate and vitamin A supplements, education about maternal and child health.
- 4 Presidential Instruction 23 of 1985 also shares these elements.
- 5 This concept was introduced as a norm of family planning in *Pelita II* [BKKBN 1995: 26].
- 6 ORT is an abbreviation of Oral Rehydration Therapy.
- 7 Details of the P2GMPK (Peranan Generasi Muda dalam Pembangunan Kesehatan) and DKIPKM (Daerah Kerja Intensif Penyuluhan Kesehatan Masyarakat) programs are not written in the Instruction.
- 8 The program can be traced back to TAP MPR RI IV/1978 and Presidential Decree 7 of 1979. The Junior Minister of Women's Affairs, based on Presidential Decree 13 of 1978, coordinated this program. It is closely related to the development through the PKK [Aman 1986: iv-viii, 1-7].
- 9 "The purpose of the BKB program is to provide knowledge and skills to mothers about how to educate and care for children under five years old (*balita*). With this knowledge and skills, it is expected that mothers will be able to educate and take care of

- their infants from an early age so that they will grow up and develop into wholesome Indonesian citizens”[BKKBN 1995: 61]. The concept of BKB was introduced at the beginning of *Pelita* III to connect family planning to children’s health services [BKKBN 1995: 60-61].
- 10 A *Kader* is a volunteer who implements the *posyandu* activities. They are recruited from the community. Literally, *kader* means a core member of an organization. Therefore, *kader* are seen not only in the *posyandu* but also in other activities.
 - 11 RW is an abbreviation of *rukun warga* and RT of *rukun tetangga*. RW is a unit of neighbourhood division under village, while an RT is a unit under an RW.
 - 12 According to Schulte, this idea was based on the ‘*taman siswa*’ movement [Schulte 1987: 49]. As for ‘*Taman siswa*’ see Tsuchiya (1982).
 - 13 According to Schulte, the official was inspired by the idea of a social institution. The institution has four tasks: (1) social aspects of general health care; (2) social care, especially for children, women and the handicapped; (3) courses and education; and (4) information and propaganda [Schulte 1987: 50].
 - 14 The Regent was later promoted to Governor of Central Java province in 1956. His service as a governor was from 1956 until 1966 [Schulte 1987: 50].
 - 15 Later, the integral characteristic of the LSD caused an administrative problem in the 1960s, i.e. the issue of coordination among many departments. Some departments were confused by the extended functions of the LSD.
 - 16 Nevertheless, Schulte says, in the early 1960s, the pressure “from the top” to implement the LSD was not intense, even in Central Java province [Schulte 1987: 53].
 - 17 In contrast to the government’s expectation, due to famine in Java in the first half of the 1960s the LSD was rapidly undermined [Schulte 1987: 53-54].
 - 18 In the New Order regime, “all social and development activities must be channelled through the official organizations,” such as the PKK and the LKMD [Achmad 1999: 29].
 - 19 His wife contributed to the development of the PKK [Yoshihara 2000: 200-201].
 - 20 *Repelita* is an abbreviation of *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* (Five-Year Development Plan) and the government’s paper, while *Pelita* (Five-Year Development Program) is *Repelita*’s implementation. Under the Soeharto regime, six *Repelitas* were formulated: the first (1969/70-73/74), the second (1974/75-78/79), the third (1979/80-1983/84), the fourth (1984/85-1988/89), the fifth (1989/90-1993/94) and the sixth (1994/95-1998/99).
 - 21 Law 5 of 1979 defined the LSD as an institution to “support village/*kelurahan* heads in development sectors” (explanation of the law). Nevertheless, as has often been pointed out, this created confusion between the LSD and the LMD (*Lembaga Musyawarah Desa*). The LSD was also expected to support the village head by holding conferences and discussions [Mendagri 1979: Chapter II, Article 3 and Article 17].
 - 22 The focus on the role of women in Indonesia was affected by the international development policy change. Specifically, it was a result of the United Nations’ declaration of the “United Nations’ Decade for Women” in 1975.
 - 23 See also Chapter Two of *Menteri Dalam Negeri* [Mendagri 1984].
 - 24 It is also important to note that the State Minister of Women’s Role was established in 1983.
 - 25 Of course, some women’s organizations had their roots before World War II. For instance, Kowani (*Kongres Wanita Indonesia*) was from the *Kongres Perempuan Indonesia* (Indonesian Women’s Congress) that was established in 1935. Nevertheless, the 1970s is significant in the sense that women’s organizations were reformed as semi-governmental organizations [Suryochondro 2000: 228-235].
 - 26 UPKG is an abbreviation of *Upaya Perbaikan Gizi Keluarga* (Family Nutrition Improvement Program, or Applied Nutrition Program).
 - 27 According to the Declaration, PHC covers at least the following eight activities; (1) health education, (2) nutrition, (3) safe water and basic sanitation, (4) maternal and child health care including family planning, (5) immunization, (6) prevention and control of locally endemic diseases, (7) treatment, (8) provision of essential drugs.
 - 28 Nevertheless, Achmad states that there were no instances of spontaneous participation in implementing PHC in Indonesia as

- set out by the Alma Alta declaration, and all health policies were formulated by the central government [Achmad 1999: 12].
- 29 The name UPGK was originally introduced in 1969 at a conference in Bogor [Sajogyo 1975: 116].
- 30 The slow development of the health sector was mainly caused by budget constraints. Although *Repelita* I already covered the health sector, it did not stress social sectors, such as health, religion, education, and social welfare due to a lack of funds. It was *Repelita* II which paid much more attention to these sectors for the first time [Hady 1990; Depkes 1980: 18]. Therefore, the development of the health sector was actually begun with *Pelita* II.
- 31 During *Pelita* I, a part of the Mother and Children's Welfare Clinic (BKIA, *Balai Kesejahteraan Ibu dan Anak*) and policlinic were integrated into the community health center [Sciortino 1999: 124]. However, efforts to improve the health of mothers and children had already started in Indonesia, prior to *Repelita* I. In 1952, BKIA were built in each area with the support of WHO and UNICEF. Midwives and paramedics from BKIA supported pregnant women from prenatal until post-natal term by providing services for babies and children. Moreover, BKIA also provided educational programs for mothers, vaccinations, and first aid [Sciortino 1999: 123].
- 32 One of the reasons is that during the first phase, the target of the UPGK program was *kecamatan* rather than *desa* [Sajogyo 1975: 12-15].
- 33 They were Central Java, Yogyakarta, South Sumatra, and West Nusa Tenggara.
- 34 North Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Yogyakarta, Bali, and West Nusa Tenggara were added to the program.
- 35 The following points are apparently the eight activities that featured in the Alma-Ata Declaration.
- 36 At first, the PKMD consisted of the following activities: baby weighing, nutritional improvement, and first aid [Soetamto *et al.* 1990: 1].
- 37 The PKMD system expected people to support the health services of the community health center [Depkes 1982]. This meant that prior to the implementation of the PKMD, the basic health facility (community health center) and the referral system were already established.
- 38 Since the PKMD was not implemented throughout the nation during *Pelita* II, *Repelita* expected PKMD to be conducted in every province [Repelita III 1979 b: 106].
- 39 In English, it is called IPPA (Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association).
- 40 The Indonesian words inside the () brackets were added by the author.
- 41 At first, the field workers, who originally were honorary employees, became civil servants [BKKBN 1986: 76].
- 42 The number of family planning field workers had increased. In *Pelita* I, there were 1,113 supervisors and 5,592 family planning field workers. By the end of *Pelita* III, the number had increased to 3,406 supervisors and 12,160 family planning field workers. [BKKBN 1986: 76].
- 43 The number of VCDs had increased from 11,937 in the fiscal year 1974 /1975 to 54,000 in 1983/1984 [BKKBN 1986: 55].
- 44 In 1981, by a Joint Instruction of the Minister of Health and the Head of BKKBN, a program to integrate promotive and preventive health services and family planning began to be implemented [Muis, Wirawanni, and Rochadi 1990: 1].
- 45 These are West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, Bali, West Sumatra, Lampung, South Sulawesi, South East Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara [BKKBN 1986: 76-79].
- 46 Furthermore, the issue of health programs in the context of international development is also important. Indonesia's national health policies are highly influenced by the policies of UNICEF, the UN, and other bilateral programs. As previously explained, the ideas of PHC and 'women's role' were introduced through international development policy and organizations.

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Context and Contingency: Los Angeles, New York City, and Other Global Nodes

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This essay explores the historical dynamics of the role and reputation of Los Angeles as a global city.¹ Urban scholars interested in international comparisons and transnational relationships are always also interested in the question of how to compare or relate great, global cities. Everyone knows that every great city is unique, with a “personality” or character that is supposed to define its residents or the quality of life there. Such comparisons have been part of popular culture for many centuries, and every epoch seems to have its own set of exemplary cities about which cosmopolitans continually comment.

A very great challenge has been to separate the sensational or anecdotal rhetoric generated by occasional observers (journalists, business boosters, literary critics—whose insights are often quite valuable) from the systematic analysis that scholars should conduct. The former all too often colors the latter, making the tasks of the scholar all the more difficult. This paper proposes a method of sorting the features of any great city into qualities that make the business of comparative and relational analysis more coherent.

For about fifteen years, scholars, cultural critics, politicians, and business boosters have engaged in colorful and often bombastic campaign to proclaim that “to understand the future of America, one has to understand Los Angeles.”² Los Angeles-based scholars self-confidently proclaimed the existence of an “L.A. School” of urban studies to study the city that was being proclaimed as the prototype of the 21st century.³ This wave of hyperbole followed decades of suffering the calumny of New Yorker’s condescension about the tawdry, suntanned, superficial, automobile-addicted, smog-choked, crassly commercial, entertainment culture of “La-La Land.” Curiously, the recent LA Boosters, who include such prominent urbanists as Mike Davis, Edward Soja, and Michael Dear, are just as likely to point to the dystopian features of Los Angeles: riots, environmental degradation, ungovernability (the *Blade Runner* images), as proof of the city’s political and cultural vanguard status, as they are to tout its positive achievements.⁴

A recent essay by Jeffrey Hanes on the historical development of the rivalry between Osaka and Tokyo presents a very helpful approach to deconstructing the bombastic self-promotion, name-calling, and hyperbole that characterizes most popular comparisons between great cities.⁵ While this essay focuses on the reputation of Los Angeles vis-à-vis New York City, I shall engage in a larger comparison with the situation of Osaka in Japan, in hopes of building on his excellent work. In many important ways, Los Angeles and Osaka resemble one another, as commercial/industrial port cities and as “second cities” within their nation-states. The relationship goes beyond this, however, for Los Angeles developed its regional identity not only in rivalry with other U.S. cities, but in rivalry and relationship with Pacific Rim cities and cultures.

Several factors and dimensions are at stake when assessing the role and identity of a great city in its national and international *contexts*. The two contexts of greatest importance are a) whether the city is also the national capital, and b) the influence of the city’s region. A great deal of “urban personality” can be

explained primarily through these two factors, but those factors need to be supplemented by the historical-developmental ones that isolate specific episodes, economic sectors, built landscapes and visual-representational features (“urban icons”), migration flows, ethnic enclaves, labor markets, and social upheavals that are *historically unique to the city in question*. These two dimensions could be called *contextual* and *contingent*, respectively.

Cutting through these two dimensions is a third: *globalism*. The rise of a city to global status separates it in fundamental ways from cities whose reach is limited to a region or nation-state (such as Topeka, Kansas or Syracuse, New York). Globalism is also the highest level of generalization. Recent scholarship on “global cities” has demonstrated a general family resemblance between Tokyo, New York City, London, Osaka, Chicago, and Los Angeles, even though the first three of these are “primate cities” and the last three are “second cities.”⁶ Admitting certain similarities, such as sheer size (eight to ten million is a standard figure for admission to global city status), major international capital flows, international migrant populations, and international influence, the differences between these global cities is usually more apparent than these similarities, not all of which each global city shares. Tokyo and London, for instance, have far fewer foreign immigrants than the American cities. Rather than dwell on this “global” dimension as a quality in itself, I shall address the globalism of Los Angeles within the “contextual” and “contingent” dimensions that, I assert, explain most of a city’s distinctiveness. All of the differences and relationships, moreover, are historical ones. Every city grew from some origin and developed in its context over time, so the rest of the paper will simply assume that the story needs to be set in a chronological framework.

Contextual factors	Contingent factors
Capital or non-capital city Location within a region	specific episodes economic sectors built landscapes visual-representational features migration flows ethnic enclaves labor markets social upheavals

Contexts (national and regional)

With the rise of the modern nation-state, great cities in most nations can only have one of two roles: capital (containing the national *capitol*) city or not. Most “global cities,” in fact, are also nation-state capitals. Paris, Tokyo, Mexico City, Madrid, all combine the role of chief urban center, directing the nation’s economy, with the role of the political and cultural center of power. National identity is impossible to separate from the urban identity of these kinds of great metropolises. The United States differs fundamentally from the international norm in this pattern. The nation’s capitol, Washington, D.C., was deliberately located in a neutral territory between the centers of power in the urban-commercial North and the plantation-rural South. To this day, the most powerful city on Earth has no economy to speak of. It is purely an administrative-bureaucratic city. Apart from Washington D.C., U.S. cities are commercial, financial, cultural, and industrial centers arrayed along a hierarchy that always begins with New York City. The United States is, therefore, effectively bicephalous, or two-headed: Political power is concentrated at Washington D.C. and socioeconomic power is concentrated at New York City. New York does not have a monopoly, but it is very hard to image it losing its preeminence.

If only because it is the center of the globe’s financial markets, the nation’s largest city, the headquarters of the nation’s publishing and performing arts (and therefore the center of its elite culture), the

home of the United Nations, and because it is much more proximal to Washington D.C. than its chief rivals (Miami, Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco), New York City may never be displaced from the top of the American urban pyramid. So, just as Toulouse or Marseilles can never hope to be the national capital of France, they can never hope to lead the French nation in the way that Paris does, and the way that Washington/New York City lead the American nation. All a “second city” can do in these circumstances is to rise or fall in power and respect relative to the capital/primate cities and to the other rivals for second fiddle status. Thus, Los Angeles eclipsed Chicago as the nation’s “second city” in the 1960s, but it can never be the first. Osaka temporarily displaced Tokyo only because of the catastrophic Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, but absent a decision to move the imperial capital, Osaka had to face an eventual return to second rate, which it did by the 1930s.

As Jeffrey Hanes’s enlightening essay shows, however, such rising and falling fortunes relative to primate city had an enormous impact on Osaka’s identity. A very important lesson to be drawn from his account is that cities like Osaka and Los Angeles, which come to rapidly to wield real economic and cultural power within their nations and globally, can provoke intense reactions by threatened partisans of the national capital. Osaka’s brief eclipse of Tokyo during the years of Tokyo’s reconstruction, he shows, was also the period in which the major stereotypes of Osakans (as crassly commercial and rude, or pragmatic and shrewd), while inherited from the Meiji period, took on a larger significance as a struggle for the right to speak for the Japanese nation and culture as a whole.⁷ The 1920s was also the decade in which Los Angeles suddenly emerged as a major center of the American economy and culture, so, using Hanes’s model, it is perfectly understandable that the epithets began to fly from New York’s cultural spokespersons in those years. During the 1920s the city’s key economic sectors: oil, motion pictures, and aircraft, and home-building, forced the rest of the nation to recognize it as more than a tourist resort destination. Each of these sectors played a part in this recognition. Oil strikes not only produced spectacular *nouveaux riches*, like Edward Doheny and J. Paul Getty, but made possible a fully-formed industrial economy, with rubber, automobile, and other factories as large as anywhere in the United States. That industrial character is the least recognized of the city’s identity, because it has been disguised behind the city’s most visible Hollywood sector. It underlay the city’s greatness, however, by attracting the sheer numbers of settlers that made the city into the global entrepôt of the Pacific (displacing San Francisco by 1920). Those sheer numbers, in turn, gave the Los Angeles basin more and more seats in the California state legislature, in the U.S. House of Representatives, and more votes for presidential aspirants to capture. That political power reinforced its economic power, channeling state and federal investments into the region, so that whatever the city’s cultural identity, New Yorkers and everyone else had no choice but to come to terms with the city’s socio-political significance.

It was the motion picture industry, of course, that set the tone for the city’s emergent identity, and also made Los Angeles vulnerable to the dismissive satires of the nation’s cultural leadership in New York City. But here the relationship is very complex, because New Yorkers were deeply involved in the rise of Los Angeles, and their dismissals of Los Angeles as a superficial city filled with nuts and dreamers belie a great measure of guilty self-loathing. The origins of the motion picture industry were in Paris and New York City. The rapid move of the American cinematic capital to Los Angeles took place between 1914 and 1920. That shift that has been explained in many ways, but the explanation for motion pictures settling in Los Angeles always comes back to the climate and landscape. With 300 cloud-free days per year and the complete range of global landscapes to use as sets (from beaches to deserts to forests, lakes, and snow-capped mountains), Los Angeles provided a year-round production center for the industry. Having asserted the natural environment as a primary factor, I hasten to add that the nascent industrial base and population concentration in the Los Angeles Basin was also necessary. Santa Barbara or San Diego would

have provided exactly the same environmental qualities, but there was no chemical industry in those cities to manufacture film stock, no sufficient supply of trucks, no sufficient concentration of workshops, communications, and so on, that are necessary for the foundation of any industrial sector.

Further, the motion picture industry remained *headquartered*, it is rarely remembered, in New York City, through the entire “classic era” of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. “Clark Gable may have posed for cameras in Culver City, but his paycheck was signed [in New York City] at 1540 Broadway, across the street from the Camel Cigarette sign blowing smoke rings.” M-G-M’s Louis Mayer was a giant potentate in Los Angeles, but he answered to his own boss, Marcus Loew, who lived on Long Island and worked on Times Square. Adolph Zukor’s office was in the Paramount Building on Broadway, New York City. The headquarters for Warner Brothers and RKO Radio Pictures were also in New York, kept close by the investors that capitalized them.⁸

But the “control” of Hollywood from these New York headquarters was deeply compromised by the regional monopoly on movie talent and production held by the Los Angeles studios. The New York corporate bosses meddled constantly through budget and production decisions, and through their power to fire the studio chiefs. From 1915 to 1920, “Uncle Carl” Laemmle hired and fired no less than sixteen managers of his giant Los Angeles Universal City studio complex (averaging 4 months tenure), before sending his young assistant Irving Thalberg out to clean the place up. But the dense concentration of specialized talent (technicians, make-up artists, and camera-experienced actors) and subsidiary industries (film processing, camera parts, lighting equipment, prop rentals) in Los Angeles was simply irreplaceable by at least 1925.⁹

That said, the nation’s leading creative artists—writers, actors, composers, hailed almost exclusively from New York City. The entire genre of the motion picture grew from New York’s vaudeville theatre, so it was impossible to make movies without a constant communication between Manhattan and Los Angeles. This required a constant stream of “talent” to travel the three-day railroad route and find some place to live in Los Angeles. Seemingly every great American writer of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s made this pilgrimage, including H.L. Menken, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Upton Sinclair, Nathaniel West, Anita Loos, William Faulkner, and many more. While not all of these were New Yorkers, they were all New York-centric in their national orientation because their editors and publishers were all based there. Faulkner, of course, was the preeminent writer of the American South, but his urban center was New York City. The prominently immigrant Jewish qualities of the Hollywood industry, including not only such founders as the Warner brothers and Louis Mayer, but also great musical composers such as Irving Berlin and Max Steiner, gave Hollywood a character as the West Coast of Manhattan.

It is well-known, however, that many of these New Yorkers despised Los Angeles, wishing every minute that they were back in the center of North American civilization. Many cruelly satirized Los Angeles, as Nathanael West did in his *Day of the Locust* (1940). This effect was magnified when the great German intellectual émigrés, Berthold Brecht, Thomas Mann, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Arnold Schoenberg, settled in Los Angeles during World War II and bemoaned their exile in a land of the “culture industry.” The Russian-Jewish cosmopolitan Igor Stravinsky, it bears noting, permanently settled in Los Angeles from the 1940s through his death in 1971, and did *not* make a career habit of criticizing the Los Angeles.

Along with motion picture production, aeronautics infused Los Angeles with its distinctive regional culture and political economy, embodying the advanced technological sectors of the twentieth century. Both seemed inherently cosmopolitan. Every flier and every flight raises the possibility of going on forever, around the world. That inherent detachment from a territory, as a very condition of being “on” or “from” that territory, is a paradoxical condition shared also by motion pictures. Movies are from everywhere in

terms of content, and to everywhere, in the miracle of mass reproduction of unique performances. Thus, the two most distinctive of Los Angeles's industries were also the most advanced, emblematic of the 20th rather than the 19th centuries. And both were inherently global.

These indigenous industries implanted into the social landscape “proliferating networks of inter-establishment transactions that [were] created as the social division of labor” widened and deepened.¹⁰ In plain language, thousands of highly specialized skills emerged, each interdependent with others surrounding it. The airframe industry created a regional critical mass of talent, facilities, and subcontractors.¹¹ The “prime contractors” located adjacent to airfields throughout the region, peripheral to the industrial core, and separated by miles of residential developments. Although they could not predict it, the early successes of the Los Angeles airframe producers positioned the region to benefit mightily by the arrival of another world war in 1939. In that year 15,000 Angelenos were employed building aircraft, but just four years later this sector implied nearly 200,000 workers. Although the end of the war caused massive layoffs, the rapid arrival of the Cold War buildup beginning in 1949 again reinforced the industry and its regional complex, which emerged as the “aerospace capital of the world,” eventually employing 290,000 in the design and manufacture of advanced weaponry, civilian aircraft, and space exploration vehicles.¹² The 1920s, therefore, laid the firm foundations for a military-industrial complex that contributes mightily to the global power of the metropolis of the 21st century.

Contingency: Regionalism, Historical Accretion, and the Landscape

To this point, I have tried to build on Jeffrey Hanes' insightful work on the Osaka-Tokyo relationship, in which he shows that the identity of a (non-capital) great city develops historically within the context of its relationship to the capital or primate city, in a complex relationship that sometimes involves central actors from the capital/primate city itself. In both cases, LA and Osaka, the crucial decade of emergence was the 1920s, but for entirely different reasons. In Osaka the crucial event was the Great Kanto Earthquake. In Los Angeles, the trigger was the sudden emergence of a coherent socio-economic-cultural metropole on the Pacific Coast, an emergence built on both “traditional” industry and commerce (oil, factory production, and a large international port), and on “emergent” industries: motion pictures and aircraft. Motion pictures and aircraft both inspired both ridicule and awe. In both cases, traditional elites on the East Coast were forced to recognize the importance of these sectors, but that very importance also provoked outbursts of insecurity and laid-down a foundation of stereotypes about the character or personality of the place.

Now I want to make my own neat division into context and contingency a bit more complicated. An infinitude of historical factors shape any great city's role in the world. These are conditions and events that occurred through time, many of which were accidental or could have happened in other ways, depending on chance individual leaders, power relationships, the outcomes of wars, etc. The quality of contingency is closely linked with that of regionalism, or the embeddedness of unique historical qualities in a specific territory. Regions are unique because nowhere else on Earth are all the factors of demography, natural resources, and international relations configured in precisely that way. Further, the actions of each generation sediment, or accrete, building up layers of institutional footprints that constitute both the massive substance and finest essence of *being there*. Cities, in other words, literally *take place*. A city that grows up within a region will at first be shaped by the dominant features of that region, but as it grows to the status of a national and then a global node, its own qualities shape the region as well. A great city that is positioned to lead a world-historic epoch, as Los Angeles did for post-World War II American culture, ultimately projects its regional culture and power on to the entire globe. The apogee of this process for Los Angeles was reached in about 1973, when the Nixon regime concentrated the Los Angeles political culture in the

apparatus of the National Security State. Salvadore Allende and Chile, the North Vietnamese, and Moscow all experienced the global reach of Los Angeles. While the Nixon regime waged war on international communism with ideology and equipment built in Los Angeles, Lockheed President A. Karl Kotchian authorized the payment of \$12 million to representatives of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Revelation of this bribe brought down the Tanaka government almost simultaneously with the Watergate crisis that forced Nixon from office. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, whose oil industry was built by Los Angeles-based J. Paul Getty in the 1940s, led the formation of OPEC and its first oil embargo. It cannot be an accident that these developments began in Los Angeles.

How did Los Angeles come to project so much global power, and why did it project power of such a particular, warlike and anti-democratic kind? Los Angeles is not just a national metropole, but a leading metropole of the US-Mexican Borderlands. The Borderlands is a region that neither Spain, Mexico, nor the United States have ever been able fully to control. Indeed, Los Angeles, a former Mexican frontier pueblo shared in a common regional political culture, shaped by centuries (since the Spanish conquest of Mexico in 1521) and generations (since the city's Spanish founding in 1781) of political and labor relations established prior to the U.S. Conquest in 1846-50. As I detail in my book, the first generation of Anglo rulers of Los Angeles reproduced these socio-political relations and created a regional political culture that lasted through the rise of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan. I can only briefly sketch the way that this regional political culture took place here, and I'll simply focus on the period culminating in the 1920s.

During the violent decade of the Revolution (1910-1920) fully ten percent of the Mexican population fled into the United States, reinforcing Mexican communities that had been founded centuries earlier and reinforcing many generations of cross-border influence. The two most important Janus-faced portals of the Borderlands were El Paso/Ciudad Juarez and Southern California—Los Angeles in particular.¹³ In 1922, the leading figures of the triumphant Obregón government in Mexico City sent a large exhibit of Mexican Popular Art to Los Angeles as part of a planned international tour to display the greatness of Mexican national culture since prehispanic days. It was organized by the Minister of Education and philosopher Jose Vasconcelos, and included the efforts of leading lights of Mexican fine arts.

But the Los Angeles of 1922 into which Vasconcelos and Obregón inserted the Mexican Revolution was intensely reactionary, and very self-consciously counterrevolutionary. The ruling régime was centered at the Los Angeles *Times*, where a veritable twin of the former Mexican dictator Porfirio Díaz had provided leadership for the fight against the Left in all its forms. The reactionary public sphere established by the Los Angeles *Times* was the work of Harrison Gray Otis, "General Otis," a Civil War combat veteran and determined foe of all forms of labor organization. Otis was the principal "booster" of Los Angeles and also a leading investor. As Kevin Starr puts it, "the *Times* was more than a newspaper. It was a major real estate company" with extensive land holdings in the region, in the Pacific Northwest, and in Mexico. "The *Times* dominated Los Angeles in these years as few metropolitan newspapers have managed to do, promoting an image of Los Angeles as an upright, God-fearing, Anglo-American Protestant city, uncorrupted by foreign or immigrant influences, including unions."¹⁴

The Mexican Revolution was *against* Los Angeles to a significant degree, but the Mexican Revolution was also *from* Los Angeles. The brothers Enrique and Ricardo Flores Magón led the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) in exile from Los Angeles, fought with the spies of Don Porfirio there, and resisted extradition in the U.S. courts. Harrison Gray Otis and Harry Chandler had extensive property investments in Mexico; they collaborated openly with the Diaz dictatorship to round-up revolutionaries.¹⁵ At issue were the strikes throughout Mexico, cruelly suppressed by the governments' troops in such locations as Cananea, Sonora, near the U.S. border, and in Orizaba, near Veracruz. U.S. magnate William C. Greene's mines at Cananea became a notorious landmark in the collective memory of oppression and a spark igniting the

Revolution. “The image of Mexican soldiers shooting down workers on behalf of foreign capitalists” fatally undermined the Díaz régime.¹⁶

The reigning theory of the regional political culture of Los Angeles was to prevent race mixing and working-class organization. Harrison Gray Otis and his son-in-law Harry Chandler effectively cleared the Los Angeles metropolitan spatial territory for the privilege of the self-proclaimed white race and its capital investors. Just days before the *Artes Populares* exhibit opening, the Red Squad of the Los Angeles Police Department had raided an I.W.W. meeting at the tavern called “Bucket of Blood,” arresting thirty-five labor organizers on “criminal syndicalism” charges.¹⁷ The LAPD and the Shipowner’s Association together made an “Official declaration of war against radicals who infest the city’s harbor.” The harbor was a particular battleground not only against radicals but against racial impurity. The Ku Klux Klan counted the City of Long Beach police chiefs among their members and regularly made the news with terrorist threats.¹⁸

Harry Chandler, “sitting on more than fifty corporate boards,” exceeded his father-in-law’s determination to destroy the union movement and to promote an economy congenial to investors. As a final gesture, Otis built for his own retirement an expansive ranch called “Las Flores”, in the southern edge of the San Fernando Valley. There in his mansion on a military ridge, Otis could view until his death in 1917 the work of his city-building: an irrigated San Fernando Valley annexed to the City of Los Angeles in 1915. The San Fernando Annexation made Los Angeles City the largest municipality, by territory, in the United States: a vast, blank slate prepared by his regime for maximum investment opportunity and maximum profit extraction.

As a major Borderland metropole, Los Angeles was also a frontier metropolis. The reigning ideology of white supremacy generated intense hostility toward all non-whites. Asians were the leading nemesis of the white supremacists in California, seen as impossible to assimilate (too different than Europeans ever to adopt American culture and institutions: permanent aliens). A range of racist myths about Asians entered popular culture. The Chinese Exclusion Acts effectively ended the influx of Chinese, but Japanese became very successful, entrepreneurial immigrants by the early 20th century. After the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake, the center of the Japanese immigrant population settled in Los Angeles. Politicians learned that they gained votes by fanning the flames of hatred toward Japanese immigrants and passed several Anti-Japanese laws (barring land-holding, for instance, in 1913).

By the 1920s, Los Angeles was the most important U.S. city on the Pacific Coast, with the largest port and therefore the front-line of the American empire. The growing rivalry between the United States’ and Japan’s Pacific spheres of influence during the 1930s escalated, it is well known, to the point of war by 1941. Los Angeles was a focal-point for this clash of cultures, economies and empires. Supremacy in the Pacific would depend on air power, and Los Angeles was the headquarters of the U.S. aircraft industry. With its large Japanese Issei and Nissei population, European-American Angelenos created an identity for themselves in racial-nationalist negation: Anti-Japanese and Anti-Mexican. The 1942-1945 “internment” of all persons of Japanese ancestry, along with the 1943 anti-Mexican “Zoot Suit” riots, marked the low point of this form of indentity-formation.

As a regional metropole, therefore, Los Angeles shaped a self-image and role that was relational not just to the dual New York/Washington DC reference point (its “second city” identity), but to the imperial “others” on the periphery of America’s global empire. In its relationship to Japan, in other words, Los Angeles was the first city: the leading edge in the world-historic struggle against Imperial Japan. The fire-bombing and concussion bomb destruction of Yokohama, Tokyo, Toyama, Nagoya, Osaka, Nishinomiya, Shimonoseki, Kure, Kobe, Omuta, Wakayama, Kawasaki, Okayama, Yahata, Sasebo, Moji, Miyakonojo, Nobeoka, Miyazaki, Ube, Saga, Imbari, Matsuyama, Oita, Hiratsuka, Tokuyama, Yokkaichi, Ujijamada, Ogaki, Gifu, Fukui, Tokushima, Sakai, Hachioji, Kumamoto, Isezaki, Takamatsu, Akashi,

Fukuyama, Aomori, Okazaki, Shizuoka, Himeji, Fukuoka, Kochi, Shimizu, Omura, Chiba, Ichinomiya, Nara, Tsu, Kuwana, Toyohashi, Numazu, Choshi, Kofu, Utsunomiya, Mito, Sendai, Tsuruga, Nagaoka, Hitachi, Kumagaya, Hamamatsu, Maebashi, in which hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians were killed before the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, should be seen as the work, literally and primarily, of the airborne military production efforts of Los Angeles. “Killing 50 to 90 percent of the people of 67 Japanese cities, and then bombing them with two nuclear bombs, is not proportional, in the minds of some people, to the objectives we were trying to achieve,” concludes former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who served as assistant to Air Force General Curtis LeMay during those attacks.¹⁹ Why was the American war against Japan waged with such savage ferocity? There are many answers, of course, but it should never be forgotten that the genocidal hatred necessary to make slaughter on this scale possible was generated in large part by a regional political culture led in large part by Los Angeles. In any case, the aircraft that committed those acts and much of the ordnance dropped on those cities, were made in Los Angeles.

Conclusion

Los Angeles emerged from the Pacific War as the leading edge of the U.S. military-industrial complex: the center of the missile industry that led the Cold War economy. By 1946 Richard Nixon had already emerged as a product and a leader of its right-wing political culture as an anti-communist crusader and Ronald Reagan began his political career in following year, as the anti-communist President of the Screen Actor’s Guild (1947-1954), managing the “blacklist.” To accelerate a long story, the presidencies of Nixon (1968-1974) and Reagan (1981-1989) can be seen as the triumph of the regional political culture of Los Angeles both nationally and internationally. Los Angeles was not, in this sense, the new first city of the American nation, but its culture, grounded in a permanent warfare economy, had made Washington, D.C. into the instrument of its regional will.

Notes

- 1 This essay was first presented at a symposium titled “Transnational Urban History: The Local-Global Nexus” held at the University of Southern California, 24-5 October 2005. The symposium was organized by Yuko Itatsu and the Los Angeles-Osaka Comparative Urban Studies Project. The author wishes to thank Toshio Mizuuchi, Jeffrey Hanes, Joan Piggott, and the other participants for their comments on earlier drafts. Most of this paper is drawn from the author’s unpublished book manuscript: *Ghost Metropolis, Los Angeles: A Cartography of Time, 1900-2001*.
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- 3 Michael J. Dear and Steven Flusty, “The Resistable Rise of the L.A. School,” in Michael J. Dear, ed., *From Chicago to L.A.: Making Sense of Urban Theory* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 3-16.; Philip J. Ethington, “Waiting for the L.A. School: A Book Review Essay,” *Southern California Quarterly* 80:3 (Fall 1998): 349-362.
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- 5 Jeffrey E. Hanes, “Osaka versus Tokyo: The Cultural Politics of Local Identity in Modern Japan.” In Jeffrey E. Hanes and Hidetoshi Yamaji, eds., *Image and Identity: Rethinking Japanese Cultural History* (Kobe, Japan: Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, 2005), pp. 229-248.
- 6 Sassen, Saskia, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: America's Global Cities* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
- 7 For the political-economic realities, see Toshio Mizuuchi, “Patterns in public service provision and urban development in prewar

- Japan before 1945,” *Geographical Review of Japan* 64 (1991): 24-49.
- 8 Diana Altman, *Hollywood East: Louis B. Mayer and the Origins of the Studio System* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1992), p. xii.
 - 9 Samuel Marx. *Mayer and Thalberg: The Make-Believe Saints* (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 25.
 - 10 Allen J. Scott and Doreen J. Mattingly, “The Aircraft and Parts Industry in Southern California: Continuity and Change from The Inter-War Years to the 1990s.” *Economic Geography* 65:1 (January 1989), p. 49.
 - 11 “Contrary to the accounts of industry leaders and an earlier generation of business historians who cited topography and California’s temperate climate as the critical factors, airframe production concentrated in Los Angeles because of technical advances developed by innovators such as Donald Douglas, the presence of skilled, nonunion labor force, and the proximity to research institutions, especially the California Institute of Technology.” Greg Hise, *Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth-Century Metropolis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)., 123.
 - 12 Ann Markusen, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick, *The Rise of the Gunbelt: the Military Remapping of Industrial America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): 82-117; Scott and Mattingly 1989; Laura M. Holson, “Rosie the Riveter in a New Generation: Military Industry Regains Self-Respect.” *New York Times* 20 October 2001.
 - 13 Of course, San Diego is the city on the border, but it was not nearly as important as Los Angeles in the geography of Southern California Dirk Raat, *Revolutosos: Mexico’s Rebels in the United States, 1903-1923* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981); Hector Aguilar Camín, *La frontera nómada: Sonora y la Revolución Mexicana* 5th edn. (México City: Siglo XXI, 1986).
 - 14 Kevin Starr, “The Great Gatsby of American Cities: Los Angeles, 1900-1930,” in Sarah Vure, *Circles of Influence: Impressionism to Modernism in Southern California Art, 1910-1930* (Newport Beach, Calif: Orange County Museum of Art, 2000). p. 17
 - 15 That Job Harriman and the socialists could successfully prevent los hermanos Magón from being extradited is impressive testimony to the checks on the power of the capitalist oligarchy of Los Angeles. Although they controlled the police, they did not always control the courts. Edward J. Escobar, *Race, Police and the Making of Political Identity: Mexican Americans and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1900-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 53-76.
 - 16 Rodney D. Anderson, “Industrial Labor: 1876-1910,” in Michael S. Werner, *Encyclopedia of Mexico*, vol. 1 p. 684.
 - 17 “Thirty-six Reds Seized in Police Harbor Raids,” *Los Angeles Times*, 9 November 1922, Part 2, P. 1.
 - 18 On 9 November 1922 former police chiefs James I. Butterfield and C.C. Cole were arrested and charged with Klan activity, but the Chief who ordered these arrests was immediately suspended by the City Manager. “Klan Arrests To Be Sifted” *Los Angeles Times*, 10 November 1922, Part 2, p. 1. In a separate incident, the Klan threatened to lynch a woman on trial for murder if she was not convicted. “Klan Menaces Mrs. Phillips,” *Los Angeles Times*, 5 November 1922, p. 3.
 - 19 List of Japanese cities and quotation of McNamara is cited from the documentary: *The Fog of War Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara* a film by Errol Morris (Sony Pictures, 2004).

Postwar Transformation of Space and Urban Politics in the Inner-ring of Osaka

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I. Concentric Circle Structure

Osaka was known as 'Japan's kitchen' during the Edo period and grew to be a major commercial city, the 'Manchester of the Orient,' after the Meiji era. Seen in its spatial structure, it functioned separately as a commercial city in the city center, and an industrial city in the inner-ring. The concentric circle model, seen in the prototype of Chicago as shown on the left in Fig. 1, is often used as a model to show city spatial structure under capitalist development. Osaka is a city where the Chicago model can be easily adapted. As shown on the right in Fig. 1, the 'historical core' of the central part of the city lies adjacent to a midtown district and it is surrounded concentrically by the inner-ring, where many factory workers and minorities are likely to reside, and where various urban problems appear. An outer-ring surrounds the inner-ring, and serves as an area in which a comparatively large percentage of tertiary sector workers live. They commute to the city center where city planning is well developed. Additionally, the concentric areas outside this outer-ring are positioned as the suburbs, satellite cities or new town areas. The inner-ring is concentrically distributed in the area around and outside the Osaka Loop (Railway) Line, and became built up through land readjustment projects during prewar times, and merged into the Osaka City region in the Great Merger of 1925. The peak population of Osaka City was in 1940 when the population reached 3.25 million and this inner-ring area welcomed the inflows of immigrants and was built up. This area already has more than 60 years of history, and has a differentiated social character from place to place.

This inner-ring is characterized by three types of industrial areas. In the Osaka Port area, especially in the north port area of Fukushima and Konohana wards, six famous industrial works sustained the industrial development from prewar times, and in the central and southern bay areas of Taishō ward, small and medium metal and machinery factories were concentrated. In the inland inner-ring, especially in the eastern area of Ikuno, Higashinari, and Jōtō wards, a dense distribution of small subcontractors is mixed with residential districts. On the other hand, also within the Osaka Loop Railway Line, are the heights of the Uemachi plateau, where there are notable residential areas in the higher-class residential districts from prewar times, and the orderly row-housing quarters where the land readjustment project was carried out. Fig. 2 illustrates the distribution of the related vocational indices according to the national census of 2000. The two big concentrations of manual laborers or so-called blue-collar workers are seen in the bay area and eastern and southeastern parts of the city, and members of this vocational group generally live in the surrounding areas, in other words the inner-ring area. When we look at the distribution of career and professional workers, their distribution is limited and concentrated on the Uemachi plateau. On the other hand, the distribution of clerical workers is quite extensive, and rather uniform. Thus white-collar workers are distributed centered around the Uemachi plateau and in the northeast beyond the Yodo River area, and

segregated definitely from blue-collar workers in the inner-ring area.




Figure 1. Concentric circle structure of Osaka based on the model of Chicago (after Mizuuchi, 2004)




Figure 2. Distribution of three occupation types in Osaka City by neighborhood based on 2000 census

The character of the inner-ring area differs greatly, however, in comparison to Tokyo. As an example, Fig. 3 compares the distribution of career and professional groups between the two cities. The Yamanote Railway Line and Osaka Loop Line are drawn inside as dark thick lines, and the outside light wide lines show the boundaries of Tokyo's 23 wards and the Osaka City region. Tokyo shows a marked contrast in distribution between the south, east, and west. However, the specialty and technological sectors are focused around the Musashino region where they are extensively distributed, but in contrast, they are sparse in the eastern and northern regions. In the case of Osaka, the managerial and professional sectors are distributed only on the Uemachi plateau, as previously mentioned, and the other concentrations have extended far beyond the city to hilly suburban areas. The urbanization of the inner-ring area in Tokyo has been rather strongly affected by the evolution of tertiary industries, while on the other hand Osaka has grown relatively more on the base of industrialization. These differences in character are the difference in the charm, or power of attraction, of Tokyo and Osaka.



Figure 3. Distribution of professional and technical workers in Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan regions based on 1995 census

II. The Transformation of the Bay Area
1. War Damage Rehabilitation Projects and the Bay Area

In the war damage, as shown in Fig. 4, the areas in the city center suffered the full effects of total destruction by fire-bombing except for a few areas. Moreover, some of the inner-ring suffered remarkable damage, while at the same time there were also areas where damage was smaller in scale. The area which was not damaged developed over time as a built-up area with a high density of wooden structures in the postwar period. On the other hand, according to the major war damage rehabilitation project begun in 1946, in the stricken areas the streets and the parks were improved and previously disorderly-built areas changed into areas where orderly land readjustment was enforced. Although the features of the war damage rehabilitation project in Osaka can be observed in Fig. 4, rehabilitation projects were simply not

undertaken in all the war damaged areas. Among the inner-ring areas, a large area in the northeast experienced fire bombing but a war damage rehabilitation project was not necessary since a land readjustment project of suburban development had already been implemented. Likewise, in some districts north of the Yodo River, and in the eastern and southwestern areas, where the damage was dispersed, projects were not undertaken due to the reduction of the war damage rehabilitation project. Although the whole project was reduced to 3,351 ha., entailing a 45% reduction from 6,114 ha. at the outset, rehabilitation projects were rather extensively undertaken among the cities concerned in Japan, and more than half of this rehabilitation project was provided for this inner-ring area.



Figure 4. War damage rehabilitation projects

Diagonal cross-hatching indicates war damage areas; the darker shade shows regular war damage rehabilitation zones, the lighter shade indicates project areas for ports and harbors reconstruction, etc. Base map is from 1947 1:25,000 topographic map

Regarding the bay area, there was still the residue of a bitter experience of high tide damage from the Muroto Typhoon of 1934, and the Osaka harbor construction plan was swiftly drawn up in January, 1946. Promptly in 1946, the Osaka Ports and Harbors Bureau began landfill construction of the central wharf, which includes Tempōzan, and it was completed three years later. After that, in the inner harbor, the Aji River was extended and dredged, and a so-called 'Hamburg system' was implemented as seen in Fig. 5. Moreover, the dredging was efficient, digging deep and in a pattern like the teeth of a comb, forming the Taishō inner harbor, also implementing land readjustment with a simultaneous land reclamation project using the dredged earth fill, thereby killing three birds with one stone. In spite of a nationwide reduction of the war damage rehabilitation project in 1949, it was carried out as a port region development project, since it was combined with a special project to raise the elevation of the land in the bay area (filling from -1m. to +2 or 3m. above sea level).




Figure 5. Post-war transformation of Osaka Bay area, circa 1960

Distribution of harbor facilities construction, dyke and levee construction, and land reclamation

Base map is from 1947 1:25,000 topographic map

Source: Osaka City Harbor Bureau, *Osaka chikō hyakunen—umi kara no machizukuri (100 years of Osaka harbor construction—building a city from the sea)*, vol. 2, 1999, p. 222, fig.6-4, based on the Osaka Harbor Disaster Prevention Plan of 1958

Although the 40-50% reduction of privately owned property through this land readjustment project was very severe to the residents, the large development of Hirabayashi's lumberyard was also planned. In addition, Typhoon Jane of 1950 caused high tide damage, and permanent disaster countermeasures such as higher land reclamation and a tide embankment were sorely needed. The disaster relief work from 1950 to 1958 and comprehensive measures against high tides were established. Thus, the bay area was institutionally separated from the war damage rehabilitation project, and the area was transformed greatly. At the end of the war in 1945, the incoming and outgoing shipment values for Osaka harbor were only 1/30 of those in 1939. It was really a great blow, and ridding the bay of mines required time before there could be a resumption of trade. However, as a special nationally-designated port, from the very next year, Osaka City formed a plan for a ten-year construction scheme, as shown in Fig. 5, and near the Aji River the inner harbor was improved rapidly. The loop rail was constructed on an elevated double track structure running through this bay area, and a subway line also appeared in 1961 as an elevated railway. The International Trade Fair Hall also appeared in front of the new subway station, and the passenger liner terminal of the Benten wharf was completed in 1965. The Osaka street car line was abolished in the bay area first, and afterward mass transportation's leading role was the step by step construction of a subway.

In Minato ward, the center of a bay area, public transportation was improved immensely by the completion of the loop rail and subway lines. Previously, bridge construction was prohibited over the Aji and Shirinashi rivers since they were fluvial ports, therefore Minato ward was long called an isolated island of land. In Taishō ward in the southwestern bay area, the large-scale lumber town created prior to the war was relocated to Hirabayashi in southern Suminoe ward, and large-scale reconstruction works, which forced

construction of the Taishō inner harbor (See Fig. 5), raising the land 2 meters through landfill, and land readjustment projects, were performed. In 1970, surplus soil from the construction of the subway was used to create the highest mountain in Osaka, Shōwa Mountain, with an elevation of 33 meters. Also, a large-scale park and a 2200+-unit public corporation housing complex appeared on the former lumberyard site. Taishō Boulevard, with a width of 50 meters, pierced through the side of the ward, and the loop line appeared in Taishō ward for the first time as a rapid transit railway in 1961. The large-scale Hirabayashi lumberyard was completed in the bay area of southern Suminoe ward, and by the second half of the 1960s, the greatest lumber industry base in postwar Osaka was born (refer to Fig. 5). Thus, large-scale engineering-works projects that took place over 30 years transformed the city structure of the bay area from prewar times.

This became a major task of the Osaka Ports and Harbors Bureau and the Construction Bureau, which took charge of these projects, and was a big undertaking for which they should be proud. However, dissatisfaction had arisen and a deep-seated grudge among residents in the severely-readjusted land project, and many 'barracks' and illegal residential quarters emerged during the prolonged construction process. This brought about the housing problem to be discussed later.

2. Nankō (South Port) Development and the Yodo River Mouth Area

On the other hand, Nankō (South Port), located on the outer borders of the port area, had received a license to reclaim land in 1933 but was interrupted by the war. It restarted land reclamation beginning in 1947. The purpose of the Osaka Harbor Development Revised Plan of 1957 (from 1957 to 1967) was to develop a coastal industrial area and create space for heavy and chemical industries. The plan was also coupled to the reclamation and industrial development works of adjacent Sakai City and the Semboku coastal area of Osaka Prefecture. Through this revised plan, Nankō land reclamation and dredging of the port were continued. As a guideline of the long-term national economic plan under the Kishi Cabinet of 1958, harbor improvement was regarded as important development, and construction of outer-harbor and a coastal industrial development began to be set forth as a principal city policy.

Financing for the plan was arranged through a special account with allocations from the tide embankment works and the issuance of bonds whereby 30-40% was received as a subsidy for public works projects. Additionally, in 1960 the Arabian Oil Company issued a private placement bond, and due to difficulty in acquiring funds, the Nankō construction works were carried out through German Mark bonds. However, after 33 ha. of land were transferred to Arabian Oil for factory construction, it officially canceled the project in 1964.

In order to change from the heavy and chemical industrialization Osaka City had planned to a substantial urban function, a new plan was adopted which incorporated a combination of the reclaimed interior land utilized for housing and the shoreline as a harbor lot. The harbor lot was utilized in the construction of a container wharf, and the interior land later was utilized as the Nankō Port Town.

The creation of this container wharf and large distribution point for land- and sea-bound goods resulted from the second revision of the Osaka harbor plan from 1967 to 1975. A huge physical distribution space of 937 ha. was created by the reclamation works in the extension of the Nankō breakwater (see Fig. 5), and this also resulted in the coastline being fairly far from the built-up area of Osaka City, as shown in Fig. 6. On the other hand, the design for a Nankō Port Town appeared around 1969, with the initial design including residential areas for those employed at the port facilities. However, it was afterward expanded to 43 ha., and housed 10,000 households containing a population of 40,000. The Harbor Bridge and Nankō (South Port) Bridge were completed in 1974, and they linked the land directly with the city. Housing construction started in 1975 and the port town opened in 1977.




Figure 6. (right) Osaka Techno Port Plan, 1983

Source: Osaka City Harbor Bureau, *Osaka chikkō hyakunen— umi kara no machizukuri (100 years of Osaka harbor construction— building a city from the sea)*, vol. 3, 1999, p. 481

Compared with the Nankō development which began smoothly, it was only from the Osaka Techno Port Plan and the Maishima Reclamation Plan of the 1980s, that development of Hokkō (North Port) was fully put into operation. Additionally, in Nishi-Yodogawa ward on the northern Yodo River bank, several districts actually sank through land subsidence, and a reduction in elevation of 2.8 meters or more was seen in the 60 years after 1935 in the most damaged area. It also suffered extensive damage from the high tides of the 2nd Muroto Typhoon in 1961, and a residents' movement which prohibited groundwater pumping came into being. Moreover, in the interior of Nishi-Yodogawa ward, riverside areas along the river banks housed many small subcontracting factories, with several heavy industry factories at the mouth of Yodo River. This became an environmental problem and together with Yokkaichi was labeled a 'town of pollution' in the 1960s. Diseases from pollution were officially recognized in 1969 and this was classified as a birthplace of respiratory diseases and one of the four major areas of diseases resulting from pollution. Also, in 1970 National Highway 43, serving as the main artery between Osaka and Kobe, traversed the ward and the exhaust gases from it were also included as a cause of disease from pollution beginning in the second half of the 1970s. The Nishi-Yodogawa pollution suit, which claimed the city's legal liability for the compounds in air pollution caused by the exhaust gases from factories and cars, started in 1978.

III. Improvement and Redevelopment of Old Built-up Areas

Thus, while the bay area experienced a dramatic change, there were extensive unchanged old built-up areas which were not the target of the war damage rehabilitation project. These especially included the area along the loop rail, excepting the bay area and the outer non-war damaged areas, or the areas of confused

land ownership such as in front of stations. These phenomena became formulated with a policy targeted at such problems of redevelopment of station fronts, or the improvement of decrepit high-density residential areas constructed of wood, and the problem of postwar temporary dwellings known as ‘barracks’ or slums. The first group was typically formulated from the first half of the 1960s and included in operations such as the redevelopment of the Umeda Station front, and redevelopment of the Abeno and Ueroku districts. Regarding the latter group, initially, housing improvement of *Dōwa* districts was begun, and at the same time, removal and clearance of ‘barracks’ and slums repeatedly occurred. In the inner-ring area, it is the former group, the redevelopments of Abeno and Ueroku, which attract attention.

1. Abeno and Ueroku Redevelopment Projects

Redevelopment in front of Osaka Station was to include a large (6 ha.) commercial block of 1000 or more houses with wholesalers of textiles and miscellaneous goods. Since there was no precedent suitable for the program, the city once again employed the Urban Renewal Law in 1961. In the Abeno redevelopment project, which was on a larger scale of 31.5 ha., thus far exceeding the Osaka Station front redevelopment, local organizations rose to push for redevelopment in the beginning of 1960s. While three-fourths of the area’s buildings were wooden, most had escaped from the firebombing and accounted for 2800 households with 7000 residents (among them 44% were single-resident dwellings). The district had a high density of population and was very close also to the terminal and amusement quarters. While employment of the Urban Redevelopment Law was proclaimed in 1969, the design materialized as a model project and a schematic plan was announced by Osaka City in the same year. However, as shown in Fig. 7, after this announcement, the city planning for A block, nearest to a terminal, was not made, and no legal proceedings were taken while several years passed.



Figure 7. Abeno ward redevelopment project, 2004 Background from aerial photo, 1974

Then, in 1975, The Urban Redevelopment Law was largely revised. This made it easier to enforce the powerful right of eminent domain when the scale of a project was large, because otherwise the project

would become virtually impossible, and aimed at smoothing progress for the completion of projects. This revision added a second type of project to the law and was endorsed through strong appeals by Osaka City. It is said that the addition of this second type of project in this law was done in order to proceed with the Abeno redevelopment. Thus, the Abeno project restarted as the first of this second type of project, and, in 1976, a city planning decision was made for promptly advancing the project in some of the blocks through tough negotiations with each neighborhood association in all blocks other than A block. In subsequent progress, as shown in Fig. 7, residential blocks appeared as high-rise condominium complexes. However, with the degradation of the commercial environment after the collapse of the 'bubble' economy, 'A' block has remained unfinished until 2003, and while the new holders of the rights have not yet been decided, as an Urgent Urban Renewal and Revitalized District, it will spread to the eastern part of the district from the Kintetsu Department Store, and the redevelopment and renewal project will be advanced. Thirty years have passed since the start of construction work, and this project has reached the final stage. This large-scale redevelopment, which gives priority to economic efficiency and activation, without doubt needs higher rates of floorspace ratios and skyscrapers, and will undoubtedly have an absence of old residential districts in the determination process. Neither previously nor since has such statutory redevelopment, with such large financial burdens, been seen on a scale such as the Abeno case.

On the other hand, unlike Abeno, the redevelopment of Ueroku in Tennoji ward is often seen as an example of success completed in a short period of time. While property rights were complicated by things such as illegal occupation and unapproved uses with origins in the postwar black market, a strong sense of community ties clearly redefined and adjusted the complicated property relations. This later allowed use of the redevelopment site by winning the cancelling of a city park planned by the war damage rehabilitation project. Involving the Japan Housing Corporation as a housing provider, this project was hastened because of a sense of crisis about Ueroku's commercial decline due to the Kintetsu Railway's extension to Namba. A city planning decision was made in 1976, and although the area is very small with only 1.2 ha., construction was completed in four years with the consent of all 172 members through the members' committee of the redevelopment association, which was instituted in 1977.

2. Housing and Environment Improvement of *Dōwa* Districts (*Buraku*)

On the other hand, another big subject in the inner-ring during the second half of the 1950s was tackling the increase of 'barracks' as sub-standard housing, and the expansion of what are called slums. As shown in the 1954 survey in Fig. 8, the distribution of sub-standard deteriorated houses in the war damage rehabilitation districts included the temporary public dwelling quarter districts or 'barracks' built through the unapproved use of planned parks or road lots until rehabilitation works got underway in the center of the bay area. In the case of non-war-damaged areas, the distribution was equivalent to the districts where there was overcrowding of high densities of sub-standard wooden housing. Although more than ten *Dōwa* districts existed in Osaka City, it was demanded that large numbers of sub-standard housing units, and the buildings that had emerged as 'barracks' in the war damage rehabilitation process, be improved and removed from the second half of the 1950s. At that time, although non-*buraku* areas with such poor housing conditions suffered removals individually through receiving some compensation or through forceful evictions, in the case of a *Dōwa* district, housing demand struggles started with the inhabitants noting that living in such 'barracks' alone was proof of discrimination. The Naniwa and Nishinari Housing Demand Realization League was formed by about 200 people in 1957. They opposed the forced evictions and demanded compensation and the construction of low-rent public housing. For the improvement of a slum's 'barracks,' it was an epoch-making demand. The Appendix shows the "Petition for Housing Installation" submitted in December 1957 by this league for the realization of public rehousing. Following

the theory of this movement fighting for housing demands in order to improve the ‘barracks’ situation, they actually also treated the *buraku* discrimination problem in a splendid way. They criticized the administrative responsibility which did nothing to improve these discriminatory conditions. From this theory, we can understand the theory of Asada, who formulated the tactics and theory of opposition struggles against the discriminatory administrations of the local and central government, and who emphasized the uniqueness of the *buraku* life protection struggles.




図 戦災復興事業と戦後の不良住宅地区との関係
**Figure 8. War damage rehabilitation projects
 and the distribution of sub-standard housing (from 1954 survey)**

The dark circles show sub-standard housing according to the 1954 survey (published by the city office in 1958); grey shading shows areas of war damage rehabilitation and harbor reconstruction projects.

In reaction to this demand, 80 houses in Nishinari ward were newly built under this project at the beginning of 1959, and public housing was built in succession in the *Dōwa* districts of the city. Since then, big housing improvement projects in *Dōwa* districts have been undertaken. In 1963, fourteen *Dōwa* districts, with a population of 67,000 people, were all located outside the loop rail. It was these districts in which there was a high density of sub-standard wooden housing in areas of non-war-damage, and the typical housing problems of the inner-ring area were detected most intensively in *Dōwa* districts.

Table 1. Budget and Housing Construction Trends Related to Dōwa Projects in Osaka City

Fiscal Year	Dōwa Projects Budget (Million Yen)	Housing Units Constructed	Public Housing Units (new construction for <i>burakumin</i>)	Public Housing Units (new construction after clearance)
1952	0.8			
1953	8			
1954	14			
1955	11			
1956	12			
1957	16			
1958	131	172	172	
1959	163	216	216	
1960	102	50	0	50
1961	205	116	0	116
1962	356	202	48	154
1963	364	161	0	161
1964	617	254	52	202
1965	923	201	54	147
1966	1,852	1,270	990	280
1967	2,810	1,058	954	104
1968	3,510	255	247	8
1969	5,040	643	343	300
1970	6,828	782	519	263
1971	9,324	331	151	180
1972	15,378	471	113	358
1973	23,622	135	0	135
1974	33,814	214	56	158
1975	37,547	615	528	87
1976	30,030	333	301	32
1977	30,883	378	282	96
1978		178	28	150
Total		8,035	5,054	2,981

Source: Buraku kaihō kenkyūjo, ed. *Osakashi dōwa jigyōshi (History of Osaka City dōwa projects)*, vol.2, Osaka City Dōwa Policy Office, 1979

Unlike non-*buraku* districts, residential improvement action rooted in the *Buraku* Liberation Movement came about earliest. As seen in Table 1, after adding up the budget for *Dōwa* projects for the first time in 1952, the *Dōwa* budget was rapidly expanded after the 1958 fiscal year when *Dōwa* public housing construction started. In 1965, in response to the verdict of the National Council for *Dōwa* Projects, housing construction progressed, and various projects were developed extensively by the city's *Dōwa* project according to the long-term *Dōwa* Plan of 1970. After the submission of the official opinion by the Municipal *Dōwa* Projects Promotion Committee in 1975, the *Dōwa* projects had evolved fully. In this way, the huge budget started to be used for various facilities and services such as the environmental improvement of roads and sewers, public facility development, public welfare, and economic activities and enriching of school education and social education. As shown in Fig. 9, the area was reborn as a completely different town after the clearance-type redevelopment of formerly decrepit high-density wooden-house districts. On the other hand, concerning clearance-type projects of non-*buraku* districts, as shown in Table 2, *Dōwa* districts in all aspects of timing and quantity of housing, and the clearance-type improvement projects of these non-*buraku* districts consisted, except for the following two examples, of the rebuilding of temporary public dwellings built in the bay area immediately after the postwar period.



Figure 9. *Dōwa* assimilation project transformation of a discriminated -against *buraku* area in Asaka, 2004

Background from 1974 aerial photo; new public facilities and housing, shown in white, as of 2004

Table 2. Slum Clearance and Resettlement Projects in Osaka City

Housing Estate Name	Type	Date of Designation	Estate Area (m ²)	Sub-standard Housing Units	Ratio of Sub-standard Housing	Planned Units of Housing Construction
YT	Dowa	1960.11	41,300	297	87	322
SM	Dowa	1960.11	9,100	100	83	178
NH	Dowa	1960.11	6,177	86	89	97
KS	Dowa	1960.11	10,106	65	80	159
IK	Dowa	1960.11	4,135	63	81	103
KH	Dowa	1960.11	3,002	50	100	50
Tsurumachi	Non-Dowa	1965.1	25,960	80	100	100
IK-2	Dowa	1965.11	1,451	120	82	289
Yahataya	Non-Dowa	1965.11	3,242	50	100	80
KS	Dowa	1965.3	9,524	88	100	120
KS-2	Dowa	1966.3	10,477	126	80	160
Airin	Non-Dowa	1967.12	15,544	385	96	342
AS	Dowa	1967.12	8,032	126	80	266
Fuku	Non-Dowa	1967.12	6,813	92	87	139
MS	Dowa	1967.3	17,916	144	93	211
Ikeshima	Non-Dowa	1968.12	101,000	687	98	510
AK	Dowa	1968.3	5,924	51	82	81
HN	Dowa	1969.2	17,200	150	81	188
Kobayashi	Non-Dowa	1970.1	75,600	967	97	1,000
AS-2	Dowa	1971.2	32,107	284	81	459
IK-3	Dowa	1971.2	15,478	229	90	409
HR	Dowa	1973.3	20,117	238	80	240
AH	Dowa	1975.3	24,327	192	100	242
SM	Dowa	1975.11	16,100	179	83	249
Minami-Okajima	Non-Dowa	1976.1	6,300	80	100	49

Note: *Dōwa* resettlement districts are abbreviated with capital letters

Regarding two cases of clearance and rebuilding of non-*buraku* ‘barracks’ districts, the Airin Project (flophouse quarters mentioned below) in 1970, with the construction of the Airin Comprehensive Social Center in Nishinari-ku, and the Kobayashi Project of 1975 in the Okinawan community of Taishō ward should be noted with attention. Especially in the latter case, the Kobayashi project was accomplished through the struggle of the city office with the powerful Kansai Okinawa Liberation League, who implemented many techniques borrowed from the *Buraku* Liberation Movement. Thus, it can be said that the clearance-type improvement projects of ‘barracks’ and slums, as well as the sub-standard wooden housing areas, was undertaken by focusing on *Dōwa* projects and the rebuilding of temporary public dwellings. Then, what were the trends in other areas where such housing problems existed?

3. Kamagasaki/Airin District

Considering the viewpoint of the housing problems in the Airin/Kamagasaki district (Kamagasaki is an old place name and still prevalent among laborers and their supporters, and Airin is an artificially determined name and literary means ‘beloved neighborhood’), this district and its adjacent areas in Naniwa ward had the highest number of ‘barracks’ slums which suffered war damage. At the same time, the flophouse quarter, Kamagasaki, with origins at the beginning of the 1900s, grew through its existence as a day laborers’ town after the war. On the other hand, Kamagasaki began to be known as a Japanese ‘Kasbah’ and had a reputation as a vicious neighborhood in the mass media from the second half of the 1950s due to the *Yakuza*- (Japanese mafia)-related labor sharks, prostitution (there is a red-light quarter nearby), drug problems, etc. (See Fig.10).




Figure 10. Kamagasaki/ Airin district (a skid row area of Osaka)

The heavy outer line demarcates the Airin district as designated in 1971. The dark grey areas show the extent of cheap lodging houses (flophouses or doss houses) in 1998. (drawn from housing map)

Social welfare administration, labor administration, and anti-crime measures were launched simultaneously, and in addition, the urban planning administration also began to be involved in flophouse

and slum improvement. With the increase of attention toward the slums, the Kamagasaki riots broke out in August 1961. Just before and after these riots, the policies for Kamagasaki were realized with the construction of the Nishinari Community Hall and the Airin Hall as a social settlement project exclusively for the Airin district as an area-specific project like that for the *Dōwa* districts. The Airin policy was completed by the establishment of the Airin Comprehensive Social Center in 1970, (established in improved apartment housing on the upper floors), and the Municipal Rehabilitation and Consulting Center in 1971, and thus the Airin District was authorized and demarcated by the city government, prefectural government, and police department. For single day-laborers employed in construction sites, job placement, welfare consultation, free medical treatment, and a jobless-insurance system were introduced only in the Airin district (69 ha.) as a special quarter. Many laborers without a certificate of residence stayed in the flophouses (cheap urban hostels) built by private entrepreneurs. On the basis of this system, many laborers were attracted from the western part of Japan at the prosperous moment of Osaka EXPO 1970, and the Airin district grew to contain about 30,000 people who lived in these conditions in the highest population density of the city. In the Airin district, twenty-one riots occurred from 1961 until 1968. The riots were the so-called 'driving force' which changed Kamagasaki, and confrontations and resistance between *Yakuza* gangs and the police were also repeated. Due to the deepening of this kind of locale-specific policy, Airin/Kamagasaki became specialized and excluded, as a town of single male day-laborers. During the bubble economy, the simple flophouses were also equipped with medium-rise hotel-like views and accommodations.

When the economy began to decline in the 1990s, laborers who were becoming older easily lost their jobs and were likely to be excluded from labor market. From the late 1990s, people who didn't have a certificate of residence, or were staying in flophouses as a home, eventually fell from the base lifestyle entitled through public assistance, to sleep rough on the streets, and these kinds of cases have been increasing dramatically. Although this is discussed later, this locally specific policy borne by the socially excluded district stratified with discrimination adjacent to the *Dōwa* district produces an overall discrimination against Nishinari ward, and politically these districts were separated from ordinary built-up areas.

4. Features and Trends of the Ordinary Built-up Area

In the late 1970s the Osaka Comprehensive Plan of 1990, which was launched in 1978, as shown in Fig. 11, laid out an urban development and redevelopment scheme and showed the city periphery, inner-ring, and city center and sub centers as three geographical divisions of major anticipated projects in the city. This scheme later led to the development of subsequent big projects. This Comprehensive Plan of 1990 paid much attention to the housing problem of the inner-ring and the future of the residential improvement districts. As also observed in Fig. 11, this distribution involves the northwest, northeast, east, and southeast areas along the Loop Railway, and is also found across the Yodo River. The actual conditions can be grasped in more detail in Fig. 12. This figure illustrates the area of high density of wooden housing and it naturally coincides with residential improvement areas. In such areas, as shown in Table 3, a rapid decrease in population was also seen in the 1970s and 1980s, and the wooden row-houses built in the prewar days, as well as the sub-standard wooden apartment houses constructed in the 1960s, have become vacant and their existence is problematic. The inner-city problem discussed later is also related to this phenomenon.

It was under these circumstances that in 1974 the housing council in Osaka City submitted findings titled "The Policy for Improving the Residential Environment in Osaka City," addressing the issues that should be solved most promptly- the improvement of small-scale and low-quality rented housing. The first redevelopment as a model project in the inner-ring at Kema-Daito in Miyakojima ward, whose location is




Figure 12. Areas of dense sub-standard wooden housing in the mid 1970s
From *Osaka City Housing Policy*, it is thought to reflect conditions in the mid 1970s.

Table 3. List of Land Readjustment Projects in Osaka City

Type		Area (ha)	Actors in charge	Starting year	Year of Completion
Readjustment of Arable Land, 27cases	Pre-war	2,280	Association	1910	1968
Land Readjustment, 75cases		4,085	Association	1924	1978
Osaka Station Front		5	City of Osaka	1935	1940
War-Damage Rehabilitation, Land Readjustment, 46cases	Immediate Post-war Period	2,202	City of Osaka	1947	1996
Harbor Area Reconstruction, Land Readjustment		1,327	City of Osaka	1947	1994
Land Readjustment; 4cases	Later Post-war Period	38	Individual	1976	2004
Land Readjustment; 5cases		62	Association	1974	2003
Land Readjustment; 18cases		1,093	City of Osaka	1959	-
		11,092			

5. Inner City Problems

Inner-ring area renewal and redevelopment of the built-up area in connection with the housing problem had become a big subject of policy from the 1970s to the 1980s. From the 1970s on, in the advanced capitalist metropolises of Europe and America, low-income people and immigrants from developing countries occupied large parts of the inner-rings of each metropolis, where slum-like environments prevailed, and led citizens to recognize the severe social problems of urban decline, the so-called ‘inner-city problem.’ Inner-ring areas that were formed by the build-up to World War II apparently became problematic due to aspects of economic decline, obsolescence of the built environment, and social disadvantages.

In Osaka, decreases in population due to the exodus of young families desiring a better living environment, progressive aging, decline of the purchasing power of residents, and the weakening of community power became problems first. Moreover, due to the obsolescence of housing and urban

facilities, aggravation of the living environment with the mixture of land uses, and the reduction in the number of the workers caused by the outflow of secondary industry, the deteriorating crisis of the built-up area deepened. It is these Japanese inner-city problems which defined the problem generically, and a sense of crisis prevailed from the second half of the 1970s. As shown in Fig. 13, the withdrawal of factories from the Osaka Bay area has progressed strikingly since the 1970s, and it is this phenomenon which has become visible among citizens. What is called the ‘hollowing out’ of industries was first predominantly seen in the bay area.




Figure 13. Areas which lost manufacturing establishments from 1969 to 1977
Drawn by the author based on Narita, 1987

Large factory groups, such as the ‘Six Companies of West Osaka’ including: Hitachi Shipbuilding, the locomotive firm Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Osaka Gas, Sumitomo Metals, Sumitomo Chemicals, and Sumitomo Electric Wire in the bay area of Konohana-ku were the major bases of employment in western Osaka for many years, but after the 1970s they withdrew or reduced production. Moreover, in the southern bay area along the Kizu River, there was a concentration of shipbuilding companies, which had all already withdrawn from this zone. Regarding population decrease, Table 4 shows the massive decrease of population of the bay area wards, and there was also a decrease in the inland wards, especially in the east inner-ring where small factories and workshops were also declining. However, in the rush of the bubble economy of the second half of the 1980s, the aspect of decline disappeared from the urban landscape due to condominiums and office development by developers even in the inner-ring. Although surely there was a problem in the inadequately built environment, the conditions which might get worse due to economic decline were not observed. Moreover, it was not a situation in which the inner-city area needed to be especially mindful of the deteriorating social conditions and the aggravation of public peace and order which seriously concerned the cities of Europe and Anglo-America.

In the inner-ring in the late 1980s, as already noted before, improvement of the living environment, which included the completion of *Dōma* projects as a housing policy and promotion of smaller factories in the inland wards, became stable. It was also the moment when, at last, some open measures advancing the rights and interests of foreign residents in Japan were officially put into practice, responding to the demands of Korean residents.

Table 4. Changes in Population in Osaka City by Wards (in thousands)

Name of Ward (Ku)	Sub-Division	1965	1975	1985	1995	2000	2005	2005 /1965*	Ratio of Lowest to Peak Year (1965)	Ratio of Recovery
Kita	Central	130.0	86.4	91.3	85.5	92.0	98.4	0.76	0.66	1.15
Chuo		114.1	70.9	62.4	52.9	55.3	65.0	0.57	0.46	1.23
Nishi		67.5	50.1	58.2	58.7	63.4	71.0	1.05	0.87	1.21
Fukushima	Central Periphery	86.0	61.1	57.5	55.1	55.7	59.6	0.69	0.64	1.08
Tennoji		75.0	59.6	55.9	55.6	58.8	63.3	0.84	0.74	1.14
Naniwa		77.9	55.7	49.1	49.1	50.2	53.0	0.68	0.62	1.09
Konohana	Bay Area Inner-Ring	88.8	82.0	69.0	68.5	65.0	64.5	0.73	0.73	-
Minato		116.5	105.8	92.0	89.5	87.3	83.9	0.72	0.72	-
Taisho		95.5	88.5	82.3	78.4	75.0	74.3	0.78	0.78	-
Suminoe		116.5	106.5	135.9	138.9	135.4	132.8	1.14	-	*
Nishi-Yodogawa	North Inner-Ring	121.2	96.6	92.4	91.1	92.5	96.3	0.79	0.75	1.06
Yodogawa		172.8	150.8	160.0	162.0	163.4	168.9	0.98	0.87	1.12
Higashi-Yodogawa		141.3	162.2	170.8	185.9	183.9	181.1	1.28	-	*
Miyakojima	East Inner-Ring	110.2	86.6	91.9	98.0	97.3	100.3	0.91	0.79	1.16
Higashinari		128.4	95.6	83.9	78.7	78.6	80.1	0.62	0.61	1.02
Ikuno		235.2	194.6	162.1	149.3	142.7	137.3	0.58	0.58	-
ASahi		141.2	123.9	110.1	102.5	99.2	96.2	0.68	0.68	-
Joto		171.5	154.4	157.5	155.6	157.9	161.6	0.94	0.90	1.04
Tsurumi		80.3	90.5	89.3	97.8	102.0	107.1	1.33	-	*
Abeno		157.9	129.0	112.4	102.8	104.0	106.3	0.67	0.65	1.03
Sumiyoshi	South Inner-Ring	177.1	182.1	162.4	162.5	161.0	159.1	0.90	0.90	-
Higashi-Sumiyoshi		191.2	173.8	149.3	141.4	139.6	136.4	0.71	0.71	-
Hirano		147.2	202.6	196.2	200.6	201.7	202.3	1.37	-	*
Nishinari		212.8	169.8	144.3	141.8	136.8	134.8	0.63	0.63	-
Osaka City Total		3,156	2,779	2,636	2,602	2,598	2,633	0.83	0.82	1.01

6. Dense Residential Areas of Japanese-Koreans

As shown in Fig. 14, Japanese-Koreans, who are registered as ‘aliens’, constitute about 80 percent of the total foreign population of 122,000 in Osaka City in 2005, and they are concentrated in the eastern inner-ring, in Ikuno and Higashinari wards, with another concentration in the southwest inner-ring in Nishinari ward. Especially in Ikuno ward, the number of residents with Korean registration accounts for 32,000 people and is one fourth of the total ward population. Seen from the urban history of the inner-ring in postwar days, especially from the viewpoint of implementation of municipal policies, Japanese-Koreans did not hold any position with the municipal government, and were not able to hold such positions. Since they demanded the right of protection as overseas citizens of North Korea, and there were homecoming programs to North Korea beginning in 1959, as well as a serious ideological confrontation between North and South Koreans, they usually could not overcome this inferiority except through self-help businesses or in self-sufficient ways without any support from the government. Japanese-Koreans mostly managed small and self-employed businesses or worked inside the ethnic community, since they could not receive any types of public service because they did not hold Japanese nationality. Through the foundation of ethnic banking facilities and supplying finance themselves, they led a life of day-to-day survival. The clause requiring Japanese nationality was removed from the public housing requirements in 1975. However, there was and still is almost no public housing in Ikuno ward. Regarding actual participation in urban rejuvenation, since people with foreign citizenship and without residence registration do not possess qualifications to participate in community associations, they cannot enjoy any official community support. However, self-employed Japanese-Korean families have acquired comparatively stable living environments through self-help in detached housing or wooden row-houses, though they are not large. While the decreases in the Japanese population continue, that of

Japanese-Koreans shows a stable transition. Moreover, because of the reality of discrimination toward foreigners, condominiums are rarely built in the devalued Korean quarter, and there is no supply of public housing. Thus, disregarded from the private housing property market as well as the *Dōwa* districts, only tile-roofed rows of small wooden houses dominated the monotonous urban scene around these areas. However, in the ethnic culture boom of recent years, ‘Chōsen’ (the old Japanese name for Korea) has been replaced by the term ‘Korean’ and with some ethnic flavor, the international market at Tsuruhashi under the Loop Railway elevated station attracted renewed attention from the mass media, as did the Miyuki Shopping Avenue in Ikuno ward, which was just a local neighborhood shopping center until it suddenly began to attract many visitors after it installed decorations like the Kudara Gate of Korea Town. In addition, the number of foreign newcomers is also increasing and especially Korean newcomers are steadily starting to live in areas adjacent to the city center aside from living in the old ethnic communities such as Ikuno ward.




Figure 14. Distribution of foreign residents According to the 2000 census

IV. The Light and the Shadow of Development

1. Big Projects

Conspicuous redevelopment of the inner-ring accelerated with the International Garden and Greenery Exposition held at Tsurumi Green Park in Tsurumi-ku in 1990. (Although it was small, the Tennoji Exposition was held in Tennoji Park in 1987 and caused controversy by reopening as a paid-admission park, which linked it with the homelessness issue). Afterward, the city enjoyed the prosperity of the bubble economy as a couple of big projects were successively begun. According to the Osaka 21st Century Plan launched in 1983 (shown in Fig.15) the Techno-Port plan in the bay area was set as the pivotal center along the bay axis, raising the accumulated effect of the vast area of reclaimed land, the bay axis developed from Kobe to the Kansai International Airport along the Osaka Bay littoral. The east-west axis extended from the bay area through Tsurumi Green Park (The Flower Expo site), toward Kansai Science City in Kyoto Prefecture, and along this axis, the Osaka Business Park (OBP) adjacent to Osaka Castle made a connection of symbolic zones of the Okawa (the Yodo River changes its name where it flows into the Osaka City center), Osaka Castle, and Nakanoshima (like Paris' Ile de la Cité),

facilitating internationalization, computerization, and the promotion of culture. Also, a north-south axis was identified along the New Midosuji and Midosuji Boulevards directly linking the Osaka Expo held at Senri Hill in 1970, and assumed two trigger areas of the deployment of the sub-civic centers of the Shin-Osaka Bullet Train Station in the north and Abeno terminal in the south. Although only the north-south axis of the center of the city from Shin-Osaka, Umeda to Namba was conspicuous within the city structure.




Figure 15. Outline of the 'Osaka 21st Century Plan - A New Grand Design' launched in 1992.

It shows major axes of development and target foci for redevelopment (in smaller characters)

The big projects in the second half of the 1980s aimed at creating city activity on the east-west axis and in the bay area, which originally specialized in production and distribution functions exclusively, and a big transformation of urban structure was experienced. Among them, the first project of the OBP plan, whose area was a long-neglected vacant ruin at the former site of the army's Osaka arsenal, started at last in 1971. Through the private sector's initiative, completion of the land readjustment project of the super block system was postponed till 1987, which meant it took a long time for this plan to mature. Fortunately, riding on the peak of the bubble economy, construction of huge skyscrapers progressed, and was praised as a successful project employing a work force 38,000 people and housing a daytime population of 150,000.

In this way, the newly emerging sub-civic center in the east grew from the outset, while the development of Benten-chō, specified as the newly emerging sub-civic center in the west, did not make progress at the beginning. But during the period of the bubble economy, development incentives rose to the nodal point with an east-west axis and the bay area axis. Utilizing a land trust financed for 30 years beginning in 1988, Osaka City constructed the main ORC200, which means an initial phase of the 'Osaka Resort City,' with a 200-meter high skyscraper as a symbol of the western sub-civic center completed in 1993. While this east-west axis makes OBP and Benten-chō the bases of the east and west in an inner-ring, the Western Nakanoshima redevelopment, whose main construction was the international conference hall opened in 2000 at the westernmost end of the city island of Osaka, included the

construction of the Osaka Dome Baseball Stadium in 1997 at the former site of the Traffic Bureau and Osaka Gas worksite, and the big theme park USJ, which opened at the former Sumitomo factory site in Konohana ward in 2001. Moreover, along the north-south axis, there were appearances one after another of redevelopment projects, especially in Naniwa ward, such as the amusement center at Festival Gate and SPA World (large spa leisure complexes) in 1996; OCAT (Osaka Cargo and Air Terminal) in 1996; and the Minatomachi River Place along the Dotonbori Canal in 2002. Thus, in the inner-ring area, third sector-type redevelopments were completed successively. Huge development was also performed strikingly in the bay area along the bay axis.

Development of a Nankō (South Port) Port Town had already carried out the town opening in 1977, and with the new transportation system, although a branch route, it linked directly with the subway, so that the first habitable space facing the sea appeared in Osaka. Until the 1990s, the inner harbor and factories in the bay area divided the seafront from the people of Osaka, and the image of the bay area was something like a back entrance to the city isolated from the built-up area. However, with decline in production in the bay area and increases in unused land, the project which left a great impact on the bay area was the series of redevelopments by the Osaka Waterfront Development Co. Ltd. established in 1988. These included attractions such as the newly-named Tempōzan Harbor Village, Osaka Aquarium Marketplace, and the Saint Mary Sea Cruise which first appeared in 1990, later continuing with the Suntory Museum in 1994, and a big ferris wheel in 1997.

The Tempōzan district, which had been only a wharf in the warehouse quarter, immediately became highlighted as a space of recreation and amenity following the completion of the Bay Area Intercity Expressway from Kobe to Kansai International Airport in 1994, and a new subway link directly into the bay area from the city center which extended through an undersea tunnel in 1997. Development of the bay area was announced in parallel with the Technoport Osaka Plan as one of the municipal centennial commemorations in 1983, which assumed a population of 60,000, a work force of 92,000, and the scale of a daytime population of 200,000. Its scale was three times as large as OBP. As shown in Fig. 6, three newly reclaimed islands' nicknames were determined in 1991 as Maishima ('dance'), Yumeshima ('dream'), and Sakishima ('blossom') Islands.

City planning for Sakishima began initially with Cosmo Square in 1989, though before that an international trade fair hall was already open in 1985. Sakishima development proceeded with the completion of ATC (Asia Trade Center) in 1994, and the WTC (World Trade Center) followed in 1995. Maishima in the Osaka North Port area started as a waste disposal reclamation ground, and was completed in 1987. On this island, several sports recreation facilities for the National Athletic Meet were built in 1997, and it was assumed it would be a main venue in case of candidacy for the Olympic Games in 2008. Thus a lot of developments were planned and some were realized in part, but in fact much land was left unused, and owners of skyscrapers also have many office vacancies. That the development is burdened with a large amount of debt through third sector development is a severe reality. For Osaka City, through a series of development projects, the bay area provided the precious opportunity through which people could share the beach, and, without doubt, the east-west axis and bay axis added to the city structure of Osaka's one simple north-south axis.

Original ideas on how to utilize this precious urban space within the framework of the shaky fiscal structure are being keenly sought. In 2001, Osaka Prefecture, joining with Osaka City and the economic associations, arranged the "Revitalization Strategy of the Osaka Metropolitan Region," and proposed it to the national government. Concerning Osaka City, in 2003 the "Osaka Urban Revitalization Program" aimed at planning urban regeneration through revitalization of the economy, and is now promoting several efforts to revitalize target areas. In the bay area, the Cosmo Square in Sakishima is designated as one of

the urgent development areas for urban revitalization, and in the inner-ring, facilitation of the on-going Abeno redevelopment project was furthered. This Abeno 'urgent program' designation was applied to the last project area and it was restarted with the inclusion of an adjacent non-redeveloping area.

2. Rough Sleepers/Homeless People

When the bubble economy burst in the second half of the 1990s and it became impossible to aim for the total fulfillment of big projects, the number of rough sleepers increased rapidly in the city parks, under the elevated roads and on the riverbanks throughout the city. Citizens believed this was a completely new urban problem. Fig. 16 shows the results of a complete survey of rough sleepers in 1998, which for the first time officially revealed a rough sleepers' population of 8660. The blue tents of rough sleepers were seen in big parks and in civic centers, especially Osaka Castle Park, Nakanoshima (Cité) Park, and Okawa River Bank Park. They were also seen sleeping covered with cardboard boxes or newspapers in Osaka Station, along Midosuji Boulevard, or the Shinsaibashi Arcade shopping street. Citizens could not help recognizing not only just the simple issue of rough sleeping, but that the lack of a social safety net and the failure of the social welfare system was an urban and social problem. At the same time, the rough sleeping issue was also strongly connected with the Airin/Kamagasaki district, where there continued to be a long-established center of rough sleepers.

Politically, in 1999 Osaka City set up the "Municipal Headquarters of Counter-Measures for the Rough Sleepers Issue," and for the first time launched the following programs: starting an outreach service to rough sleepers; offering public works using an urgent special subsidy for improving local employment; and providing shelters through consigning NPO or social welfare corporations for their management. In this process, the Organization to Support the Homeless in Kamagasaki (NPO Kamagasaki) established in the Airin district in June 1999 shouldered a large role from that time on, and some shelters were revived exclusively for rough sleepers after a long suspension of services. In the Airin district, an emergency shelter for one-night stays was established, and a care center for short stays of two weeks enhanced its capacity. Temporary shelters housing people for as long as three years were also opened in the three big parks of Nagai, Nishinari, and Osaka Castle exclusively for the tent residents of each park. Moreover, in 2000, three Self-Sufficiency Support Centers were opened which aimed at helping people gain independence after becoming ex-rough sleepers.

Although the number of rough sleepers had decreased to 6603 by the time of the National Survey of 2002, not only the living sites of rough sleepers but the support facilities and activities for ex-rough sleepers tended to be located in the inner-ring area. Several opposition movements were also concentrated in this inner-ring, such as those opposing the shelter construction in Nagai Park and the clinic for rough sleepers, and thus the support facilities themselves became targets, and friction arose between local communities and support organizations.

On the other hand, the counter-measures for rough sleepers began to work; the numbers of ex-rough sleepers who successfully returned to regular employment were also increasing considerably. The most crucial factor which contributed to the reduction of the number of rough sleepers was the improvement in the operation of providing public assistance and enlarging the window for the receipt of assistance to the ex-rough sleepers. The situation of public assistance in Nishinari ward, which contains the Airin district, is increasing rapidly to a monthly average of 14.1% in 2003, up from an average of 8.1% in 1998, and the Osaka City average is also rising to 3.3% from 2.1%. This is 3.3 times as high as the national rate of public assistance. Nishinari-ku constitutes the shocking number of 14 times the national rate.




Figure 16. Distribution of rough sleepers according to 1998 survey

Based on Morita 2001, (left) numbers of rough sleepers by ward, (right) distribution by neighborhood

As shown in Fig. 17, the unemployment rates of Nishinari ward and adjacent Naniwa ward are as high as 14% and 7% respectively. The worsening of the unemployment rate of Osaka City as a whole also coincides with the increase in the recent years of the poverty phenomenon in these inner-ring areas, and Osaka's rate is definitely the highest, at 3%, among the metropolitan governments in Japan. The inner-ring area is seriously exposed to the merits and demerits of big projects, and the phenomena of poverty, which are seen through the rough sleeping life, the high rate of public assistance, and high unemployment.

Living in the inner-ring of Osaka City, Japanese-Koreans account for 90,000 people, the *Burakumin* 60,000 people, day laborers in Airin District 20,000 people, and Okinawans 20,000 people; therefore, the so-called 'social minority' populations might total over 200,000 people. Although the Urban Revitalization Committee of Osaka City has addressed economic revitalization and activation of the city and the people as a big subject, it can be said that the revival of Osaka is also greatly concerned with regeneration of the inner-ring. Present-day Osaka is figuratively expressed as light and shadow, and while excessive attention is directed to the three showy promotion axes of urban development, at the same time they coexist with the thick inner-ring area, which cannot be easily exposed to such attention. The current catchphrase of an "International City of Gathering Visitors" should be turned into the pivot of a design for ordinary people who use and live in Osaka City, and make itself into a place where citizen's expectations can be fulfilled. The established reputation of "The International City of Gathering Visitors" might be also derived from the design's orientation.




Figure 17. Percentage of unemployed persons 2000 census

Appendix

'A Petition for Housing Installation' released in December 1957 by the Naniwa and Nishinari Housing Demand Realization League.

"We, the residents of Nishihama, have been branded with the label 'illegal occupiers' by landowners and the city authorities, and are being forcefully evicted from our homes. But should we really be dismissed with this oversimplified characterization? We, whose prewar homes were built with sweat and tears, and who lost everything in the destruction of the war, have been left only with cold discrimination. The power of Nishihama within Daikoku-chō has been stolen, and it has become a derelict neighborhood. In the confusion at the end of the war, without knowing who or where the landowners were, we built barracks, dug wells and drainage, widened the streets, and cleared away the burned rubble of wartime. Now our current homes, the result of our heart and soul efforts, have been mercilessly labeled as illegal occupancy. Since the war's total devastation, as many as 3,000 homes have been rebuilt in Nishihama and another 3,000 in Hiraki, Dejiro, but half of these now fall into the category of illegal occupancy. What is clearest in the midst of this discrimination against our neighborhood is the heavy hand of Osaka City, which built only one hundred homes to replace the 10,000 that were destroyed in the war. And Nishihama residents are not even allowed to move into this newly constructed housing. Even though the residents of Nishihama have revived the neighborhood over the last twelve years, the city planning administration has now rejected them as illegal occupiers and is treating them as outlaws. Although Nishihama residents pay citizen head taxes and fixed asset taxes, cooperate with community fund drives, participate in crime prevention committees, and have formed block associations, nevertheless Osaka City does not provide water service or garbage collection, and will not let them qualify for loans or resettlement in public housing. 500 households that were forced to relocate out of Nishihama, because they had nowhere to go, simply repeated illegal occupancy elsewhere, and some have been reduced to destitution and begging. We ardently wish we could live in ferroconcrete or concrete block housing. In Kyoto City and in Hyogo Prefecture, public housing designated specially for buraku people has already been built. Although we

hear reports that the Public Welfare Bureau of Osaka City is adopting measures concerning burakumin, we can only say that the Construction Bureau, housed under the same roof, continues its hostile intransigence toward us. The illegal occupancy is not being carried out recklessly by a bunch of undesirable miscreants. Nishihama is a buraku, and discrimination against burakumin remains deeply rooted. Osaka City, which in spite of these facts continues to push forward construction in Nishihama and its own urban plan without an adequate policy of buraku liberation, bears a heavy responsibility.” (From: Committee on Osaka Buraku History, 2000, pp. 283-288)

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Migrant Workers' Housing in Illegal Construction in Guangzhou: A Prelude to Social Justice and the Chinese City

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Considerable changes have taken place in Chinese cities since the 1980s. On the one hand, to begin with there are a lot more cities and towns. Not only have they increased in number, but they have also expanded their boundaries. Accordingly, urban encroachment on the countryside is commonplace, and many villages on the fringe have been circumscribed into villages-in-the-city (*chengzhongcun*). Insofar as land reform in the rural area has transformed the countryside and brought additional wealth to it, newly built housing has sprung up like mushrooms, some legally, some illegally. On the other hand, since there may be as many as 150 million 'surplus' farm workers, and given that township and village enterprises have stagnated in terms of employment creation after the mid-1990s (Nolan, 2004: 11-2), peasants have flooded cities and towns to look for jobs. Most of these migrants, who are unskilled labour, manage to find temporary, usually low-paying jobs and can get only temporary household registration (and so are labeled as the 'floating population'). Due to their low ability to pay, they largely end up staying in illegal buildings in villages-in-the-city.

Guangzhou is no exception to this 'rule.' Except in a few old districts, villages-in-the-city are found everywhere in Guangzhou. According to the survey done by the city's Land Resource and Housing Administration Bureau in 2000, there was a total of 139 villages of this kind, occupying a built-up area of 80.6 km², or 20.9% of the planning district of the city (385 km²) (Li, Zhunfu, 2004:97). Additionally, Guangzhou has been one of the fastest growing areas in China. In 2002, its GDP reached 300 billion *renminbi* and its *per capita* figure exceeded US\$5,000 (Li, Zhunfu 2004-93-4). This growth was the outcome of an impressive FDI since its designation as one of the 14 coastal open cities back in 1984. The newly established enterprises and services must be manned by workers, some of whom have to be migrants. According to one estimate (Tang and Chung, 2002: 53), the size of the floating population amounted to 990,000 in 1990 and 2,082,600 in 2000. Many of them finally stayed in villages-in-the-city.

How should we understand this phenomenon? Research on this topic has recently been growing by leaps and bounds (e.g., Gu and Liu, 2002; Jie and Taubmann, 2002; Li, Peilin, 2004; Li, Zhunfu, 2004; Tang and Chung, 2002; Taubmann, 2002; Zhang, 2005; Zhang, Zhao and Tian, 2003; Wang, 2004; Wu, 2002, 2005). One common problem with this literature is the emphasis on description, not understanding (with the possible exception of Zhang, 2001). The analytical tools employed in these analyses have remained empirical. Drawn on experience from the West, gated communities (e.g. Tomba, 2004), migrant enclaves (*chengzhongcun*) and self-help housing are invoked to depict the spatial distribution of migrant housing and settlement. At most, these categories are restricted to the documentation of territorial justice: these migrants live in a poor living environment without basic services and facilities. It is a fact that migrant workers contribute to the booming economy, but they have not received what they deserve. Worse still,

they are discriminated against. In fact, they are excluded from the total population figures, which is the criterion for calculating all sorts of services and facilities. When they try painstakingly to provide the services and facilities themselves, they have to fight against all the hurdles put in front of them. They are often blamed for every urban problem one can imagine. But, why is this the case? Does it have anything to do with the perpetuation of a dual social structure? Why does it persist? What are the power relations involved? In studies on illegal construction in particular, the phenomenon is usually attributed to the greediness of peasants. Is it really? Why are peasants greedier than urbanites? Do the former have a choice? In my earlier study of Tianhe Village in Guangzhou, I discovered that illegality was the outcome of the interaction of the spread of state control, on the one hand, and negotiation by the peasants, on the other:

Illegal land use and constructions occur, because while the state is still upholding the rural/urban divide, it extends its basically urban network of government to the rural. The implementation of the regional administrative reform of city-leading-counties [that allows cities to annex their jurisdiction to the surrounding counties – WST] has reinforced the dominance of the town over the countryside. Tianhe Village remains a rural place, but now under the administration of Shahe Town and, in turn, Tianhe District. Since every level of government has its own scope of concerns, method of calculation and sphere of control, the urban-rural transitional zone of Tianhe has administratively disintegrated into urban and rural, on the one hand, and into various hierarchies (city, district, town, village and individual), on the other. Specifically, peasants were suddenly informed of the Tianhe District development scheme, which was decided at the city level and approved by Beijing. On the one hand, since the village is situated in the district, their cultivated land must give way to the fulfilment of this cause. Their rural community can no longer consist of a space of production and a space of reproduction, as the former is detached from the latter. For some peasants, their space of production was even taken away completely, whereas others must change their lifestyle by familiarising themselves with a new, industrial or service space of production. The important point is that the original space of production was rural and, for some, the new one is urban. On the other hand, when some peasants rebuilt their houses for leasing purposes to earn a crust, they were told that with the extension of the urban land administration system their activities were proclaimed illegal and this ‘misbehaviour’ will be corrected one day. Put differently, their own space of reproduction is now at the mercy of some officials at a distance. For some peasants, they cannot stand the increase in vulnerability. This has already sparked protests in many rural areas.” (Tang and Chung, 2004: 58).

Given this complexity, unless we have taken up these social issues theoretically (Tang, 2005), we will not be able to understand them and identify a possible future.

My proposal to get over this impasse is to draw on the concept of social justice. A theory of social justice allows us to go beyond the approach focused on territorial justice. There are a few considerations, though. First, a discussion of this kind must deal with not only class (Harvey, 1992) but also specific places, since it is the interweaving of space and social relations that defines social justice. Second, more relevant to our discussion here, we must be aware of the different mechanisms at work under socialism. The classic statement is the one made by Szelenyi (1983: 11):

while under capitalism the market creates the basic inequalities and the administrative allocation of welfare modifies and moderates them slightly, under socialism the major inequalities are

created by administrative allocation, and the market can be used to reduce inequalities.

However insightful it may be, this statement lacks details. In particular, what is missing are the ways space and social relations have interwoven to produce social justice specific to socialism. Third, it is important to take note of the differences between China and other socialist countries in general (Tang, 1997). The latter are somewhat more mature, urbanised societies with a more vivid urban-rural dichotomy at a slightly more developed state of economic development. For a country like China at its current stage of development, it is an *urbanising* rather than *urbanised* society. (The other difference is, as aforementioned, the large amount of 'surplus' agricultural workers.) As a corollary, the urban-rural dichotomy is blurred rather than clear-cut (see Lin, 2001; Tang and Chung, 2000, 2002). In other words, the space component of social justice that interests us is more complicated than the literature on migration, work and housing can convey. To comprehend this, we need to show how the physical space of the urban fringe is produced under the historical and institutional context of contemporary China. Finally, it is not repetitious to remind ourselves of the importance of the peasants and migrants in the urbanising process. It is then necessary to pay attention to how they perceive space, their relations with urbanites and permanent households and their definitions of social justice. Once we have integrated these two analyses, one on space, another on social relations, we would be in a better position to understand social justice and the Chinese city.

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How to Understand Housing of the Urban Poor in Hong Kong from the Perspective of Colonial Governmentality?

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The literature that focuses more narrowly on housing of the urban poor in Hong Kong is flourishing. The Society for Community Organization (SoCo) has brought attention to the issue by the publication of its stunning 1999 study on homelessness and many other problems of the elderly, children and families living in old neighbourhoods, cage-homes and cubicle apartments (see <http://www.soco.org.hk>). The issue has also received a fair amount of attention in academic circles interested in new immigrants (Chui, 2002), the elderly (Chou and Chi, 2001; Chui, 2000, 2001; Hong Kong Council of Social Service, 2000; La Grange and Yung, 2001, 2002; Lo, 1998) and women (Ching and Kwan, 2002). Although this literature is informative in that it tells us who the urban poor are, how many of them there are, and where they are from, it lacks the theoretical rigour to unravel the problem. Very often, a host of historical, socio-economic, political and cultural factors are identified to label, stigmatise and scapegoat these marginalised groups and exclude them from getting access to an acceptable quality of housing. This mode of understanding – an enumeration of factors – has in fact downplayed the power relations underlying state governance and the formulation of land and housing programmes as well as their implementation. Many forces are operating simultaneously over time and across space. As a result, the only kind of policy implication that one can draw from this literature is something like requesting the government to incorporate into its housing policies the principles of ‘ageing-in-place’ and ‘community care’ (e.g. Chui, 2001). Without putting the aforementioned relations of power and space in the foreground, the policy recommendations made by the literature would merely perpetuate social exclusion and marginalisation.

To make up for these deficiencies, we need to make the issues of power and space explicit in our conceptualisation. Informed by critical realism (Sayer, 1992, 2000), the research is divided into two parts: the casual mechanisms and contingent conditions behind housing the poor in Hong Kong (see Figure 1). Due to the limited scope of this paper, however, I will focus on the causal mechanisms only.

I will start by arguing that there are networks of redevelopment. The city is conceived of as one being in a constant and dynamic process of making and remaking. At work are many complex and interlocking power networks, which operate at different temporal and spatial scales. Each power network has its own spatiality and temporality. The city is seen as the physical space where different networks are layered on top of one another. Each network affects various social groups or individuals differently. While some are able to tap into one or more networks and, therefore, benefit from them, others are effectively imprisoned by them. As a result, it is the operation of these power networks in the city that makes and remakes space and differences (Bridge, 1997; Bridge and Watson, 2002; Wolch and DeVerteuil, 2001). For our purposes, then, urban redevelopment activities can be conceived of as networks of redevelopment interweaving a number of actors initiating a rich array of actions due to redevelopment.

In an attempt to avoid the mistake of equating power with authority, and given the necessity of understanding Hong Kong's socio-historical specificity as a city that was under colonial rule, I borrow Michel Foucault's perspective of governmentality (Tang, 1997), which emphasises state practices rather than institutions. Recent developments have extended this perspective to investigating colonial governments (e.g., Kalpagam, 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Scott, 1995). Although Hong Kong was a colony, it developed in a specific time-space, thereby calling for extra efforts to understand its peculiar practices. Thus, the first step to elaborate on the networks of redevelopment is to theorise Hong Kong colonial governmentality. This involves elucidating the rationalities and technologies of the colonial government in the two related processes that produce spaces, namely, prescription and negotiation. The outcome of government is a function of the interaction between spaces of prescription and negotiation.

The Hong Kong government constantly builds and rebuilds a spatial order in response to global and local restructuring. To operationalise every programme of the government such as developing Hong Kong as 'Asia's World City,' the government draws into its ambit many different actors, materials, knowledge, laws and regulations, etc. This translation process is entangled in a spatio-temporal web in several senses. First, the human and nonhuman actors involved in government programmes exist across space and over time. Second, the translation process has a definite spatial arrangement of these actors in mind. Finally, as a consequence, certain spatial relations among them are produced. To better specify how urban redevelopment projects act as techniques of government, impose a spatial order in a particular area, and cause possible effects on residents living there, I need to situate these projects within the social relations of housing provision (Ball, 1986) in Hong Kong and their spatiality. These forces produce what I call a space of prescription.

This elaboration must be supplemented by giving attention to the other side of the coin too. Without people's support, government would not be effective in the first place. Yet they are not passive receivers. Based on their representation and use of place, people reaffirm or contest existing power relations. Redevelopment projects have the effect of sharpening the power relations in a specific time-space. They uproot the living space of some residents but not others, highlight some rights and obligations, and thus induce particular thoughts, mobilise resources and promote transgressive acts, activism, civil disobedience, and formal politicking as well as everyday practices. In the end, some kinds of social and spatial order are reasserted: physical reordering of place, (dis)placement of people, and symbolic readjustment of self. This results in the formation of spaces of negotiation. It is the interaction between spaces of prescription and negotiation that specifies the distinct features of colonial governmentality and, then, lays down the conditions for a better understanding of redevelopment activities in Hong Kong.

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Festival, Identity and Urban Community in Modern Japan: 'Yamakasa' Festival in Hakata, Fukuoka City, 1880-1940.

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I. Introduction

Over the last few decades, there have been many debates over the concepts of identity, community, and place in the social and human sciences (Silk 1999). Critics of these concepts point out that community and place can have a very exclusive character, deny difference or diversity, and thereby subsume otherness. Young (1990) argues that "there are no conceptual grounds for considering face-to-face relations more pure, authentic social relations than relations mediated across time and distance." Therefore the idea of 'community' is an undesirable ideal for her, because its formation necessitates the exclusion or assimilation of otherness. Certainly such an exclusionary idea of community and place can betray a reactionary impulse and become the basis of xenophobia. And even though a territorial-based politics and 'regional resistance' can be the scaffolding of oppositional movements, they also run the risk of being dominated by the universalizing power of money (Harvey 1993).

Others have attempted to elaborate on an alternative way of thinking of these concepts. Massey (1991) has argued that the identity of a place is defined in terms of linkages with elsewhere and emphasized the possibility for a more "progressive sense of place." The attachment to place is not always reactionary. Rose (1997) has also tried to reconsider the concept of community and its spatiality. She attempts to radicalize the idea of community through the acknowledgment of contingent insiderness, partiality, and lack, as community is dependent on neither an essential identity nor authentic timelessness, but a social construction from contingent practices and discourses in particular circumstances. She regards community as not only a social structure or relation, but also a structure of signification or discursive reality, in short, an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). As Rose (1990) defines it as "a group of people bound together by some kind of belief stemming from particular historical and geographical circumstances in their own solidarity," the imagining is defined by the specific connections of the material and the ideal. It is always grounded in specific social and economic conditions and has real material consequences, and its transformations are not separated from the consequence of fluctuations in social, political, and economic structures. The formation of community can also be understood as a dynamic process involving both conflict and negotiation. Therefore, we need to consider the relational qualities of identity and community that are embedded in power relations and particular historical-geographical and social contexts.

The local festival is a crucial moment that enables the members of a community to constitute and establish their identity. It demarcates symbolic and social boundaries more clearly and plays a pivotal role in creating a feeling of solidarity and comradeship among members, thus binding them together. So it can produce and reproduce an 'imagined community' on a local scale. Recently social and cultural geographers have focused on the social and political meanings of carnivals or street festivals within contemporary urban society so as to elucidate key aspects of the social construction of identity and difference (Smith 1999). In addition, researchers have looked at how the cultural articulates with the political and the economic, or how 'culture' works in geographically uneven systems of social reproduction (Mitchell 2000). As Jackson (1988)

argues, “the ritual and symbolic aspects of Carnival are not autonomous from, or independent of, their political and economic context, while at the same time they are not reducible to it...Carnival is a contested event that expresses political and ideological conflict.” Thus the social meanings of a festival or carnival need to be examined in the context of the social reproduction of hegemonic power structures. And in this context festivals construct and strengthen not only the identity of and loyalty to a community, but also various interrelations between communities at different scales (Di Méo 2002). In light of this research I will look more closely at the relations within and between territorial-based communities at multiple scales in order to come to grips with the complex interrelations between the cultural and political construction of the distinctly urban material and economic bases of the city.

In this paper I shall explore some aspects of formation and transformation of urban community and its identity by analyzing the Yamakasa Festival in Hakata, Fukuoka City (Onjo 1992). This paper has three sections. First, I trace the complex ways in which the festival simultaneously constructs the identity of neighborhood communities and connects local people and various outsiders. I want to shed light on the ambivalent or contradictory aspects of ‘imagined community’ through examining the slippage of meanings that people attach to the Yamakasa Festival and their communities.

Second, I will discuss transformations of neighborhood communities and people’s consciousness, feelings, and attitudes in relation to the police and governmental officials. Particularly I focus on the place of ‘the streets,’ locating it within particular social and economic conditions. A lot of writers have already pointed out that the streets are an important political domain. In light of this I will also describe the conflicts in practices and discourses on the streets between local people and the authorities. These conflicts represent the transformation of experience that marked the ‘modernization’ of the urban world and landscape.

Finally, I pay attention to what effects the selling of the image of the city in general or the ‘commercialization’ of the festival in particular has had on the consciousness and attitudes of local people. I interpret the different discourses and practices through which people make sense of their world and define their ‘community.’ In this regard, debates over the concept of ‘tradition’ represent one of the most important discourses and have had very real consequences. Festival as ‘invented tradition’ is deeply involved in the circulation of money and national politics, and local people are active participants in these movements through the festival.

II. Festival and community identity

Fukuoka City is the largest city in the Kyushu region, the southernmost island of Japan, and composed of two distinct areas: Fukuoka and Hakata (Fig.1). While Fukuoka is a former castle town where warriors lived, Hakata has a long history from ancient times as a port and commercial town. Hakata is one of the oldest ports in Japan and a ‘gate city’ connecting Japan to China and Korea. Fukuoka and Hakata have distinct cultural, economic and social characteristics, and their social structures are quite different too. After the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese local administrative system was fundamentally changed several times and in 1889 both areas were merged and became Fukuoka City. The two areas, however, had maintained a distinctive character and stood in opposition for a long time.

Every July, the people of Hakata have held the week long Yamakasa Festival. The origin and background of this festival have not been clarified in detail, but it seems to date from the fifteenth century and was originally held to disperse a plague. It is a main festival of Kushida Shrine and a symbol of the independent spirit of the inhabitants. They construct six floats (*dashi*), move them around within Hakata, and compete with each other. These floats are luxuriously decorated with a lot of dolls and their heights

were about fifteen meters until the 1900s. Through the festival, the inhabitants could show their wealth and cultural tradition to others outside the community.




Fig. 1 Map of Fukuoka City in 1910

The neighborhood community was the basic territorial unit of everyday life and the festival. The population, as well as the occupations, classes, and social makeup differed widely among neighborhoods and each neighborhood had a distinctive character. While one neighborhood was mainly composed of large and small shopkeepers, another was made up of various small artisans, porters, rickshaw men, and so forth. Although conflicts were common within and between neighborhoods, inhabitants had a feeling of belonging to their own neighborhood and of camaraderie. Local, unmediated, face-to-face interactions and reciprocity in everyday life were the seeds of such feelings. In addition to these everyday interactions, the festival was important in fostering feelings of community through the non-routine physical experiences and social relations associated with the festival, thus binding the members of the neighborhood community together.

Only male inhabitants, heads of households in particular, could take part in this festival. Women were thus excluded. So it was an exclusively masculine event and gender difference was distinctly emphasized at various points during the festival. Within each neighborhood male inhabitants were classified into four groups by age. These groups were children, youths, adults, and elders. The sociability and close personal friendships within and between each group gave its members a shared communal sensibility and a vast store of memories from birth to death. And this shared “structure of feeling,” to use R. Williams’ phrase, was passed on from generation to generation. Among these groups the youth group played a major role in carrying out the festival and its leader (*torishimari*) was recognized as an honorable position by its members.

It is important that they organized their groups and carried out the festival by rules and standards that differed with those organizing daily life. These standards were birthplace, age, and contribution to the festival. These simple rules allowed them to feel solidarity despite social differences and hierarchies. Moreover, corporality, embodied experience, and repetitive practices in the conduct of the festival were fundamental in producing and reproducing this communal structure of feeling and affective community. When they moved a heavy float together they felt pain and pleasure in their bodies and learned physical techniques needed for particular circumstances in the festival. This intensity of embodied experience and repetitive practices permitted its members to have a high level of pride and enthusiasm for the Yamakasa Festival and a strong allegiance to their community.

So becoming or being ‘Hakata Men’ (*Hakatakko*) was defined through the discourse and practices of

the festival. Members could get a sense of imagined unity or solidarity while this identification erased real differences between individuals or social groups. Their 'real' relations were asymmetrical and unequal, and conflicts and opposition among members were very common. As affluent residents could take higher positions than poorer ones, in reality the social hegemony of the economically dominant group was reproduced in the festival. Thus festival-based standards, rules, embodied experience and practices had the ideological effect of binding together people occupying different locations in the social hierarchy. However, they worked in an ambivalent way. On the one hand, some members could represent their social status in the hierarchy and legitimate the established social order by obscuring its oppressive social relations. The power relations that were fused into the conduct of the festival had the members recognize social positions, roles and differences as taken-for-granted natural relations. To emphasize territorial identity veiled various differences within the neighborhood. On the other hand, other members sometimes had a chance to invert daily hierarchical relations and orders within the neighborhood. Anyone could enhance their powers by strictly adhering to festival practice and displaying their physical prowess in the process. They could rejuvenate their own powers through these extraordinary experiences, perceptions and performances, although they could experience this empowerment only temporarily. Social relations within the community might appear to be turned upside down during the festival, but they actually reaffirmed the strength of the status quo. Power allowed itself to be contested only symbolically, so as to control social relations more effectively in reality.

These neighborhood communities were the basic components of seven larger territorial groups that were called *nagare*: Daikoku, Doi, Nishimachi, Gofuku, Higashimachi, Ebisu, and Fukujin (Fig 2). One *nagare* group was made up of ten to eighteen neighborhoods, was the elementary territorial unit of the festival, and dated back to the early modern era. Every year, six *nagare* groups built their own floats, and one would sit out and take charge of the ritual and organizational aspects of the festival according to an annual rotation.¹ Since each *nagare* group had their own distinctive way of carrying out the festival, conflicts between groups were common and they had to negotiate with each other in order to carry out the festival smoothly. Between *nagare* groups there were large differences of population, wealth, etc. It was said that inhabitants in the Daikoku *nagare* group had more zeal than others for two reasons: their number of neighborhoods was more than the other groups, and there were quite a few rich households, such as fish wholesalers and dealers in kimono fabrics.

Moreover, there were some neighborhoods within Hakata that were not able to participate in the festival.² These inhabitants could take part in the festival only as assistants called *kasei*. They contracted with and assisted the same neighborhood or *nagare* group almost every year. The relations between these assistants and the seven *nagare* groups were both reciprocal and oppositional. The assistants could get a sense of attachment to Hakata by participating in the festival, and *nagare* groups could mobilize a lot of people in order to move their floats around with greater speed. But their relations sometimes became oppositional because the assistants were subordinated to *nagare* groups and their identity was thus marginalized. This marginality was not merely symbolic and emotional, but had real underpinnings. Thus the assistants could not be satisfied in their status and roles and gradually asked *nagare* groups to change the status quo. For example, in 1892 conflicts occurred between the Higashi *nagare* group and the assistants who lived in Ohama district. Both fought each other, because the assistants broke away from the traditional rules and forced the float of the Higashi *nagare* group into their own neighborhood territory. After a heated discussion, the assistants formally asked to construct their own float, and the Higashi *nagare* group too suggested that the other *nagare* groups should approve this proposal. The representatives of the other six *nagare* groups continued discussions for a year, but did not approve the proposal, citing the need to preserve

the ‘tradition of Hakata.’ So within Hakata, there were various conflicts within and between households, neighborhoods, *nagare* groups and neighborhoods outside the *nagare* groups.



Fig 2. Map of *nagare* in Hakata Area

Thus we see that participants in the Yamakasa Festival were not limited to inhabitants of Hakata. Since they could not move around the heavy floats by themselves, the *nagare* groups had to mobilize villagers who lived on the outskirts of Hakata by using a wide range of social connections, kinship and friendship in particular. As there was a diversity of urban-rural relations in everyday activities, urban inhabitants not only hired men, but also invited whole families on the final day of the festival. The relationships between urban inhabitants and villagers were simultaneously cooperative and confrontational, even aggressive. While the latter could both view and experience the spectacle of the urban festival and thus add excitement to the routine of their everyday lives, the former could present their magnificent urban culture and history to outsiders. But in the middle of the festival outsiders transgressed the rules and norms frequently, even though the roles of inhabitants and outsiders were distinguished clearly. As they often fought each other or with local people, the festival was thus sometimes canceled at points midway through the festival. As the power relations between the urban and the rural were momentarily inverted, the disorderly power of

outsiders threatened the urban identity of Hakata. But through these experiences urban inhabitants could distinguish themselves from outsiders more clearly.

The Yamakasa Festival is principally about membership in and rivalries among indigenous neighborhood communities and *nagare* groups. Local people got their own sense of belonging first to their own neighborhoods, second to *nagare* groups, and finally to Hakata. The processes of identification were contingent and inhabitants did not always feel an attachment to the place of Hakata as some unified whole. These nested identities were formed only in relation to other individuals or groups at different scales. The identity of each neighborhood community, *nagare* group and Hakata itself was always incomplete, because it needed and relied on the existence of various others. To imagine a harmonious or transparent community is to erase the significant differences between individuals or social groups. So it can be said that otherness is always folded within the self and is necessary in constituting the self. The imagined unification of community thus constitutes itself against the background of an exclusion and repression of real power relations and social processes on which it relies. Therefore, the lived experiences of people were not independent of, but were framed by this structure. Therefore, the festival had a certain ambivalence: while it established symbolic and social boundaries, distinguished those who belonged from those who did not, and stirred up local identities based on distinct boundaries, it also made up many social networks, thus creating a connectedness beyond the boundaries at different scales.³ Making boundaries can give people a feeling of unification and exclude those designated as the other. But this ‘imagined homogeneity or sameness’ is not an essential or necessary intrinsic feature. It is always incomplete, lacking something, and dependent on otherness. It cannot produce a stable identity by defusing contentiousness, because it always needs the existence of and the relations with the other. As Simonsen (2004) suggests, this working of the ‘mirror-effect’ which enables us to constitute self-other relations is not the form of purely mental topologies; it is always embedded in its spatial-historical context, and spatial scale is an important element in understanding these complicated identities. As “scale is conceived of not as a natural metric by which to order the world, but one which emerges out of struggles and compromises between different social actors” (Smith 1990), for some, one scale is an important base for establishing identity and for others is not. The territorial-based community of the Yamakasa Festival has an exclusive and closed character on one scale certainly, but it retains an implicit possibility of making horizontal and various other connections across spatial and social boundaries on a larger scale.

III. Struggles around the festival: transformation of power relations

After the Meiji Restoration, the central government prohibited old customs of local communities including various festivals and rituals because they were obstructions to the modernization of Japanese society and the construction of a unified nation-state. Especially, the old social ties and local identities of urban and rural communities presented a potential source of opposition to the formation of a hegemonic national identity. In the case of Hakata, the local territorial organization of neighborhoods and *nagare* groups had a broader range of administrative functions and was a kind of political organization. The association of neighborhood chiefs (*chōsōdaiikai*) could mobilize inhabitants, participate in municipal policy decisions, and have a variety of impacts on politics; they could also select or recommend candidates for municipal and prefectural elections.⁴ As the capability of local government was inadequate and fragile from the 1880s to the 1900s, the neighborhood community played important political and administrative roles. Local cultural values or the morality of the neighborhood shaped the local politics (Rose 1988). Municipal officials strove to change these social structures repeatedly, and in the process both compromised with and

confronted the chiefs.

In particular, government officials regarded the collective solidarity and deviant behavior in the festival as threats to new social orders and norms. The great confusion of many drunken men who stripped to the waist was seen as dangerous, uncivilized, barbarous, and unproductive. First, this rough behavior on the streets was thought to present a danger of moving in the direction of an anti-government movement. Second, sanitary problems were very serious in urban environments where social infrastructure was still incomplete. Cholera epidemics broke out many times and seriously damaged economic activities and social life. Finally, it costs too much money to carry out the festival. In Hakata, inhabitants had to save much money over the years to construct tall and ornate floats and serve alcohol and food to a large number of people. There were even some neighborhoods that rented out houses to raise funds. And as many young men indulged in festival preparations for two or three months of the year and could not settle down to their jobs, the festival was seen as a waste of time and energy from the municipal officials' point of view. In 1886 a municipal official admonished the inhabitants as follows:

The rate of tax delinquents was extremely high in the Hakata area. So people ought to change their life-style and long-established customs and norms, and set their money or property aside, instead of wasting it. *(Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun 13 May 1886)*

In addition, a new urban traffic system transformed the landscape, functions and meanings of the urban streets and neighborhoods, and municipal authorities regarded the Yamakasa Festival as more and more inappropriate for modern urban space. Streets began to function as the exclusive domain of traffic, and power lines became a major obstacle to the movement of the festival's towering floats. And although spatial structures and the daily rhythms of social life changed rapidly, inhabitants still thought of the streets as their living space. For them the streets were an intermediate space site between private or domestic space, on the one hand, and public space, on the other. The street was an important and multifunctional space for everyday life. They conducted their mundane social interactions, such as neighborly exchanges that reinforced mutual ties, and paid close attention to the numerous everyday spectacles that were played out on the street. So the streets embodied a variety of informal and shared meanings and rules that almost all members of the community understood implicitly.

The police and municipal authorities, for their part, tightened their control and surveillance of social practices, sought to contain collective disorders on the streets, and aimed to make them a sphere of regulated operations. They intended to change the local residents' habitual ways of living and walking, and discipline the mundane spatial practices of the inhabitants. The unauthorized occupation of the streets by hawkers and street vendors was also prohibited again and again, although these activities were an important means for ordinary people to survive. Street vendors and rickshaw men were harassed by the police and subjected to an increasing number of controls. As Lefebvre (2000) points out, the streets are the domain of tensions and conflicts between domination and order from above ('representations of space') and everyday routine, festivals, and resistance from below ('spaces of representation').

In 1873 the Fukuoka prefectural governor and the police banned the Yamakasa Festival. But, as the inhabitants did not readily submit to this order, conflicts and negotiations between the police and residents continued for ten years. In the end, in 1883 municipal authorities modified their urban policy and allowed inhabitants to hold the festival. In the process, local people also compromised on some points and changed their common practices, for example, they decided to wear their own *happi* (special coats for the Yamakasa Festival) to hide their naked bodies and designate their neighborhoods. Municipal authorities thought that naked bodies on the street represented the backwardness of Japanese society from the 'western gaze'. So

disciplining the body was an important adjustment in modernizing Japanese society as a whole and helped to form a well-behaved and self-surveillant subjectivity. But in turn, this elaborate *happi* became a symbol of the identity of each neighborhood community and a ‘tradition’ of the Yamakasa Festival. In short, local people invented a ‘tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) as they appropriated the compulsory rule of wearing *happi* in their own way.

In 1898, inhabitants applied for permission to hold the Yamakasa Festival, but the police once again refused. As a result, many men assembled at Kushida Shrine and burned firewood in order to protest this order. A famous journalist and later member of the Diet, Kojima Kazuo commented as follows:

The solidarity of territorial groups serves public works and some of them save money to pay taxes. This local autonomy is not in opposition to constructing the nation-state, but one of the bases for it. Municipal governors and the police ought to use and encourage these social ties and the spirit of solidarity so as to construct a new urban society from below.

(Kyūshū Nippō 21 July 1898)

After intense negotiations between the neighborhood chiefs and the police, the police made a concession to the inhabitants and allowed them to continue the festival. But in some cases the festival was still canceled. For example, during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), local people canceled the festival and voluntarily contributed their money to families of soldiers. It seems that the experience of this war had a great impact on the consciousness and attitudes of ordinary people toward the state and became a moment that strengthened an imagined connection between the local community and the national one.

After this war, Japanese society became rapidly industrialized and urbanized. Not only in large cities such as Tokyo or Osaka, but also in many medium-sized cities, massive transformations in social and spatial structures took place. In the case of Fukuoka City, the seventh Kyushu-Okinawa Eight Prefectures Exhibition held in 1910 transformed urban infrastructures, spatial structures and landscapes. For example, the moat of the former castle was filled in, and local and national entrepreneurs constructed new street networks and traffic systems centered on the streetcar. And branch offices, banks and large shops, including department stores, were constructed along the new main street that connected Hakata and Fukuoka, and this new street came to represent the modernization of the urban landscape. Land prices also rose rapidly and some entrepreneurs speculated in real estate. Increasing mobility and speed was one of the distinct characteristics of the modern urban world, and as Fukuoka City became more deeply involved in the circulation of capital, its urban form and standing was altered considerably. In this restructuring process some inhabitants, particularly affluent ones, moved out of the city center and into the suburbs. As living space was separated from workspace, daily relationships and mutual ties within the neighborhood community gradually lost their material bases and social meanings, and the neighborhood thus diminished in significance to its inhabitants. These transformations, what Harvey (1989) calls ‘time-space compressions,’ had a profound impact on the way of thinking and habitual practices of the people. But responses to these transformations differed among individuals and social groups. Some inhabitants objected to the expansion of roads because it broke down local social ties and transformed daily life. They were still not in accord with the new dominant conceptions of space and time. As some made an effort to accept and live according to the new paradigm, others did not. Thus we can see there is no unified experience of modernization. Simonsen (2004) points out that the urban is a site where multiple spatialities and temporalities collide and that ‘the rhythms of the city’ (Lefebvre) are composed of numerous conflicting processes. Therefore an account positing an uni-directional homogenization of time-space is inclined to overlook the complex relations between the cultural and social construction of bases of urban life.

Under such conditions, it was seriously discussed whether the Yamakasa Festival ought to be canceled or not. There were lots of pros and cons, and an elder who was one of the former chiefs in Hakata insisted that:

The Yamakasa Festival is already inadequate for the new era. It is a ridiculous event. The grandeur and splendor is already lost and it does not represent the authenticity of urban culture nor the authority and prosperity of local residents. There are also many disputes among and within *nagare* groups in carrying out the festival. We no longer need to preserve it. Constructing the streetcar provides a good opportunity to cancel it... Even in the Daikoku *nagare* group, whose inhabitants have more enthusiasm for the Yamakasa Festival than other groups, almost all inhabitants may apparently approve of carrying out the festival, but actually the majority of them feel participation to be cumbersome in reality. (*Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*, 24 June 1910)

He thought that the festival had lost its authenticity as urban culture in the new period. As he had a good knowledge of the former state of the festival, he may have felt a sense of loss to a greater extent than other people did. Since he was one of the representatives of Kushida Shrine, it seems that his opinion had a large impact on other inhabitants. Moreover, some people that insisted on canceling the festival complained of a cumbersome set of rules and obligations. For example, if the head of a household could not participate in the festival or was female, he or she felt obliged to pay money or hire men to participate in their stead. According to critics, these obligations showed that inhabitants did not take part in the festival voluntarily like they used to. I cannot clarify when these practices emerged, but they may point to transformations in inhabitants' attitudes and consciousness toward the festival in particular and to the traditional rules and norms of the community in general.

But for those who hoped to carry on the festival, these opinions were regarded as corruptions that emerged with the ideas of 'civilization' or 'modernity':

The head of police says that the Yamakasa Festival is a very dangerous festival and ought to be banned for three main reasons: sanitation, traffic problems, and public morals. But the new streetcar is more dangerous, because it killed some people...After all, not all people are interested in becoming 'civilized' and are pleased to raise hell during the Yamakasa Festival once a year. (*Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*, 21 June 1910)

This article represents the discussion among inhabitants at Kushida Shrine and is written in the local dialect. By deliberately using the local dialect, we may say that they intended to represent the ideas and attitudes of local people more forcefully. They may still have had a different attitude towards the quickening pace of life associated with a modern sense of time that the street car represented, and they may have had a concept of modernity that conformed with their daily lives and that they interpreted according to their own framework.⁵ As they felt some anxieties about their future lives and could not entirely accept new conceptions of life, their imaginations sought to forge a distinctive identity, depending on the idealized tradition of the festival. In the end, only the Daikoku *nagare* group paraded its float and the other *nagare* groups constructed their floats, but did not parade them around. As the power lines for the streetcar were set up, the traditional style float changed drastically. A new style of float emerged that was divided into two parts: one was tall and of the traditional style, the so-called *kazari yama* that was put on the streets, the other was the shorter *kaki yama* that members could move around on the streets.

After this development, municipal authorities and the police repeatedly attempted to regulate festival

practices and performances instead of banning the festival. For example, in 1916 the police instructed the leaders of Yamakasa groups and the chiefs of neighborhood communities as follows:

1. Participants must always wear their own *happi*. Nudity is prohibited.
2. Do not quarrel.
3. Observe the rules, times, and routes when parading the floats.
4. The leader must take responsibility for his group during the festival.
5. Put floats on the side of the street so as not to obstruct the flow of traffic.
6. To whatever extent possible, do not permit the participation of outsiders.

(*Kyūshū Nippō* 7 July 1916)

The police intended to control the festival as a whole through such regulations. And the streets were one of the important sites where individuals internalized and were subjected to social norms. Althusser (1970) emphasizes that ideology transforms ordinary individuals into the subjects of and for these very social norms through ‘interpellation,’ and it is ‘on the streets’ that individuals are subjected to these ideological forces in overdetermined ways. The interrelations between the street and the subject are not one-way, but are composed of complex and conflicting processes. As mentioned above, the street was also the site for organizing people to protest against hegemonic norms and for producing collective meanings from below. However, as the police intensified state control over the streets and they became more a regulated domain for conspicuous consumption, ‘micro-politics’ on the streets changed both in content and symbolic meanings.

IV. Commercialization of the festival and the selling place: transformation of ‘tradition’

Fukuoka City had less of an industrial base than neighboring Kita-Kyushu, which was one of four major Japanese industrial regions in this period. Under increased inter-urban competition for governmental redistributions or industrial locations, autochthonous entrepreneurs and municipal authorities worked together not only to develop urban infrastructure such as ports and road networks, but also to produce and reproduce distinctive urban images and identities as an important strategy to attract economic activities and people. They had to offer ‘something different’ to outsiders. In the case of Fukuoka City, holding various exhibitions was one of the key means to create and represent the urban image of the ‘central city of the Kyushu region’. Thus a re-imaging of the city aimed to create social consensus or integration within the city as well as to attract outside resources. As Philo and Kearns (1993) point out, the ambitions involved in ‘selling places’ or ‘place marketing’ are about economic gain and social control. As urban image or identity itself became a commodity, and only select images were presumed to be ‘authentic’ or ‘local,’ some sites and people that were seen as inappropriate for ‘the authentic’ were sometimes then excluded from the idealized and romanticized spaces of Fukuoka City.⁶ As arguments over ‘culture’ play a key part in drawing the social and economic boundaries between the valued and the non-valued, many residents of Fukuoka naturally consented to this exclusion through the workings of hegemonic representation.

The Yamakasa Festival had attracted many spectators from the outskirts of Hakata from the early modern period. But in the 1910s, local entrepreneurs really began to take the ‘commercialization’ of the festival seriously. When, as mentioned above, there were disputes over whether the festival ought to be canceled or not in 1910, one local entrepreneur said that it would better to hold the festival not on the streets, but in the public park outside Hakata:

We should hold the Yamakasa Festival in West Park (Fukuoka). If local inhabitants accept this idea, some problems, in particular traffic, can be resolved. If the festival is held, there is no difference whether it is in Hakata or Fukuoka. And the number of spectators and the economic benefits shall not diminish.

(*Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun* 23 June 1910)

As he reinterpreted local culture from an economic point of view and de-contextualized the festival so as to sell it as 'urban cultural and historical heritage,' he did not take the relation between festival and place into account. Since the 1910s, *nagare* groups had dealt with new social and physical circumstances by dividing their floats into two types and changing modes of movement so they could continue the festival on the street. Through the process of urbanization, however, urban inhabitants moved into suburban areas and immigrants who did not have any knowledge of festival moved into the city center, and neighborhood communities changed in character. Particularly in the face of economic depression and increased social inequality in the 1930s, a lot of small scale merchants and shopkeepers declined economically and went into bankruptcy as they competed with the new consumption spaces (public or private local markets and department stores). As a lot of households could not bear the expense of the festival, the scale of it gradually declined, and the number of floats decreased from six to three. Some inhabitants proposed improving on festival practice by no longer hiring assistants from rural areas, having Kushida Shrine grant economic assistance to *nagare* groups, etc.

In these circumstances, municipal authorities began to regard the festival as a valuable resource for tourism and actively sought the cooperation of local people. In 1935 the Ebisu *nagare* group took its float to City Hall (Fukuoka) and offered it to Mayor Kuse Tsuneo in order to cooperate in staging the 'Hakata Port Memorial Exhibition,' which became an official plan in 1936. It was the first time that a float was moved out of Hakata and into Fukuoka. Newspapers reported that this cooperation between Hakata inhabitants and municipal authorities was a historical event. The relation between them was transformed from one of hostility to one of cooperation and both of them seemed to regard the Yamakasa Festival as not only the 'traditional festival' of Hakata, but also the civic symbol and historical heritage of Fukuoka City as a whole.

Two years later, eight members of the municipal assembly submitted a new bill to grant economic assistance to the Yamakasa Festival. They mentioned two reasons for this bill: first, other cities, such as Kyoto, Nagasaki and Shimonoseki, already subsidized their local festivals to attract many tourists and improve their economic health; second, as the central government promoted local traditional festivals and rituals in order to enhance national prestige during the Japanese-Chinese war, this grant plan was just right for this national policy. From then on, municipal authorities granted three thousand yen every year and at the same time the Chamber of Commerce of Fukuoka and Hakata decided to grant economic assistance too (Fukuoka City 1983).

In this way the Yamakasa Festival became more deeply enmeshed in cultural politics and tourism-based economic development. The representation of a vigorous physicality with coordinated *happi* and a tolerably 'violent performance' became the stereotypical object of the tourist gaze. Through this objectification of corporality and performance, individuals were more and more transformed into the docile subjects who were keenly conscious of being gazed upon by the other. And inhabitants as subjects reconstituted their own identity only in an imaginary sphere, relying upon the ideological discourse of 'tradition' which municipal authorities recognized as 'authentic.' Notably, this transformation occurred at a time when the residents' community-derived social and material bases had weakened and they could no longer sustain the Yamakasa Festival by themselves. And while there were tensions over the meanings of 'tradition' between inhabitants

and municipal authorities before, these differences were considerably attenuated. While inhabitants could legitimate their identity and draw the line between themselves and the other by manipulating 'tradition,' for municipal authorities tradition implied the idealized representations of the city and played a key part in the commodification of festival and place. But as the members of neighborhood communities sought to compensate for 'a sense of loss' that came from the transformation of real economic structures and the loosening of local social ties, and still legitimate their positions in the urban society, they depended on a discourse of 'tradition' which was different from their own. In the process, residents' attachments and allegiance to the neighborhood community became manifest in an imaginary sphere. Thus the discourse of 'tradition' came to define the image of the idealized community and controlled the concrete attitudes and behavior of the inhabitants. As Harvey (1993) argues, while "the collapse of spatial barriers undermined material and territorial definitions of place, the very fact of collapse has put renewed emphasis upon the interrogation of metaphorical and psychological meanings which, in turn, give new material definitions of place by way of exclusionary territorial behavior."

Moreover, although the formation of neighborhood community was formerly defined by 'horizontal' interrelations within and between communities, *nagare* groups, and outsiders at different scales, it came to be more deeply articulated with and more 'vertically' integrated into a larger 'imagined community,' the nation.⁷ In particular, corporeality and performance in the Yamakasa Festival were utilized to represent the spirit and subjectivity of Japanese nationhood. In 1944 a movie company went on location in Fukuoka City to make a film, *The Army*, that aimed at boosting national prestige and consoling the soldiers at the front. Military authorities asked local people to cooperate in making the film because they thought the brave performance of the Yamakasa Festival could represent the climate that had produced the Japanese nation. Local identity was no longer opposed to, but became associated with, national identity. Thus 'nested identities' from local identity to national identity became embedded in and adapted to the changing urban environment as each profoundly influenced the other in their interdependent transformations. In the end, the local 'imagined community' could retain its collective identity only as it became subsumed into the larger and more abstract entity that was the national community.

V. Concluding remarks

In this paper I have examined the transformation of "local socially established structures of meaning" (Rose, 1988) within wider economic and political contexts. These structures are the medium for and result of the social reproduction of everyday life. As local territorial-based community is the scaffolding of reactionary exclusionary politics and progressive resistance simultaneously, it cannot be understood as a static entity but rather must be seen as a complex dynamic involving numerous contradictory processes. This process of community formation, then, invents difference by drawing a line between 'us' and 'them,' thus obscuring connections as it constrains the perspective of subjects, and confines them to their small separated worlds. However, at the same time the community can also form the basis of local resistance that has the potential to associate with the other across visible and invisible boundaries.

Both the local and the national operate as a type of 'imagined community,' but there are some clear differences in terms of historical origin, material base, and the degree of abstraction. Particularly, while the local does not necessarily have a tendency toward expansionism, the national has both aspects of expansionism and protectionism. The relationships between these two communities are contingent and ambivalent, and deeply incorporated into the power relations of 'modernization' in general and the social relations of urbanization and 'mass society' in particular. While the local is opposed to the national in some contexts, the local can complement the national in others. So we need to reconsider these relationships in

the face of the contemporary resurrection of nationalism in various contexts and at various spatial scales.

Notes

- 1) Violent conflict between the Fukujin *nagare* group and other *nagare* groups arose in 1905. After this dispute the Fukujin *nagare* no longer built its own float. Since then it took charge of ritual matters and other groups built their floats every year.
- 2) Although it was not clarified why they could not take part in the festival formally, it seemed that they were relatively new neighborhoods, and the number of households was also lower in the early modern era.
- 3) Mitchell (2000) points out that works of culture advance social integration and production through the making and marking of differences that obfuscate real connectedness.
- 4) In Fukuoka City, there were some local organizations that stored rice or money so as a precaution against famine and natural disaster and for economic assistance to the poor. In the case of Hakata, it dated back to the early modern era and had persisted until 1926, when municipal and prefectural authorities started their social work programs (public market, unemployment relief projects, and so on) from the second half of the 1920s. It seems that these local organizations had two aspects: first, they fostered the spirit of mutual aid and amicability among inhabitants, and second, they worked to relieve the social tensions between the affluent and the poor and the complaints of the latter, and thereby sustain the mechanisms of paternalistic social control.
- 5) When, in December 1911, an elementary school girl who lived in Hakata was run over by a streetcar, local people protested against the company. It seems that this collective protest implied not only immediate anger at this accident, but also anxiety about increasing speed in all aspects of social life. And as many rickshaw men in Hakata were faced with the difficulty of unemployment after the inauguration of the streetcar, this protest had the potential to become larger and more violent.
- 6) When the central government decided to found the fourth Imperial University in the Kyushu region, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Kumamoto municipal authorities competed against each other fiercely to attract it. And when Kyushu Imperial University was located in Fukuoka City a 'red-light district' near the university campus was forced to move to the outskirts.
- 7) In 1940 the central government reorganized urban and rural neighborhood communities as the lowest administrative unit to more easily mobilize the entire nation. Thus not only as an imaginary sphere, but also as an organizational one, neighborhood communities became increasingly subjected to the hierarchy within the nation-state.

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Local Tradition and the Construction of Community and Identity in Postwar Japan: The Case of the Kishiwada Danjiri Matsuri

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In this paper I will examine the Danjiri Matsuri of Kishiwada City in Southern Osaka, a local festival that has attained national notoriety, and consider its role in identity formation at various levels. Specifically, I will focus on the centrality of the festival in the construction of local identity and community. In addition to this local focus, given the fact that this *matsuri* has had considerable national exposure and has been a tourist attraction since the early 1970s, I will use the festival as a means to examine the place of local tradition in relation to the larger questions of culture and identity in postwar Japan. In other words, I hope to understand how and why the Kishiwada Danjiri Matsuri came to be seen as an attractive expression of traditional Japanese culture in recent years. However, before introducing the Danjiri Matsuri and proceeding to my research questions I would like to contextualize my research within a broader framework. I will do this by summarizing some key concepts in and the contours of the discourse among scholars dealing with the related questions of nation, culture, identity and the local in the field of Japanese Studies. Lastly, in light of this scholarship I will introduce my own approach to these questions.

A recurring theme in much recent scholarship on contemporary Japanese cultural identity is a pervasive sense of loss and longing for aspects of native culture perceived lost or at the point of vanishing as a result of Japan's modernization. Wedded to this loss and longing are various nostalgic attempts at preserving or recovering traditional culture. In one of the more prominent and challenging meditations on the dynamics of cultural loss and recovery Marilyn Ivy writes

there is widespread recognition in Japan today that the destabilizations of capitalist modernity have decreed the loss of much of the past, a past sometimes troped as "traditional"; at the same time, there is a disavowal of this recognition through massive investment in representative survivals refigured as elegiac resources.

However, in the end, in spite of "labors to recover the past and deny the losses of 'tradition,' modernist nostalgia must preserve, in many senses, the sense of absence that motivates its desires." Ivy describes this nostalgic practice of preserving numerous cultural forms precisely on the point of vanishing as fetishistic. She argues that through such fetishistic practices Japanese subjectivity becomes split between "the subject who knows (something is missing) and the subject who (fixed on the replacement of absence) doesn't."¹ By focusing on various marginal localities and cultural practices as instances of this "fetishistic disavowal" that Ivy sees as a pervasive aspect of contemporary culture, she provides an example of how the national and local are linked in contemporary Japan. Furthermore, in pointing out how the tourism industry promotes travel by tying various regional sites to this practice of cultural recovery she shows how the cultural and economic realms are linked. Occupying a central place in Ivy's work is her treatment of Yanagita Kunio's *The Tales of Tono* as a classic attempt at and an enduring monument to capturing the

“vanishing” elements of Japan’s past. She also discusses the current utilization of *The Tales of Tono* by the city of Tono in promoting the city as the home of Japanese folklore, and even the *furusato* (old hometown) of Japan.

Lastly, in making the ironic, though quite conventional, point that the attempt to recover “prewestern Japanese authenticity is inescapably a *modern* endeavor, essentially enfolded within the historical condition that it would seek to escape,”² I believe Ivy is likely consistent with her theoretical approach. But, such a position on the question of authenticity and tradition seems to assume a “prewestern” moment when tradition was not subject to similar historical pressures.³ In doing so Ivy casts the modern as an amorphous and exceptional category in a way that offers little in the way of explanatory power or historical accuracy, and more importantly risks reifying a tradition-modernity binary that many contemporary Japanese would not recognize. In short, she ignores the quite obvious possibility that in undergoing historical change tradition can be redefined, reconfigured, and remain legitimate and viable. In the end, Ivy betrays a predilection to view contemporary cultural practice through a dense layering of popular social theories at the expense of both clarity and a more extensive treatment of the subjective views of contemporary Japanese.

A key concept, mentioned above, that alludes to the nostalgic dialectic of loss and recovery presumably at the center of the intersection between questions of culture and identity and questions of nation and locality is *furusato*. Jennifer Robertson has argued that *furusato* is the dominant trope in Japanese political and cultural discourse and the dominant representation of “Japaneseness.” *Furusato* is an ambiguous term that can alternately and simultaneously refer to one’s hometown, to Japan itself, or to an imagined ideal village in the, typically Tokugawa, pre-modern past. The idea and image of *furusato* has been used by many diverse groups ranging from local environmentalists, to various businesses, ministries of the national government, and finally by the LDP in its “recent appropriation [1984] of *furusato-zukuri* [“old village’-making” or “native place-making”] as an administrative model of and for a ‘new’ national culture.”⁴ Despite the diverse subjective meanings and associations that *furusato* contains, Robertson writes that since the 1970s the “dominant representation of *furusato* is infused with nostalgia, a dissatisfaction with the present on the grounds of a remembered or imagined past plenitude.”⁵ Robertson writes that the evocative images associated with *furusato*—including rural scenes of mountain villages, with winding paths or streams cutting through fields, and village festivals, among others—strengthens its appeal to the majority urban Japanese who have a sense of loss and longing for a real or imagined rural past.

Capitalizing on the broad appeal of the images and idea of *furusato*, in the 1970s local governments enacted *furusato-zukuri* campaigns in an attempt to recreate the ambiance of the imagined ideal village of the pre-modern past. Among the traits typically thought to define such village life would be close knit, cooperative, and affective communal ties. In reflecting on the “sociopsychological motive for the *furusato-zukuri* project and the symbolic reclamation of the landscape of nostalgia,” Robertson writes in a similar vein as Ivy in insisting that it is a “nostalgia for nostalgia.”⁶ In other words, given the urbanization of many villages and the concomitant blurring of urban and rural that has come with rapid urbanization “the nostalgia provoked by estrangement from an ‘old village’ has become thin and insignificant. There is no particular place to go home to; consequently, there is no particular place to feel nostalgic toward. Homelessness today may be defined as a ‘postmodern’ condition of existential disaffection: nostalgia for the experience of nostalgia.” Continuing with the postmodern theme, Robertson writes that the politics associated with *furusato-zukuri* are a postmodern politics where hegemony resides in mastering the various signs and symbols of various periods. Under such postmodern symbolic politics order does not have to be imposed, but instead inheres in evocative symbols as they are deployed.⁷ In this way Robertson provides a framework to understand how a hegemonic rendering of *furusato* allows for a symbolic reconstruction of the national community and a linking of the local and national congenial to dominant political and economic

interests. In short, “*furusato* has been deployed as a dominant trope to regulate the imagination of the nation and contain the local.”⁸ This critical account of the ideological aspect of dominant public representations of *furusato* and their articulation at the local level provides an invaluable insight into how a popular nostalgia has been politicized and disseminated in contemporary Japan. Nevertheless, to get a fuller sense of the linkages between culture and politics and the national and local in contemporary Japan, I feel that there is still a need to research alternative localities, subjectivities, and memories that do not romanticize, but problematize the past without necessarily being pessimistic about the present, and that potentially challenge the political status quo.⁹

Therefore, despite the relevance and value of the work of Ivy and Robertson it must be remembered that there are thriving local traditions in Japan that are not recent inventions nor easily subsumable to the nostalgic narrative of loss and recovery, nor represent a “fetishistic” preservation of the “vanishing.” This is especially true if we view local tradition from the perspective of the local community. In short there are some long standing local traditions that form a solid basis for the identity of local residents who possess their own discursive and other symbolic means of representing and authenticating local cultural practice. Indeed, in some cases the centrality of a local tradition for local identity and in the local consciousness may be such an obvious matter of fact that a politically engineered authenticating ideology is scarcely needed. The ease with which such a bedrock institution can be exploited for political or commercial purposes, on the other hand, is, as we shall see, another matter entirely. In the case of the Danjiri Matsuri, authenticating narratives seamlessly blend into everyday discourse. And official accounts of *matsuri* history tend to collapse any tradition-modernity binary with a historical perspective that assumes and duly records historical change and adaptations in festival practice. In addition, historical representations of the festival do not idealize the past vis-à-vis the present. In fact the opposite is the case. Of course, these authenticating representations possess a political element, and this politics of representation must be examined. Nevertheless, I feel that representations of the Danjiri Matsuri offer a counternarrative to the nostalgic dialectic of loss and recovery so prominent in the scholarly literature on modern Japanese culture and identity.

Lastly, I feel that it is the strong local character and thriving community spirit embodied in traditional festivals like the Danjiri Matsuri that has transformed them into national cultural events in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was a time when many traditional cultural forms were undergoing a resurgence as Japanese yearned for “meaning in wake of the rushed, materialistic, postwar prosperity.”¹⁰ Therefore my goal will be to understand the symbolic means of representing and authenticating local culture, which is integral to the process of constructing local community and identity. In the process I hope to gain fresh insights into how these processes relate to the construction of a symbolic community, a sort of pluralistic and culturally based identity, at the national level. And, of course, as a historian, how the past is represented and used in this regard is of primary concern.

Towards a Methodology on Tradition in Community and Identity Formation

In his classic ethnography of an arguably typical Tokyo neighborhood Theodore Bestor uses the concept of “traditionalism” to describe how dynamic social institutions and practices (such as neighborhood associations and festivals) utilize the idea of tradition to legitimize such practices and institutions as they adapt to changing times.¹¹ Such a position on the congruity of tradition and modernity, or the efficacy of invoking tradition for the needs of the present seems to have become common sense to researchers of Japan some time ago. And in Bestor’s ethnography the “traditional” *matsuri* in his neighborhood could seemingly accommodate innovation without problem. In contrast, Robertson describes the incongruity of “native”

residents leading a *mikoshi* procession during a newly created secular “citizens’ festival” where the non-traditional processions of “newcomers” were also featured. This citizens’ festival was a central innovation in Kodaira City’s *furusato-zukuri* program and suggests the problems in authenticating newly invented traditions that are clearly linked to a political program from their inception. In addition, other authors have noted how some Japanese feel that too much innovation in and promotion of their local tradition has compromised the authenticity of local cultural practice.¹²

At this point I would like to introduce Keiko Ikeda’s work on the Kenka Matsuri of Himeji. This work describes how a thriving local festival can serve as the basis for local community and identity construction. In some ways Ikeda is similar to Bestor in her treatment of tradition. She writes, “‘tradition’ is maintained by being constantly revised, renewed, and renegotiated by the people of the community. And this ‘tradition’ gives meaning to community and enables residents to articulate their identity.”¹³ In this way Ikeda argues for the need for a dialectical understanding of community and tradition “to understand the meaning of this festival in its contemporary context.” She cites Bestor on the festival in his neighborhood where “[t]he vitality of the community is the *raison d’être* for preserving (and creating) tradition, not the other way around.” In the case of the Kenka Matsuri on the other hand, Ikeda argues that it is indeed “the other way around.” It is the festival that “has the power to bind people to the locality,” and “has the power to produce and reproduce a symbolic community—a community bounded by what they believe to be ‘our tradition.’” In this way the festival can be said to constitute and form local community and identity rather than merely expressing it.

In describing a community where the local festival takes center stage in local life, and is the unquestioned source of community identity, and thus explaining how community is symbolically constructed, I think Ikeda provides a good model to apply to the Kishiwada Danjiri Matsuri. The fact that the Kenka Matsuri and the Danjiri Matsuri (which has also been referred to as a *kenka matsuri*) have many traits in common underscores the suitability of her method for my own research. In both cases the symbolic construction of community can be seen in the *matsuri* providing the “master metaphor” for local life. The *matsuri* occupies a place of central significance on the local calendar, and in collective and individual memories. The *matsuri* provides a dominant set of symbols that are firmly embedded in the local consciousness and (at least in the case of Kishiwada) the local landscape. Hence the metaphor of the *matsuri* and its associated symbols are revealed in the physical landscape, in *cho* (neighborhood) level organizations and in the recurring rhetoric and social practice that expresses the central place of the *matsuri* in local life. In other words, through the *matsuri* a symbolic community is constructed.

The Danjiri Matsuri in Community and Identity Formation

Every September fourteenth and fifteenth over a half a million people witness the spectacle that is the Danjiri Matsuri. The festival opens at 6:00 on the morning of the fourteenth as the *danjiri* of each of the twenty-one participating neighborhoods (*cho*) are pulled from their parish shrines. The hardwood *danjiri* weigh an average of four tons, are roughly twelve feet tall, and have four wooden wheels on two large axles that bear the weight of the main body of the *danjiri* that is covered with intricate carvings of historic scenes and figures. Soon after departure the five hundred or so neighborhood youth and adults of each *cho* procession pulling their respective four-ton *danjiri* are in a full sprint. This opening portion of the *matsuri* is referred to as the *bikidashi*. In addition to the sprinting residents clad in matching *happi* (jackets) with their *cho* insignia pulling their much loved *danjiri* at full speed through the streets, each procession also features neighborhood elders (*kaicho*, *fukukaicho*) directing the procession and occupying a position of esteem and responsibility as they ride on the front of the *danjiri*. Young adults (*seinendan*) playing *taiko* drums, flute, and

bell ride on the inside of the *danjiri* and provide rhythmic inspiration for the pullers as well as for the stars of the festival, the dancing and leaping *daikugata*, or “carpenters,” riding on the roof of the *danjiri*. The *bikidashi*, or opening pull, is the most exciting part of the *matsuri* since it is the time when each *cho*'s procession runs at full speed for an extended period of time. For this reason the one and a half-hour *bikidashi* is also the most dangerous point in the *matsuri*.

Spectators are distributed throughout the course that the *danjiri* run, but are especially concentrated at corners where the *danjiri* make dramatic and potentially dangerous turns, called *yarimawashi* in local parlance. Spectators are witness to the spectacle of the speed and precision timing of each *cho*'s procession as they maneuver their respective *danjiri* through narrow streets and ninety degree turns to the inspiring rhythm of the *seinendan*. Onlookers also see the colorful and coordinated attire of the pullers, the ornamentation of the *danjiri*, and the daring *daikugata* of each florid procession as they pass in front of their eyes at speed. Of course the possibility of danger, of a *danjiri* crashing into a building or electric pole, or tipping over and launching a rider, crushing a runner, a rider, or even a spectator, adds immensely to the excitement and drama of the *matsuri*. And although efforts to make the *matsuri* safer have been successfully implemented, and are an important aspect of the postwar history of the *matsuri*, the element of danger is still at the center of what fascinates spectators about the *matsuri*.¹⁴ It must be noted, however, that the literature on the *matsuri* mentions the allure of the beauty of the festival, the individual *danjiri* processions, and the *danjiri* themselves as frequently as the speed, competitive energy and danger of the *matsuri*. And it is in terms of the speed and facility with which each *cho* procession moves through the course, the skill and daring of their *daikugata* and *seinendan* musicians, as well as the beauty of the designs of the respective *happi* coats and the *danjiri* themselves that the various neighborhoods compete with each other. This ritualized inter-*cho* competition and rivalry plays an integral part in creating a shared sense of community identity at the local level while simultaneously forming the basis of the identity and image that Kishiwada projects to the nation.

In addition to the *bikidashi* the *matsuri* also features a slower paced parade in the afternoon that still highlights the *yarimawashi*, and a very slow evening procession known as the *hi ire*, featuring *danjiri* adorned with a towering wall of Japanese lanterns hoisted above the *danjiri* roof. At this point parents often accompany small children who get their chance to pull the large *danjiri*. Children also have their own event at festival time where they pull miniature *danjiri*, and women often run at the head of *danjiri* processions with small children in tow, sometimes even with babies tied to their backs during the *bikidashi* and parade segments. In this way children are acculturated to and participate in the *matsuri* from an early age.

The second day of the *matsuri* is referred to as the *bon matsuri*, or main *matsuri*, since it features the *miya iri*, or shrine visit. After the *miya iri* the second day of the festival proceeds much as the first day with parades followed by the *hi ire* processions. During the *miya iri*, however, each participating *cho* tows their *danjiri* to their respective parish shrine to give thanks to the enshrined deity, pray for a safe *matsuri* and perform purification rites. Although the *bikidashi* is the unquestioned highlight of the contemporary *matsuri*, the *miya iri* reflects the religious and historical origins of the *matsuri* which is said to have started in 1703 when the *daimyo* Okabe Nagayasu invited townspeople into the castle compound to pray at a small branch shrine of the Fushimi Inari deity for a good harvest. In contrast to the unbridled energy and extravagance of the rest of the festival, the solemnity of the *miya iri* can be said to reflect the simple (*soboku*) nature of the earliest *matsuri* on the castle grounds.

The three hundred year long history of the *matsuri* underscores the shifting position of the festival vis-à-vis various political authorities that have at times supported, and at other times sought to control, regulate, use, and even on occasion cancel the *matsuri* according to the politics of the day. Therefore, contemporary representations of the *matsuri* and its history highlight the freedom and autonomy of the residents of present day Kishiwada to stage their own extravagant and “beautiful” *matsuri* on their own terms.

Notably, these same accounts also highlight the ability of the local community to successfully and independently manage and reform a festival that was, and sometimes still is, known as a *kenka*, and even bloody *matsuri* for its aggressive and dangerous nature. How the Danjiri Matsuri has come to be the large-scale spectacle that it is today and the ambiguous role of the *daimyo* and later political authorities in this process will be discussed in relation to contemporary representations of *matsuri* history. At this point I will examine how the *matsuri* functions as the basis of local identity and community formation.

In spite of local pride in the national notoriety of their festival and in performing for spectators, Kishiwada residents assert that the performance of their festival has not changed since it gained national fame in 1972 when it was featured on the highly popular NHK television series *Furusato no uta matsuri*. And in spite of the national stature of the *matsuri*, locals insist that the reason for continuing their festival is the feeling they get from participating in it. Thus it is said that one cannot truly understand the *matsuri* without participating. Such rhetoric shows how the *matsuri* appeals to something visceral in Kishiwada residents; as one young mother told me she gets the same excited feeling (*waku waku*) at festival time that she did when she was a little girl. In relating how the *matsuri* annually conjures up the same excitement as past *matsuri*, this quote illustrates both the recurring, reassuring excitement as well as the nostalgia that the *matsuri* evokes.

For Kishiwada residents, then, the *matsuri* forms a visceral link to the past thereby creating a sense of continuity conducive to a strong sense of community identity. In addition, local knowledge on the true, performative, nature of the *matsuri* can be seen as creating a boundary between the local community and the outside world; in essence a boundary between those who know the essence of the *matsuri* and participate, and those who watch.¹⁵ This boundary is based on a distinct local tradition, a familiarity with the neighborhood organizations that it supports (and is supported by), and the sights and sounds, and feelings and memories it evokes. Taken together these factors form a distinctly local mode of being and knowing based on the festival. This way of life broadly shared and understood across a locality is thus constitutive of a boundary that sets the local community apart from the larger society and is a key factor in the symbolic construction of community.¹⁶ Lastly, it must be noted that the *matsuri* is not only how Kishiwada expresses its identity to the larger society, but also that at the local level the *matsuri* is the idiom through which each neighborhood expresses its own identity vis-à-vis the other *cho*. And in addition to *cho*-based organizations forming the institutional basis for the *matsuri*, the *cho*-based competition at the heart of the festival is said to be the source of the dynamism of the Danjiri Matsuri and even the local community.¹⁷

In her research on the Kenka Matsuri of Himeji, Keiko Ikeda posits a tradition-community dialectic where a continually evolving *matsuri* is the basis of community identity and serves to mark the parish of Nada as a distinct symbolic community at a time when the homogenizing social forces of late capitalism are particularly strong. In fact Ikeda argues that it is precisely the homogenizing tendencies of “post-industrial” society that strengthens such symbolic communities. She writes “in recent years, as this community has moved away from agriculture and fishing and become increasingly middle class, with most of its members working in companies and factories outside of the community, the Kenka Matsuri has only become more extravagant, more intense. Community members declare openly and unanimously that they live for these two days in October.”¹⁸ And in addition to binding members to the community, the festival also compels those that have moved outside of the community to return at festival time. I am not in a position to judge whether the Danjiri Matsuri has grown more intense as Kishiwada has evolved. But I can say that the Danjiri Matsuri of Kishiwada inspires sentiments comparable to the Kenka Matsuri of Himeji, and similarly binds residents to the community.

A case in point, Uchida Yukihiro, author of *Furusato Kishiwada* (a volume of short chapters on episodes of local history written with the intent of preserving such lore for younger generations) writes that the passion that Kishiwada residents have for the Danjiri Matsuri is like the passion a man feels for his

newlywed wife. And as is the case in Himeji, natives that have moved outside of the community inevitably return at festival time. Uchida also writes that local passion and anticipation for the festival is so strong that on the pretense that the *matsuri* is a mere three months away residents of the various *cho* will take out their *danjiri* and begin preparations in early June.¹⁹ The sights and sounds associated with festival preparations are often cited as typical signs of summer in Kishiwada and as putting residents in a festival frame of mind. These sights and sounds include the *seinendan* running through the streets to build up their endurance while shouting “*sorya-sorya*,” the chant, or *kakegoe*, uttered at festival time. Another common festival related summertime image is the *seinendan* of the various *cho* practicing festival music (*bayashi*) while sitting inside of the neighborhood *danjiri*. And as the *danjiri* are pulled out of their storehouses for *bayashi* practice onlookers from the vicinity of all ages routinely gather and take in the festive ambiance.²⁰

That such festival related ambiance serves to mark seasonal change seems to coincide with Ikeda’s point on the importance of a “festival calendar” as a key factor in creating a festival centered community identity. And in an article by Yorozuya Seiji of the Danjiri Museum ostensibly on the Edo period history of the festival the author refers to a local “festival calendar” when describing the centrality of the *matsuri* in the lives of Kishiwada residents. Yorozuya writes, “Kishiwada has a calendar that starts in September.” He goes on to explain that the new year in Kishiwada begins on September sixteenth when the *nenban*, the umbrella organization responsible for organizing the *matsuri* and coordinating activities with the authorities and the various *cho*, starts planning for the following year’s *matsuri* the day after the current year’s *matsuri* has ended. Yorozuya also writes that given the fact that the *matsuri* is central in the lives of Kishiwada residents (*seikatsu no chushin*) they will not attend school or work, nor move, plan weddings or other major events during festival time.²¹ And asking the question: “What does the festival mean to you as a Kishiwada resident?” of a young single woman yielded consternation and finally the response “It is like New Year.” The respondent reasoned that the *matsuri* was like New Year because it was an important event in the year and marked the passage of time and provided a time to reflect on the past and ponder the future. She went on to explain that the *matsuri* is an important event in her life because it was something she participated in when she was younger and something that her father and brother still participate in. She also mentioned that the importance of the *matsuri* for locals can be gauged by the amount of time and money residents routinely dedicate to the *matsuri*, and added that she had not met any residents who did not like the *matsuri*. In a similar vein Uchida writes that in spite of all the expenses and potential for problems that the *matsuri* poses, locals always begin planning for the following year’s *matsuri* right after the current one has ended. Uchida concludes by noting simply that the Danjiri Matsuri is the reason for living (*ikigai*) for Kishiwada residents.²²

As the “master metaphor” for local life the *matsuri* is synonymous with local life, and is the dominant symbol of the locality, while at the same time transcending mere symbol status. The *matsuri* provides a lived experience from which important individual and collective memories are based.²³ The *matsuri* also supports and is supported by neighborhood level organizations that are hierarchically structured according to age and corresponding function in the *matsuri*. This last characteristic is also reminiscent of Ikeda’s festival-based symbolic community of Nada Parish in Himeji. Of this community Ikeda writes: “Since roles in the festival are defined by a strict age hierarchy, it also works as a rite of passage, providing the community’s vision of manhood and a yardstick for maturity.”²⁴ In this way the *matsuri* and its supporting organizations can be seen to both embody and transmit social values in the process of continuing a distinct local tradition.

Evidence from both interviews and printed matter on the Danjiri Matsuri discloses such normative didacticism inherent in local cultural practice and supporting social organizations. A clear articulation of the didactic socializing functions of the *matsuri* can be seen in an article by the 2003 *nenbancho*, Mr. Tsuchitani Susumu of Minami-*cho*, entitled “The Danjiri Matsuri is a School for Human Development.” After citing

the three hundred-year history of the *matsuri* and describing it as a tradition built on the many sacrifices of the ancestors, Tsuchitani explains the three guiding principles of the *matsuri*. These principles are independent administration, regulation, and security, which are applied to the goal of an enjoyable and accident free *matsuri* while protecting the dignity of “*danjiri* culture.” In the process of reaching this goal via these principles, the *matsuri* compels local residents to act in a spirit of mutual aid, to teach civility to local youth, beautify local neighborhoods, and kindly welcome and guide tourists. In short it is through the efforts of the twenty-one participating *cho* and a spirit of mutual aid that such a spectacular *matsuri* is able to thrive. And as a result both the *matsuri* and the values it embodies are passed down through the generations.²⁵

Similar sentiments on the social value of the *matsuri* were expressed in an interview with Mr. Nishide a neighborhood leader from Ookita-*cho* who was *kaicho* for three consecutive years and once served as *nenbancho*. In noting that as *nenbancho* he missed close to a hundred days of work in consultations with the police and other authorities, Nishide underscores the points made above about the time and money that Kishiwada residents dedicate to the *matsuri*. Nishide also provided insights on both the organizational and social virtues of *matsuri* supporting organizations at the *cho* level. Nishide argued that these organizations, in addition to providing a necessary command structure for organizing and maintaining the *matsuri*, were also instrumental in creating a strong, stable and cooperative community. Elaborating on the social utility of these neighborhood organizations, Nishide speculated that the self-sufficiency, community consciousness and cooperation that they engendered would make Kishiwada people extremely helpful in a disaster situation. He also stated that the lessons learned by moving through the various levels of these neighborhood organizations over one’s life would allow anyone of the proper age to fulfill the duties of the various positions of responsibility (*sekininsha*), even that of *nenbancho*, needed to organize and perform the festival. Mr. Kakimoto of Oote-*cho* is another neighborhood elder who similarly stressed the central importance of *cho* level hierarchies in putting on the *matsuri*, but he also noted the tendency of individual leaders of a particular cohort to remain largely unchanged as the cohort moved up the hierarchy. Squaring this revelation with the seemingly widespread practice of determining leadership positions at each level through discussion and deliberation within the respective levels will require further research, as will uncovering the general social history of *cho* level organizations related to the *matsuri*.

The organizational and didactic utility as well as the inclusive and participatory impulses embodied in these hierarchies are all duly noted by local residents and in *matsuri* literature. The functional, age based hierarchies of both the *nenban* and the neighborhoods are even described and graphically depicted among the exhibits and publications of the Danjiri Museum. For example the magazine commemorating the ten-year anniversary of the Danjiri Museum provides a schematic diagram with brief descriptions of the functions of the five basic levels of organization related to the *matsuri* at the *cho* level. The diagram ranges from the *kodomokai* for kids up to the age of fifteen to the *sodan yaku* for adults over fifty-five. The text notes how through these levels of organization all generations are given a function and guidance. And festival organization is thereby perfected. Furthermore, the annual selection of new residents from each *cho* to form the *nenban* is said to reflect the inclusive nature of the *matsuri* and its supporting organizations.²⁶ But the potential for power to be monopolized at various levels in the *cho*-based organizations mentioned by Kakimoto is not mentioned in this official statement on *matsuri* supporting organizations, and has not been mentioned by any locals outside of Kakimoto.

Perhaps the reason for overlooking this potential for power monopolization is the fact that the positions of authority in the *nenban* umbrella organization as well as those at the *cho*-level, for the most part, do alternate from year to year according to a deliberative process. The question of precisely how leadership is determined, is of course a key one. In addition, the fact that these positions are seen as much as

positions of responsibility as positions of power, with expectations that the burden of responsibility will be broadly shared over the years, may help to deflect critiques of festival organization. There is also the distinct possibility that these festival supporting organizations have become such seemingly natural social institutions that these quintessentially local organizations and the hierarchies that they embody elicit little criticism. However, at this stage in my research, with only limited resources pertaining to the question of local social organization, its relation to the *matsuri*, the local power structure and subjective views of residents, I am limited to speculation on these important questions that relate to larger questions on Japanese culture and identity.

Likely related to the questions above on local social organization and identity tied to local cultural practice in Kishiwada is the question of the relationship between social structure and cultural identity in the larger national discourse on Japanese identity (*Nihonjinron*). In a synthetic work summarizing his earlier work on theories of Japanese uniqueness, commonly subsumed under the heading *Nihonjinron*, Harumi Befu describes how theories on Japanese social structure and group orientation are often argued to be central to the uniqueness of Japanese culture. Befu argues that these essentialist ideas on social structure posit “an ideal type, [where] the group is structured so that all members are selflessly oriented toward the goals of the group. With benevolence and magnanimity, the leader helps, supports, and protects his followers at all times regardless of personal cost. In return, subordinate members are expected to express their uncalculating loyalty and devotion.” Befu cites Nakane Chie as a prominent scholar in this area who posits a theory of group organization where “Japanese are said to achieve harmony by belonging to a hierarchically organized group in which human relations are based on particularism, functional diffuseness, and trust.” And if the tendency has been to stress hierarchy and vertical relationships in these “prescriptive” models of Japanese social structure, Befu also notes more recent theories that expound on the importance of “horizontal ties” and “relationships among equals in organizations,” as well as “the importance of collegiality in Japanese society.”²⁷

Reflecting these contrasting views on the nature of and values inherent in basic patterns of social organization, are contrasting views on the nature of the *kyodotai*, a primordial concept of community that invokes the type of cooperative social organization thought to have emerged from necessity with the advent of wet-field rice cultivation. Jennifer Robertson has noted that *kyodotai* is a loaded term that carries different connotations for different users. For example, “[l]ocalists such as social historian Daikichi Irokawa regard *kyodotai* as ‘the historical basis of Japanese culture and society’ and see in it the operation of democratic procedures and horizontal social relations. Others, such as political scientist Masao Maruyama, insist that the operations of *kyodotai* preclude democratic procedures and circumvent horizontal relations.” Robertson goes on to note that *kyodotai* is a “fetishistic” term that is often invoked “nostalgically” as part of *furusato-zukuri* programs that seek to recreate the cooperative social relations assumed to be inherent in pre-modern agricultural society.²⁸ Such seemingly contradictory positions on both the nature of what could be called the imagined community of the *kyodotai* and the nature of seemingly distinctively Japanese forms of social organization more generally is also reflected in both Western and Japanese scholarship on neighborhood associations or *chonaikai*. And this neighborhood (*cho*) level is precisely the level of social organization at issue in festival organization. Given the diversity of local practice it is likely that definitive answers on the *general* nature of local social organization in Japan are less plausible than definitive answers about the social organization of a particular locale or at best region.

This realization of the primacy of the local in many instances of identity construction, instead of causing despair, should stimulate research on the local, even neighborhood level, which some notable ethnographic research, and the case of the Danjiri Matsuri shows is a basic site for community and identity formation. Indeed, as has been noted earlier, the characteristic that makes the Danjiri Matsuri so

exceptional is that it is in essence an assembly of individual neighborhood processions engaged in a competitive aesthetic and athletic display. Thus it can be said that the collective identity of the city as well as the image projected of the city and the *matsuri* is to a large extent based upon the energy and intensity of a highly localized and ritualized inter-*cho* rivalry. In addition to its presence in local discourse and *matsuri* practice this inter-*cho* rivalry is also discernible in the local landscape. For example the local map in front of Kishiwada Station features the local symbols of all the *cho* of the historical center and contemporary ritual center of Kishiwada as they appear on their respective *happi* (coats) worn at festival time. Furthermore, if one walked through these neighborhoods one would see these local neighborhood symbols displayed on the warehouses storing the neighborhood *danjiri*, on hand held fans (*uchiwu*) displayed in store windows, or any other number of renderings of the *cho*-symbol in any number of interior or exterior sites. There are even vending machines painted in the same design as the *cho-happi* in many of these neighborhoods.

The symbolic landscape of Kishiwada, however, is not confined to these various displays of neighborhood symbols. For instance, the gable of the shopping arcade directly in front of Kishiwada Station (*ekimaedori shotengai*) features a rendering of perhaps the most common graphic representation of Kishiwada, namely a *danjiri* procession in the foreground of Kishiwada Castle. This image captures both the history of Kishiwada as an Edo era castle town and its thriving present as symbolized by the *matsuri*. In many different media such as the Danjiri Museum and countless published accounts the *matsuri* does not only represent a thriving present, but also links contemporary Kishiwada to its history as a castle town or *jokamachi*. The physical traces of local history embedded in the physical landscape have been consciously preserved (or in some cases recovered) and promoted in a manner entirely consistent with recent trends in cultural policy and local attempts at tourism promotion. Hence one can find guide maps detailing points of historic interest dotting the Kishiwada landscape. These points include the preserved Edo era row houses (*machinami*) along the historic highway known as the Kishukaido that led to the *jokamachi* in the Edo era. Other points of interest include the numerous shrines and temples in the general vicinity of the historic *jokamachi*. But the centerpiece of this symbolic landscape is the reconstructed Kishiwada Castle. The castle sits on its original site and houses local cultural artifacts largely consisting of armor, calligraphy, sculptures and paintings that belonged to the Okabe family that ruled Kishiwada from 1640 to the end of the Tokugawa period.

Thus the “symbolic reclamation of the landscape of nostalgia” that Robertson writes of in reference to the attempts of *furusato-zukuri* programs to recreate the imagined ambiance of Tokugawa village life is not limited to merely “sociopsychological” realms, but indeed can be seen in the preserved and reclaimed physical landscapes of places like Kishiwada. Policies aimed at preserving and showcasing the cultural resources of a region, and in the process creating a marketable regional identity, have been part of what has been referred to as the “commodification of culture” increasingly at the center of regional economic and community development policies. In such a political-economic context, cultural resources such as festivals, castles, temples, and traditions of various sorts are of critical importance, and the potential for them to be overexploited in the process of promotion presents serious risks to both communities and the economy.²⁹ Given this broader context of cultural policy and critical voices on the risks inherent in overexploiting cultural resources, the example of Kishiwada which features a Communist Mayor who is also the head of the tourism promotion board should be instructive.

An indication of Mayor Hara Noboru’s politics and his use of local tradition in an era of increasingly cultural based politics and economic development can be seen in a publication summarizing his successful 1993 mayoral election. In an article on the significance of the election, Hara’s opponent Terada Shigeji is accused of running an aggressive and baseless campaign comprised largely of mean spirited anti-Communist messages. And Hara’s victory is portrayed as a victory for the independent and democratic politics of

Kishiwada against the unified political establishment and money politics of greater Osaka. This victory is given even greater significance as providing an opportunity for maintaining a democratic form of community development in Southern Osaka in the context of the runaway development that has occurred in the region as a result of the opening of the Kansai International Airport. In short, Hara's victory is touted as a victory for a citizen based politics founded on openness and trust that is committed to a vision of democratic community development in an age of unbridled and shortsighted development.³⁰

True to this claim of championing a citizens based politics, the 1993 election summary magazine features a variety of posters advertising the numerous policies and facilities for children, women, and the elderly in Kishiwada. Hara's campaign posters and advertisements also feature the mayor as a big supporter of the Danjiri Matsuri. For example, the opening of the Danjiri Museum and the successful protection of the practice of letting the *matsuri* course run along a famous corner for spectators known as the *kan kan* that the Osaka Police had deemed dangerous are both cited as prime examples of Hara's support for the Danjiri Matsuri. Hara's ads also show his belief in the social value of the *matsuri* in creating an active citizenry, especially among the *seinendan*, of whom it is argued are not only central in sustaining the *matsuri* but also in sustaining community development.³¹ Lastly, a popular visual used in many of Hara's campaign ads shows an oversized rendering of the mayor as the archetypal *kaicho*. These images feature Hara in a *yukata*, brandishing an *uchiwa* and riding on the front of a *danjiri* in a sea of faceless *happi* clad residents pulling the *danjiri* in front of Kishiwada Castle. This political imagery essentially inserts a larger than life caricature of an avuncular Hara into the quintessential representation of Kishiwada City, and thus insinuates that Hara is among the dominant fixtures of the city. While I do not agree with the postmodern label used by Robertson, such political symbolism is a clear example of the politics of adroitly deploying evocative symbols tied to various historical periods that Robertson describes.

Despite this presence of a pervasive "postmodern" symbolic politics in both Kodaira and Kishiwada I nevertheless feel that the case of Kishiwada and the Danjiri Matsuri stands in marked contrast to Robertson's subject Kodaira City and its recently invented citizens' festival. For example, Robertson discusses the myth making surrounding the nostalgic redefinition of the despotic founder (Ogawa Kurobei) of the village (Ogawa-*mura*) that Kodaira traces its origins to as a model "self-made man." It is notable that this official representation of Kurobei emerged at the same time that the citizens' festival was inaugurated. Of course, both the citizens' festival and the redefinition of Kurobei were part of Kodaira's mid-1970s *furusato-zukuri* program. And in this political-historical context "Kurobei represents the subjective human agent and personifies the sociohistorical process of village-making. Eulogized as the civic ancestor of all Kodaira residents, Pioneer Kurobei is presented by local historians and city administrators alike as an exemplar for residents to emulate in the quest to reclaim a 'new furusato.'" And through such local myths a spirit of "local, self-initiated action" is invoked for city hall's political project of "'old village'-making."³²

In treating the history of the Danjiri Matsuri I do not suggest that local-history is not recast by local historians in ways that reflect the politics of the present. But the nature of the dominant representations of local history is profoundly different than that discussed by Robertson, and for that matter by Ivy. Again, representations of the history of the Danjiri Matsuri do not represent a dissatisfaction with the present and an imagining of an idealized past, nor do they represent a "fetishistic" attempt at preserving or recovering some lost or "vanishing" traditional cultural practice. A plausible explanation of this difference in historical representations can be gleaned by revisiting Mayor Hara Noboru's political use of the *matsuri* discussed above. In particular the prominent insertion of Hara's likeness in the dominant representation of Kishiwada may suggest more than just a masterful stroke of "postmodern" symbolic politics. If we recall the centrality of the Danjiri Matsuri in local identity and community formation we can postulate that it would be political suicide if not virtually impossible for any mayor to ignore it. Thus it makes perfect sense

that the *matsuri* has been routinely invoked as an asset to or even the spiritual basis of community development projects in a manner that reaffirms the critical position of local tradition in contemporary political culture.

Nevertheless, historical representations of the Danjiri Matsuri cannot be said to reveal a strained, mythologizing, nostalgic attempt to legitimize the political project of reconstructing the ambiance of an idealized Edo era village. Instead historical representations of the Danjiri Matsuri construct a *matsuri* centered local history that highlights the thriving state of the contemporary festival against the various highlights and hardships of the past, duly noting changes in festival practice that accompanied historical change over the years. And, finally, although the adjectives *furusato* and *kokyo* have often been invoked by both local and national media to describe both Kishiwada and the Danjiri Matsuri, Kishiwada has a distinct history as an Edo era castle town. This, of course, further distances Kishiwada from the hegemonic norm of the imagined, ideal Edo era village or any other endangered rustic site associated with dominant notions of *furusato*. This in turn suggests a rich plurality of images and associations, even subjectivities, tied to the hegemonic trope *furusato*. Perhaps it is precisely because the Danjiri Matsuri is a thriving local tradition, a local institution that forms the basis of local community and identity that it has come to have a national stature, and at the same time conjure up associations with *furusato*. This may also explain why the case of the Danjiri Matsuri seems in many ways at odds with the more common, contrived, synthetic aspects of contemporary cultural politics. Furthermore, the fact that the Danjiri Matsuri retains its vitality and its centrality to local identity suggests that publicity, promotion, and national fame need not compromise the legitimacy of local culture, even as it becomes entwined with popular images of tradition and culture writ large in postwar Japan.

The Danjiri Matsuri in Local History

History is much more than the events of the past, it is also our relationship to the past, how our collective past is remembered and forgotten, represented and given meaning. Thus history is as much of the present as of the past. And history is as much about contention and contesting as it is about consensus. This is reflected in contemporary pre-occupations in academia. For example, much current anthropology stresses the need for a historical perspective. On the other hand, historical scholarship is seemingly as concerned with how the past is remembered and represented as it is with the past itself, further evidence of the critical presence of the past in the present and vice versa. Presentism is also apparent in a long-standing conventional aim of history, namely the provision of a narrative account of how we arrived at our present state. Thus if the study of history is so thoroughly intertwined with the present, then a clear understanding of the status quo of the here and now is essential to any historical study. Therefore, although I have the goal of treating the larger postwar history of the Danjiri Matsuri and its local and national significance, I have decided, largely of necessity, to take the present state of the *matsuri* and its contemporary historical representations as a departure point. Since I have discussed the present state of the *matsuri* and suggested its local, even national, significance, I will now treat prominent local accounts of festival history.

The opening of the Danjiri Museum in 1993 further underscores the centrality of the festival to local identity as well as the centrality of local culture in contemporary community development plans. Clearly congruous with this state of affairs is a *matsuri*-centered history of Kishiwada that is featured in a museum publication commemorating the ten-year anniversary of the museum. In his introduction to this commemorative volume Mayor Hara Noboru writes that the museum has helped to provide a fuller understanding of the Danjiri Matsuri, which, although nationally famous is still largely known only as a

spectacle featuring the spectacular *yarimawashi*. The museum has endeavored to remedy this situation by featuring exhibits that include information on all of the *danjiri* in Kishiwada and their supporting *cho*, as well as displays of the beautiful and intricate carvings of the *danjiri* themselves. The museum also has exhibits describing the organization and roles of *matsuri* supporting organizations, in addition to interactive activities designed to provide museum visitors with the opportunity to experience the festival anytime throughout the year. And lastly the museum has sought to relate how the *matsuri* has changed with the times, yet remained a living tradition as it has been handed down through the generations.

This last point is clearly in evidence in the *matsuri*-centered history of the museum's anniversary volume. The official history also puts the festival in a broader temporal and "national" context, describing how changes in festival practice coincided with larger historical developments. As such this history reflects an interaction between local culture and nationally prominent shrines, historical figures, and general cultural and historical trends.

Standard accounts of the history of the Danjiri Matsuri usually trace the origins of the festival to 1703. This is the year when the *daimyo* Okabe Nagayasu is said to have established San no Maru Jinja as a small branch shrine to the Fushimi Inari deity on the castle grounds. Nagayasu then invited the townspeople onto the castle grounds to pray at the shrine. This is often described as a gracious, egalitarian gesture in the context of Tokugawa Japan, which was characterized by a strict social hierarchy and a distancing of the ruling warrior class from the rest of society. The official history of the museum also covers the history of Kishiki Jinja, one of two shrine parishes currently associated with the Danjiri Matsuri, and its predecessor, Gozutennosha. According to shrine records of a resident monk from 1661, Gozutennosha was established in 1362 when Gozutenno (Susa no O) was invited to and enshrined in this new branch shrine from his main shrine, the one and only Yasaka Jinja of Kyoto.

The establishment of Gozutennosha clearly falls within the period of the Northern and Southern Courts (*Nanbokuchō*) as does the founding of the original castle in Kishiwada in 1334, the first year of Kemmu, by founding father Wada Takaie who named the region "Kishi" due to its proximity to the seashore. Although these dates and events are recorded there is no discussion of what connection these events may have had to larger historical events of the period. Given the fact that the Edo era history of the festival is also unclear in many regards, it is quite plausible that a scarcity of documentation is the reason. Nevertheless, taken together with the standard history of the festival that ties the festival to Fushimi Inari Jinja and its resident deity, this account further ties the festival to important national institutions and gods such as Yasaka Jinja and Susa no O (Gozutenno). At the same time this extended narrative suggests the long and rich history of the area.

The narrative then jumps to the warring states (*sengoku*) era and discusses Toyotomi Hideyoshi's nephew, Koide Hidemasa who was overlord from the 1590s to the 1610s. Koide is given credit for modernizing Kishiwada Castle, giving it the stone trapezoid base and towers associated with the grand castles of the Warring States and Edo periods. Koide is also reported to have established a small branch shrine on the castle grounds where simple, solemn rituals are thought to have occurred annually around harvest time. The text briefly refers to Matsudaira Yasushige, Koide's replacement, who oversaw the planning and the start of construction of a new castle town, designed with separate samurai quarters, *machi* (urban), seaside (*bama*), and village (*mura*) divisions in place of the scattered villages that dotted the landscape around the castle. However, in 1640 Matsudaira was deposed by Okabe Norikatsu, the first of thirteen generations of Okabe *daimyo* that ruled Kishiwada throughout the rest of the Tokugawa period. Norikatsu is described as a capable ruler who oversaw the completion of a "modern" castle town plan, the layout of which remains to the present day. And, although the focal point of the castle town, Kishiwada Castle, was struck by lightning and burnt down in 1827, leaving only its stone foundation, it was reconstructed in 1954, reportedly reflecting

the wishes of the people of Kishiwada. Thus we can see how this official narrative uses history to reaffirm the dominant image of Kishiwada: a historical castle town with a thriving traditional *matsuri*. It does this by tracing the origins of the *matsuri* to the towns *jokamachi* past, linking this history to larger historical trends, actors, and institutions, while simultaneously pointing out the physical traces of the past on the contemporary urban landscape.

The earliest *matsuri* on the castle grounds of the early 1700s are said to have been characterized by the presence of popular theater such as *kyogen* and *nivaka* (a form of drama that originated in Osaka in the 1710s). After taking in these popular dramas being performed on the castle grounds at festival time the townspeople would then offer their prayers at Kishiki and San no Maru Shrines.³³ Noting that there is only one source, dating from 1805, that describes the dimensions of the earliest *danjiri*, the narrative next ponders the appearance of these early *danjiri* and how they were used during the festival. The earliest *danjiri* appear to have been merely a simple detachable box on wheels that would have been big enough to carry only one rider. This rider was then presumed to have played *taiko* drum as townspeople paraded around their respective neighborhoods performing traditional dances for the gods prior to entering the castle grounds.

In spite of the emergence of early model *danjiri*, these relatively simple early *matsuri* which were held three times a year, in the sixth, eighth, and ninth months, were still centered on taking in popular plays and worshipping the enshrined deities on the castle grounds. In the sixth month of 1745 however, changes occurred that marked the emergence of a tendency toward extravagance in *matsuri* practice that was initiated by the townspeople and then further stimulated by the *daimyo*. This tendency towards extravagance indicates the continued influence of the culture and festivals of the greater Osaka area and the growing prominence of the *danjiri* in Kishiwada's seasonal *matsuri*. An example of this popular tendency to extravagance in festival practice can be seen in the actions of the commoner Chaya Shinuemon of *Kita-machi*. After seeing a lively urban *matsuri* in Osaka that featured the conspicuous display of paper lanterns that lit up the night, Shinuemon got the idea to hang lanterns from the eaves of individual residences in the neighborhood that would then be lit on the evenings of the eve, and the day of the festival. When the *ban* authorities granted *Kita-machi* permission to hang lanterns other *cho* soon followed suit, thus making the festival a more extravagant, urban event no longer tied strictly to the local castle. And for the festival of the eighth month of that same year, 1745, the *daimyo* Okabe Nagaakira showed his support for this trend toward decoration and beautification by supplying four large flags to decorate the entrances of Kishiki and San no Maru Shrines. He also donated twenty smaller flags and a large *taiko* drum (that is still used at festival time in the *danjiri* of *Miyamoto-cho*) to the townspeople. Following this general tendency toward conspicuous decoration at festival time was the construction of five new ornately decorated *danjiri* in 1746 and the marked proliferation of *danjiri* construction among the various neighborhoods from this period onward. An important similarity with the contemporary *matsuri* that the text notes is the competitive impulse and concomitant increases in spending among the various neighborhoods at this time as they frequently constructed new and larger *danjiri* with increasingly elaborate and intricate carvings.³⁴

This official narrative, then, treats 1745 as a turning point from the earlier and more restrained theater and prayer centered *matsuri* to an increasingly extravagant and popular *danjiri* centered *matsuri*. In tracing the evolution toward a larger and more ornate *danjiri*, the influence of *danjiri* designs from nearby Izumi Ootsu, Sakai, and especially the Tenjin Matsuri of Osaka, which today includes only one *danjiri*, but in 1780 featured 84 *danjiri* are discussed. It is also pointed out that the standard, contemporary three-roof *danjiri* seems to have emerged with the Tenjin Matsuri, and that as early as 1649 the first *danjiri* is said to have appeared in the Tenjin Matsuri. By linking the Danjiri Matsuri to this larger history the official narrative of the Danjiri Museum thus places the Danjiri Matsuri in a league with some of the most prominent traditional *matsuri* in Japan. Even going so far as to suggest that if it were possible to trace the festival to its ultimate origins,

history and geography suggest that it would ultimately lead to the Gion Matsuri.³⁵ It is interesting to note that while this official narrative uses history and supposition to elevate the status of the Danjiri Matsuri by linking it to the great *matsuri* of the region, locals often elevate the status their festival vis-à-vis the Gion Matsuri. This is done by claiming that while the various *cho* of the Gion Matsuri have to hire outside help to stage their *matsuri*, the few outsiders that participate in the Danjiri Matsuri actually pay the same dues as locals for the privilege of participating. And Uchida Yukihiro writes in *Furusato Kishiwada* that the time he and a friend went to see the Gion Matsuri the pace of the festival was so slow as to be boring to someone who was raised in Kishiwada. As a result he and his friend left the Gion Matsuri after only an hour and visited the Toei Eiga Mura (a museum of a leading film production company located in Kyoto).³⁶

To this point the official narrative of the Danjiri Museum may come across as nothing but an idyllic account of how a local festival of national stature developed as an increasingly extravagant citizens' festival with the consent, and even support of the local *daimyo*. However, representations of episodes of *matsuri* history that discuss the regulatory, even suppressive actions of political authorities towards the festival show how the *matsuri* was also an object of contention that brought into clear relief the conflicting values between rulers and ruled. For example, in light of the increasing extravagance and expenditures tied to the performance of the *matsuri*, as early as 1771 *han* authorities enacted numerous economizing measures related to festival practice. Later, in connection with austerity measures tied to financial retrenchment in 1829, the festival was canceled through 1831. And when the festival was resumed in 1832 a new litany of rules and conditions were handed down by the *han* authorities. These new measures stated that the *matsuri* was allowed in 1832 only because there was a bountiful harvest and that the townspeople should not assume that the festival would be permitted from this point forward. The rules also stipulated that the people of each *cho* not spend too lavishly on the festival, nor wear expensive clothes, argue, fight or drink at festival time. Furthermore, townspeople were implored to be punctual for the *mija iri* and to promptly return to their respective *cho* after praying at the castle shrines. The rules also stipulated that the people from other *han* were not allowed to participate, that if a *danjiri* was damaged it was to be reported and then investigated, and any orders from *bakufu* officials that may be present had to be obeyed. Lastly, the townspeople were reminded that outside of festival days no rest from work was permitted. The editors conclude that this tendency toward regulation reflects that this local festival that had emerged as a simple harvest time ritual had evolved to become a festival that reflected the tastes and increased economic power of the townspeople. Likewise, the increasingly larger and more ornate *danjiri* came to symbolize the conflict between the townspeople that desired an increasingly spectacular and expensive *matsuri* and the *han* authorities that sought both control and a more simple and austere festival amid times that grew ever more trying for the increasingly financially burdened ruling samurai class.³⁷

With the fall of the Tokugawa Bakufu the “feudal era” draws to a close, and as Japan undergoes a fundamental transformation, the Danjiri Matsuri too undergoes significant changes. In the fourth year of Meiji (1871) Kishiwada Han is abolished and Kishiwada Ken is established. The following year at a meeting of the *cho* of the *jokamachi* it was decided that the *cho* belonging to the parishes of Kishiki Jinja and Sugawara Jinja (predecessor of Kishiwada Tenmangu), the two shrine parishes of the contemporary Danjiri Matsuri, would hold the *matsuri* on September fourteenth and fifteenth. These dates remain the dates of the contemporary *matsuri*. With the emergence of Kishiwada as a center of textile manufacturing in mid-Meiji, improved economic conditions allowed for a wave of new *danjiri* construction. And as these newer *danjiri* used wooden axles the distinctive creaking sound of wood on wood friction that had been associated with the festival slowly disappeared. This innovation together with improvements in road conditions in Taisho and Showa allowed for *danjiri* speeds to increase. On a more somber note it was in late Meiji, 1903, that a cholera epidemic caused the festival to be canceled. And when someone residing next to the *danjiri*

warehouse for Nanmatsu-*cho* became infected the police ordered the warehouse and the *danjiri* to be incinerated.³⁸

Continuing its chronological sweep through the years the official narrative next treats the early Showa years. Prior to the renovation of Showa Dori, the street that led to Kishiwada Station and is today known as Ekimae Dori, the *matsuri* ran exclusively north and south on the narrow and historic Kishukaido. As a result, *danjiri* processions moving in opposite directions would often come to an impasse and fights would break out over which procession had the right of way. Hence the *kenka matsuri* label. The *matsuri* of this period followed no predetermined route and featured *danjiri* processions in pursuit of or flight from the procession directly ahead or behind, respectively. With the renovation of the Showa Dori, the space in front of the station became a staging and resting area for *danjiri* processions. This space then became a site for displays of bravado and general revelry as the festival music of the various assembled processions filled the air. Renovation of other roads during this period also allowed for more route options besides Showa Dori and the Kishukaido. Lastly in contrast to the frenetic and macho air of the daytime *matsuri* of the early Showa period just described is the slow evening parade of lantern lit *danjiri* of the same period which allowed for the broad participation of the whole community: “men, women, and children of all ages.”³⁹

The history of the *matsuri* of the war years is made problematic by the lack of *nenban* records from the years 1937-1946. However, from the onset of outright hostilities with China from 1937, what had become standard practice with regards to the *matsuri* was drastically altered, and residents had to endure numerous hardships that are reflected in the history of the *matsuri* of this period. For example it was only in 1942, after a five-year suspension of the *matsuri* that police permitted residents hold the *matsuri*, but under the circumstances the festival was little more than an activity to instill a “fighting spirit” in the citizenry. And the following year citizens were compelled to decorate their *danjiri* with wartime slogans and caricatures of Roosevelt and Churchill. The editors add that such perversions to standard festival practice are something surely unimaginable to contemporary residents. Lastly, unquestionably the most poignant episode recounted in this official narrative, and one that boldly suggests the centrality of the festival and the *danjiri* itself for local identity, occurred in 1944. At this late stage of the war it is said that the residents of each *cho* sought and received permission to taxi soldiers departing for the front to Kishiwada Station by *danjiri*. Thus as they were pulled to the station accompanied by shouts of “*banzai!*” the whole way, the soldiers had the opportunity to ride the beloved *danjiri* that they may never see again. Since the experience of war completely transformed Japanese society, it is only natural that it would also profoundly effect the festival. Nevertheless, it is said that even during the years that the *matsuri* was prohibited, residents of the various *cho* would take out their *danjiri* and parade them through their respective neighborhoods. The only year that the *danjiri* were not paraded at all was 1945, when the festival would have been scarcely a month after surrender.⁴⁰

This official narrative provides a rather brief treatment of the postwar festival. The text describes the enthusiasm of young demobilized soldiers in 1946 enjoying the freedom of release from wartime discipline and energetically competing with other *cho* as they paraded down roads that were only a year ago evacuation routes.⁴¹ Though likely true, as far as it goes, this brief account is incomplete in that it does not capture the complexity of the earliest years of the occupation, nor the uncertainty of the future of the *matsuri* at this time.

To fill this gap in the official history it is necessary to turn to the *City History of Kishiwada*, the *Kishiwada shi shi*. The *City History* tells of an episode from 1948 relating to orders from the occupation authorities to burn *danjiri*, again dealing with Nanmatsu-*cho*. This was a transitional period when the traditional local administrative organizations at the neighborhood level, the *chonaikai* were abolished by government order on May 3, 1947. And in the case of Nanmatsu-*cho* the *seinendan* had taken control of *cho* assets including

financial assets, the neighborhood meeting hall, and *danjiri*. However, the local head of the Red Cross, an organization that occupation authorities planned to use to reform local administration in the wake of *chonaikai* dissolution, was a Nanmatsu resident and claimed that according to orders from Osaka occupation authorities, all *cho* records and the neighborhood *danjiri* were to be destroyed. As local residents were suspicious of these orders the titular head of the *cho*, the *seinendancho*, Takabayashi, went to the Osaka headquarters of the occupation authorities on September 12, 1948 to determine the authenticity of these orders. When it was learned that these orders to destroy the *danjiri* were real, he quickly returned to Kishiwada and convened an emergency meeting with the Kishiwada police chief and the *seinendan* of all the various *cho*. The decision arrived at during this hastily convened assembly was to once more plea to the occupation authorities in Osaka to rescind the traumatizing order.

On the following day Takabayashi returned to the Osaka headquarters and obtained an interview. It is recorded that the Osaka Police Chief as well as a highly competent and empathetic Japanese American (*Nisei*) interpreter were present. As a result of the presence of the *Nisei* officer it is reported that Takabayashi was able to argue his case as to the importance of the festival as a local tradition in convincing detail. The Commanding Officer then revealed that the order was issued in accordance with a one time order from General MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) ordering the prohibition of festivals related to both Shinto Shrines and Buddhist Temples. It was also revealed that the conventional wisdom at GHQ was that contributions solicited from residents to support local *matsuri* were thought to be antithetical to democracy. However, the Commanding Officer conceded that on the understanding that the *seinanden* strive to become a sound organization that the *matsuri* would be allowed to continue as a "recreational" activity. It is revealed that recalling such episodes of the hardships of war, defeat, and occupation, including the loss of the *danjiri* of Nakanohama-*cho*, in an air raid in 1945, is enough to send a shiver up the spine of the *danjiri* loving residents of Kishiwada.⁴²

The coverage of the postwar in the official narrative also mentions the emergence of reforms that dramatically transformed what had come to be known as a dangerous, "bloody," "*kenka matsuri*." For example the establishment of a one way *danjiri* course in 1958, and the installation of brakes on all *danjiri* from 1959-1960, are cited as key elements in enabling the Danjiri Matsuri to fully "come back to life" in the postwar.⁴³ The narrative next discusses the tremendous postwar growth in the number of *danjiri* outside of the historic center of the city. It is revealed that from the 1950s through the period of high economic growth that lasted to the early 1970s that the *matsuri* was often critiqued as a feudal remnant that was best to abstain from. Furthermore, this period of high economic growth is said to have neglected local society and thus saw the breakdown of the "*kyodotai*" as agriculture declined and youth left the rural areas to work in the cities. As a result of this state of affairs, by the 1970s the more rural areas of Kishiwada saw a surge in *danjiri* acquisitions as more and more neighborhoods came to participate in the various October Danjiri Matsuri in the outlying regions.⁴⁴

In conclusion I feel that this official history of the Danjiri Museum, though hardly apolitical, nevertheless presents a counternarrative to the dominant narrative of nostalgic loss and recovery, and "fetishization" so popular in English language studies dealing with tradition and cultural identity in postwar Japan. The official narrative of the Danjiri Museum more or less describes how the festival changed with the times, and does not reflect an idealistic account of an imagined past that reflects a dissatisfaction with the present that is also prevalent argument in many treatments of tradition and contemporary Japanese cultural identity. And as mentioned earlier, it is the seemingly commonsensical understanding that tradition can change with the times and still remain viable that is conspicuously absent in some of the more prominent narratives outlined above. Clearly the Danjiri Matsuri can be seen as an example of the commodification of culture in the broader contemporary political economic context of local tradition based tourism and

community development. However, this does not change the fact that the Danjiri Matsuri is a thriving tradition that is the source of local community and identity. Furthermore, I believe that it is precisely because it is a thriving tradition capable of sustaining a strong local identity that the Danjiri Matsuri has come to national attention and thus made it a natural object of promotion and commodification. This in turn is likely related to fact that countless localities have sought to manufacture their own local traditions at the same time that the Danjiri Matsuri has come to national attention. However too much focus on invented traditions and “fetishistic” and nostalgic attempts at recovery of the “losses” that have accompanied modernization has obscured the fact that there still are thriving, viable, and, I would add, authentic local traditions in contemporary Japan. Furthermore, these traditions likely serve as inspiration in times when cultural authenticity is arguably in crisis, and would therefore seem to be the proverbial “other side of the coin,” of the dominant loss and recovery narrative. Therefore a more complete understanding of contemporary culture and identity necessitates an understanding of the thriving, and more or less, legitimate and authentic traditions in contemporary Japan. Lastly, to further enhance our understanding of the connections between the national and local in the area of cultural identity, and how various local traditions have come to national attention, there needs to more work done in the fields of cultural policy and media studies. Further work on the social history of local organizations such as *chonaikai* is also crucial in this regard.

Notes

- 1 Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 9-11.
- 2 *Ibid.*, p. 241.
- 3 For example the research of Peter Nosco on prominent *kokugaku* (nativist) scholars of the eighteenth century clearly demonstrates that nostalgic attempts at recovering an authentic Japanese essence not corrupted by foreign influences need not be a reaction to the modern West. Thus Nosco writes that the *urusato* and Edo booms of the 1980s “are not the first time that patriotic and nostalgic constructions have existed side by side in Japan.” Peter Nosco, *Remembering Paradise: Nativism and Nostalgia in Eighteenth Century Japan*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. ix-x.
- 4 Jennifer Robertson, *Native and Newcomer: Making and Remaking a Japanese City*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 26.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 9 In a chapter from the volume *Kokyo no soshitsu to saisei* historian Narita Ryuichi, like Ivy and Robertson, discusses the nostalgia-laden politicization and commercialization of *kokyo* (*urusato*) that accompanied (perhaps even prompted) feelings of loss and an impulse to recover one’s (often surrogate) native place in the late 1960s. However, Narita provides much-needed historical context in his account of the modern historical development of the *kokyo* idea. He traces how a *kokyo* consciousness emerged, grew, and changed with Japan’s urbanizing trajectory from early Meiji. Narita describes how people formed native place associations (*dokyokai*) as they migrated to the cities, and how sharing news of the native community, and a shared knowledge of the native landscape, dialect, and history formed the basis for a modern *kokyo* consciousness. He then describes how an abstract and nostalgic *kokyo* ideal pervaded numerous forms of popular culture from Taisho, and then became conflated with the nation as Japan became increasingly consumed in empire building and finally war. In addition to this historical outline, Narita also asserts the important subjective images and meanings of *urusato* in shaping individual identities. Lastly, Narita makes an important yet often overlooked point on the nature of nostalgia. Namely that people often feel nostalgic towards times that were hard in a reflective, bittersweet manner that gives meaning to the present while valorizing the struggles of the past. These points on the

- historical, regional, and subjective aspects of *kokyo* fill significant gaps in the English language literature on the topic. Narita Ryuichi, “Toshi kukan to ‘kokyo,’” in Narita Ryuichi, eds., *Kokyo no sosbitsu to saisei*, (Tokyo: Seikyusha, 2000).
- 10 Ronald A. Morse, “Yanagita Kunio, and the Modern Japanese Consciousness,” in J. Victor Koschman, Oiwa Keibo, and Yamashita Shinji eds., *International Perspectives on Yanagita Kunio and Japanese Folklore Studies*, (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1985), p. 12.
- 11 Theodore C. Bestor, *Neighborhood Tokyo*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1989).
- 12 It is important to note that Robertson’s critique of the incongruity of certain elements of the citizens’ festival of Kodaira City is her own and does not reflect the opinion of a local resident. Eyal Ben-Ari, on the other hand, cites local voices when describing the “discomfort many people feel with the synthetic creation of traditional practices in inappropriate contexts.” Eyal Ben-Ari, “Contested Identities and Models of Action in Japanese Discourses of Place-Making,” in Joy Hendry ed., *Interpreting Japanese Society: Anthropological Approaches*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 83-84. As opposed to problems of inauthenticity with invented traditions, Scott Schnell discusses how perceptions of excesses in innovation and promotion of a long-standing festival can cause some members in the ritual community to fear that the authenticity of local tradition is being compromised. Schnell, however makes the argument that such subjective views may overlook the historicity of local tradition and how not just the practice but also the function of local tradition changes with time, while still representing the agency and the needs of a younger generation of festival practitioners. Scott Schnell, *The Rousing Drum: Ritual Practice in a Japanese Community*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), pp. 288-289.
- 13 Keiko Ikeda, “*Kenka Matsuri*: Fighting with Our Gods in Postindustrial Japan,” in Susan Orpett Long ed., *Lives in Motion: Composing Circles of Self and Community in Japan*, (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1999), p. 123.
- 14 For example an interview with Izutsu Kazayuki, director of the first movie in the *Kishiwada Shonen Gurentai* series, tells of the gap in Izutsu’s expectations and then his impressions of the festival after he witnessed it when doing site research prior to filming. Izutsu relates how he is not really a fan of *matsuri*, and did not expect much from the Danjiri Matsuri, but was in the end deeply impressed. But it was not just the speed and aggressive energy that was impressive. Izutsu was shocked at how the *matsuri* united disparate generations. He cited the fact that even rough looking teenagers would respectfully listen to adults of authority when they were told to move from dangerous locations along the festival course. Lastly Izutsu noted that the Danjiri Matsuri is not just something you see, but given the fact that you may have to flea a careening *danjiri*, it is indeed something you experience, “*Intabyuu, bakuryoku ha mochiron furyoppoi wakamonotachi no ittaikan*,” in *Nippon no matsuri* no. 13 (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 2004), p. 13. The very fact that Izutsu’s movie sparked a whole series of movies set in the 1970s about young hoodlums from Kishiwada suggests that Kishiwada has a distinct character and special appeal to media producers and consumers. Furthermore, the danger and violence associated with the city and by extension the *matsuri*, especially in the films by the prolific, innovative, and controversial Miike Takashi, reveals an honest and bittersweet nostalgia for 1970s Osaka. Furthermore, this palpable nostalgia for the recent past is conspicuous in its absence in the scholarly literature on nostalgia in Japan that is largely confined to a treatment of a nostalgia for a distant and idealized imagined past. This is a central topic in my larger research project, but exceeds the focus of this paper.
- 15 It must be noted that outsiders, typically friends of a resident that wants to share the festival experience, are often invited to participate in the *matsuri*. This, seemingly recent, practice thus underscores the symbolic, and somewhat porous, nature of these boundaries that set the community apart from the larger society, as well as the appeal participating in a thriving traditional festival has for people outside the physical boundaries of a particular festival community.
- 16 For the importance of boundaries based on forms of local knowledge or local social practice such as a local tradition in constructing a symbolic community see Ikeda, op. cit., and Anthony Paul Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, (Chicester: Ellis Horwood Limited, and London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 1985).
- 17 This *cho*-centered nature of the festival is revealed in a section on the Danjiri Matsuri and community in a policy publication related to local problems and community development issues. In enumerating the defining characteristics of the Danjiri Matsuri (which are curiously paralleled by an outsider’s impressionistic account of the festival) it is stated that the tradition (*dento*) that is the Danjiri Matsuri is maintained through the agency of the residents of the various neighborhoods. Thus as active subjects,

through the *matsuri* these residents express the pride and love they feel for their respective neighborhoods, and in the process reveal their true identity in an explosive display of competitive spirit that unites the city and expresses its collective identity. It is notable that according to the outsider's account of the Danjiri Matsuri, the festival itself conjured up images and associations with *furusato*. Osaka jichitai mondai kenkyusho, *Sorya Kishiwada: dento to benkaku no machi*, (Tokyo: Jichitai kenkyu sha, 1993), p. 35, 39. Similar points on how competition, even contention and conflict can create community and, in the process, civic identity are made by William Rowe in his study of late imperial Hankow. Particularly relevant to the issue at hand is his treatment of the summertime Dragon Boat Festival that was an occasion for general working class revelry as well as competition among the numerous ethnically based dockworker guilds. Rowe writes: "Even as it strengthened neighborhood and work-group boundaries, the Dragon Boat Festival reinforced local residents' sense of Hankow as a social unit. Although extremely competitive, the races were organized and enjoyed on a municipalitywide scale; they were a celebration by and for the city. Intergroup contention in Hankow was itself a key form of social intergration." Rowe continues: "Had local subcommunities been able to regard each other with complete indifference and passivity, an urban community could not have come into existence. In the event, systematic bonds of antagonism and competition held them together." William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 206.

18 Ikeda, op. cit., p. 121.

19 Uchida Yukihiko, *Furusato Kishiwada*, (Hannan: Nakaishoten, 2003), p. 143.

20 On festival music as a sign of summer in Kishiwada, as well as inspiring a "festival frame of mind" among residents see, Takami Masao, "Danjiri hayashi," in *Yokoso Kishiwada Danjiri Matsuri*, (Kishiwada: Danjiri sairei nenban, 2003), pp. 46-47, and Koshino Junko, "Matsuri no daigomi: hiru no'ugoki'to yoru no 'shizuka,' happi sugata no utskushisa," in *Nippon no matsuri* no. 13 (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 2004), pp. 4-5.

21 Yorozyua Seiji, "Edo jidai no Danjiri matsuri," in *Yokoso Kishiwada Danjiri Matsuri*, (Kishiwada: Danjiri sairei nenban, 2003), p. 44.

22 Uchida, op. cit., pp. 146-147.

23 For example the famous fashion designer and Kishiwada native Koshino Junko wrote of how a *danjiri* crashing into her family's Western-style clothing store became an event that her mother would retell for years to come, Koshino, op. cit., p. 5. And in an interview with a Kishiwada local I learned that interested individuals of a particular *cho* meet at the neighborhood *danjiri* storehouse monthly to dust the carvings on the *danjiri*, drink, and share old stories of past *matsuri*. In short, these anecdotes and those mentioned previously closely parallel the "master metaphor" narrative of festival and community identity put forward by Ikeda. Of such a "distinctive social and moral world" Ikeda writes: "In the everyday discourse of the members of the festival community, we hear 'festival talk' all the time. References to the festival calendar, such as 'Not much longer to the Festival,' are the most appropriate greeting among community members. And each festival is rich with unique episodes and events: fights, accidents large or small, unusually beautiful performances by one's own or another's team, memorable moments of friendship shared with teammates, or introspection about things that went wrong. Whenever they get together, people ruminate over festival experiences, talking about them again and again. There is no end to anecdotes related to the festival. In the telling of these stories, remembrances of festival episodes become markers of historical time, and the telling itself perpetuates community memories. Lifecourse and festival events often become intertwined to the extent that people organize their personal experiences in relation to specific festivals." Ikeda, op. cit., p. 129.

24 Ibid., p. 121.

25 Tsuchitani Susumu, "Danjiri Matsuri ha ningen keisei no dojo," in *Yokoso Kishiwada Danjiri Matsuri*, (Kishiwada: Danjiri sairei nenban, 2003), p. 1.

26 Kishiwada kanko shinko kyokai, *Kishiwada danjiri: Kishiwada danjiri kaikan kaikan jushunenn kinenshi*, (Kishiwada: Kishiwadashi kanko shinko kyokai, 2003), pp. 6-7.

27 Harumi Befu, *Hegemony of Homogeneity*, (Melbourne: Transpacific Press, 2001), pp. 22-23, 78.

28 Robertson, op. cit., p. 89.

29 Tanaka Shigeru has noted the tendency for community and city development in contemporary Japan to be based on a unique and defining aspect of local culture. He also provides a historical sociological outline of how such particular cultures developed.

- Tanaka suggests that the unique local cultures in the central cities of each *han* of the Tokugawa period emerged as the result of an interaction between a “patron culture” and a “market culture.” The former was determined most often by the religious orientation of the *daimyo*, who in either promoting or suppressing certain doctrines and practices played a large role in determining the general moral and cultural orientation of the castle town. The latter refers to an improved transportation and communication network that emerged in the Tokugawa period and thus exposed commoners to diverse cultural practices and products from other regions. This in turn led to adaptations and innovations in local culture.
- 30 Kishiwada minshushisei o susumerukai, *Kishiwada no ikioi aki: 1993 nen Kishiwada shicho senkyo no kiroku*, (Osaka: Kansai kyodo inshojo, 1994), pp. 14-16.
- 31 Ibid., p. 84.
- 32 Robertson, op. cit., pp. 85, 103-104.
- 33 Kishiwada kanko shinkokyokai, op. cit., p. 120.
- 34 Ibid., pp. 121-122.
- 35 Ibid., p. 122.
- 36 Uchida, op. cit., p. 146.
- 37 Kishiwada kanko shinko kyokai, op. cit., p. 123. It is notable that this historical view of local culture in the Tokugawa period neatly parallels the view outlined by Tanaka. For example the origins of the festival in the actions of the *daimyo* and commoners subsequent adaptations in festival practice towards extravagance based on outside influences, which was then reciprocated by the *daimyo* Nagaakira shows the complex interaction of “patron” and “market” in the construction of local culture. Furthermore, the later divergent tendencies toward extravagance and simplicity of the commoners and *han* authorities respectively, also parallels Tanaka’s theorization of a model “patron” culture based on Confucian austerity and a model “market” culture based on luxury and the world of the *ukiyo-e*. See Tanaka, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
- 38 Kishiwada kanko shinko kyokai, op. cit., pp. 124-125.
- 39 Ibid., pp. 125-126.
- 40 Ibid., p. 126.
- 41 Ibid., p. 127.
- 42 Kishiwada shi shi hen san iinkai, *Kishiwada shi shi, dai go kan*, (Kyoto: Kawakita insatsu kabushiki gaisha, 1977), pp. 559-560.
- 43 Kishiwada kanko shinko kyokai, op. cit., p. 126.
- 44 Ibid., p. 128. Such resurgence and the characterization of the period of high economic growth as a period that saw the neglect of local society and culture closely parallels the argument of Tanaka. And the arguably “fetishistic” reference to *kyodotai* reflects the insights of Robertson on postwar traditional culture. Though I would argue that the revival of the Danjiri Matsuri in the outlying regions of the ritual center of the *jokamachi* is qualitatively different than the wholesale invention of a citizens’ festival in Kodaira.